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TIIVISTELMÄ
Väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan kansalaiskasvatuksen koulutuspolitiikkaa Venäjällä ja Suo-
messa. Se suhteutetaan Euroopan Neuvoston (EN) ja YK:n kasvatus-, tiede- ja kulttuu-
rijärjestön (UNESCO) muovaamaan ylikansallisen kansalaiskasvatuksen retoriikkaan. 
Tutkimukselle on asetettu kaksi tehtävää: se tulkitsee ylikansallista kansalaiskasvatuk-
sen politiikkaa ja analysoi Venäjän ja Suomen kansalaiskasvatuksen koulutuspolitiikkaa 
1980-luvun puolivälistä vuoteen 2007. Lisäksi tutkimuksessa vertaillaan ylikansallista ja 
kansallista kansalaisuuskasvatusta. Tutkimus keskittyy makrotason analyysiin ja tutki-
musaineiston muodostavat venäläiset ja suomalaiset koulutuspoliittiset asiakirjat sekä 
kahden kansainvälisen järjestön viralliset dokumentit. Koulutuspolitiikan tavoitteita ja 
niitä oikeutettavia argumentteja analysoidaan retoriikan ja ’politiikka diskurssina’ lä-
hestymistapojen avulla. Kontrastoiva vertailu auttaa ymmärtämään molempien kansal-
listen kontekstien erityspiirteitä ja helpottaa koulutuspolitiikan tavoitteiden tulkintaa. 
Venäjän ja Suomen valinta tutkimuksen kohteiksi pohjautuu maiden erilaisiin valtio-
malleihin ja kansalaisuuden traditioihin. EN:n ja UNESCO:n koulutuspolitiikan tar-
kastelun taustalla on puolestaan pyrkimys tulkita ylikansallista koulutushallintaa, joka 
kasvavassa määrin tuottaa toimintamalleja kansalliselle tasolle. 
Tutkimuksen keskiössä on valtion ja valtiollisen koulutusjärjestelmän puitteissa 
harjoitetun kansalaiskasvatuksen keskinäinen suhde murroskautena 1980–2000. Tässä 
kontekstissa kansalaiskasvatus nähdään ensisijaisesti valtiovallan uudelleen legitimoin-
nin välineenä. Samaan aikaan kansalaiskasvatusta lähestytään eräänlaisena ikkunana 
yhteiskunnan laajempiin kehityslinjoihin, kuten valtion, kansalaisuuden ja kansallisuu-
den välisten suhteiden ja näiden käsitteiden sisältöjen muutoksiin. 1980-luvun puolivä-
listä alkaen sekä Venäjällä että Suomessa on koettu merkittäviä valtioon ja kansakuntaan 
vaikuttaneita yhteiskunnallisia mullistuksia. Neuvostoliiton romahdettua Venäjä on 
pyrkinyt löytämään uusia tapoja kansallisen yhtenäisyyden ylläpitämiseksi, valtioval-
lan uudelleen rakentamiseksi ja maan kansainvälisen aseman parantamiseksi. Suomessa 
puolestaan Euroopan yhdentyminen ja lisääntyvä maahanmuutto ovat asettaneet muu-
tospaineita kansalaisuudelle ja kansalliselle identiteetille.
Euroopan Neuvoston ja UNESCO:n asiakirjojen analyysi osoittaa, etteivät nämä 
järjestöt noudata yhtä kansalaiskasvatuksen mallia. Perinteisestä kansallisen kansa-
laiskasvatuksen mallista poiketen ne edistävät kansalaisten kriittistä ajattelua, aktiivis-
ta osallistumista politiikkaan ja ihmisoikeuksien ensisijaisuutta. Järjestöt ottavat myös 
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kantaa monikulttuurisuuden puolesta ja näkevät kansalaisuuden monitasoisena käsit-
teenä, joka koostuu sekä paikallisesta että globaalista ulottuvuudesta. Järjestöt liittävät 
kansalaisen oikeudet ja velvollisuudet alueelliseen tai globaaliin kansalaisuuteen, eivätkä 
ne rajaa niitä ainoastaan kansallisvaltion sisälle. Siten järjestöt erottavat kansalaisuuden 
kansallisuudesta ja edistävät kansalaisuuden uudelleen muotoutumista. Kansainväliset 
järjestöt perustuvat valtioidenvälisiin suhteisiin ja niiden historia on vahvasti sidoksis-
sa kansallisvaltioiden nousuun. Tämä tuottaa niiden kansalaiskasvatukseen ristiriitoja 
ja kansallisen kansalaiskasvatuksen mallin mukaisen retoriikan yllättävää toistamista 
esimerkiksi silloin, kun järjestöt määrittelevät yhteiskunnan ensisijaisesti alueellisesti 
rajatuksi kansallisvaltioksi. Järjestöjen dokumenteissa myös korostetaan kansallisten 
instituutioiden ensisijaisuutta kansalaiskasvatuksen toteutuksessa.
Venäjän kansalaiskasvatuksessa kansainvälisten järjestöjen mukaisia sisältöjä esiin-
tyi vain 1990-luvun alkupuolella, jolloin kansallisen yhtenäisyyden ylläpitäminen ja 
kansalaisia yhdistävän kansallisen identiteetin rakentaminen eivät vielä olleet merkittä-
viä poliittisia tavoitteita. Siinä vaiheessa etusijalla oli Neuvostoliiton aikaisen poliittisen 
kasvatuksen purkaminen ja uuden kansalaiskasvatuksen kehittäminen. Sen keskeisiä ta-
voitteita olivat kansalaisoikeudet, lainsäädännön tunteminen ja lainkuuliaisuus oikeus-
valtion rakentamisen nimissä. Kansallisten arvojen ja identiteetin osalta viranomaiset 
painottivat yleismaailmallisten arvojen tärkeyttä ja alueellisten kansallisten identiteet-
tien vahvistamista. 1990-luvun lopulta alkaen kansalaiskasvatuksen tavoitteet ovat 
muuttuneet perustavanlaatuisesti. Valtiovalta korostaa kansalaisten uskollisuutta Venä-
jän valtiota kohtaan ja alleviivaa tätä kautta keskeistä asemaansa kansalaiskasvatuksen 
koulutuspolitiikan määrittämisessä. Isänmaallisuuskasvatuksen ohjelmat ovat 2000-lu-
vun alusta lähtien korostaneet alistumista aktiivisen osallistumisen sekä konsensusta 
mielipiteiden monimuotoisuuden sijaan. Yksilöllisen identiteetin asemasta etusija anne-
taan kollektiiviselle identiteetille. 
Vielä 1980-luvulla suomalaisen kansakunnan elinvoimaisuus liitettiin kansallisval-
tion suvereniteettiin. Uusimmissa asiakirjoissa korostetaan sen sijaan kansallisen kult-
tuurin keskeistä roolia kansallisen identiteetin lähteenä. Kun Suomi palaa kansakunnan 
kulttuuriseen tulkintaan, se samalla purkaa kansakunnan ja valtion sekä kansallisuuden 
ja kansalaisuuden välistä suhdetta. Tämä kulttuurinen käännös on tullut väistämättö-
mäksi Suomen pyrkiessä säilyttämään kansallisen identiteettinsä ja legitimiteettinsä 
globalisoituvassa maailmassa. Kansalaisuuden ja kansallisuuden vahvan yhteyden pur-
kaminen avaa mahdollisuuden yhdistää uudella tavalla käsitykset kansalaisuudesta ja 
kansallisesta identiteetistä. Toisaalta tässäkin mallissa kansallinen taso nähdään ytime-
nä ja muiden tasojen lähtökohtana. 
Historiallisista ja yhteiskuntapoliittisista eroistaan huolimatta sekä Suomi että Venäjä 
antavat edelleen suuren arvon kansalaisuudelle ja kansalliselle identiteetille. Venäjä on 
1990-luvun lopulta lähtien lujittanut kansalaisuuden ja kansallisuuden suhdetta. Se on 
näin siirtynyt valtionationalismin tielle. Samalla monitasoisen kansalaisuuden rakenta-
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minen kansainvälisten järjestöjen mallin mukaisesti muuttuu yhä mahdottomammaksi. 
Suomi on sen sijaan alkanut purkaa valtion ja kansakunnan vahvaa historiallista sidettä 
ja painottaa yhä selkeämmin kansallisen identiteetin kulttuurista ulottuvuutta euroop-
palaistumisen rinnalla. 
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SUMMARY
This doctoral dissertation studies citizenship education policies in Finland and Russia 
in relation to the supranational citizenship education rhetoric shaped by two large 
intergovernmental organizations, the Council of Europe (COE) and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The research pursues 
two broad research aims. First, to understand the supranational agenda of citizenship 
education, and second, to analyse citizenship education policies in Russia and Finland 
since the mid 1980s up to 2007, and to compare them to the supranational agenda of 
citizenship education. The dissertation is concerned with the macro level and thus 
the research data comprises policy documents issued by the Russian and Finnish 
state authorities, and the two intergovernmental organisations. The analysis of policy 
content draws on the rhetorical and policy-as-discourse approaches in order to elucidate 
the objectives of citizenship education, as well as the arguments employed to justify 
the proposed objectives throughout the studied period. Individualising comparison 
enhances the interpretative task of the dissertation, as it increases the visibility of one 
national context by contrasting it with another, and therefore helps to find adequate 
explanations to particular policy outcomes. In selecting Russia and Finland as the two 
national case studies, the dissertation concentrates on countries embedded in different 
state models and citizenship traditions. The main motivation behind the selection of the 
COE and UNESCO is to acknowledge and analyse the rising supranational educational 
governance, which increasingly provides models for and restrictions on actions and 
policies at national level. 
The study is particularly interested in the relationship between the state and 
citizenship education in public schooling at the time of state (re)formation and nation 
(re)building. Citizenship education is perceived as a means to legitimise and maintain 
state power unsettled in periods of political changes. Equally, citizenship education 
offers a prism through which to examine larger processes in a given society, in particular, 
changes in the relationship between the state, citizenship and nationality, and possible 
modifications in the meanings of these essential socio-political categories. For the 
national cases examined in the dissertation the period since the second half of the 1980s 
has been rich in political changes related to, and leaving their mark on, the state and 
the nation. Whereas since the collapse of the Soviet regime Russia has striven to find 
ways to regenerate national cohesion, rebuild statehood and reconsolidate its status in the 
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international arena, Finland has attempted to adjust its national identity and citizenship 
to European integration and increasing immigration.
The analysis of the COE and UNESCO reveals that there is no one modality of 
citizenship education embraced by the examined supranational actors. On one hand, in 
clear contrast to the traditional model of citizenship education, they advocate proactive 
political participation, critical scrutiny of state institutions and action against the 
state on the basis of universal human rights. They also promote diversity and perceive 
citizenship as a multilayered concept extending to the local, national, regional and global 
levels. Instead of linking rights and duties to membership in a territorially demarcated 
polity of the nation-state, the COE and UNESCO often advocate the notion of human 
rights and link rights and duties to the global humanity. In this manner, supranational 
organisations decouple citizenship from nationality and, by doing so, advance the post-
nationalisation of citizenship. On the other hand, the intergovernmental character of 
the organisations and their origin embedded in the consolidation of the nation-state 
system lead to inconsistencies in the agenda and somewhat surprising repetition of the 
traditional citizenship rhetoric, for instance, in linking society narrowly to the territorially 
demarcated nation-state. The supranational agenda also continues to emphasise the key 
role of national governments in implementing citizenship education and therefore still 
posits the nation-state as a central player in education policy and practice.
The Russian case exemplified convergence with the post-national supranational 
citizenship education rhetoric only during the first half of the 1990s when the new 
country leaders did not pay serious attention to regenerating national cohesion and 
building an all-embracing national identity. In this period, preference was given to 
the de-legitimation of the Soviet type of political education, and slightly later to the 
development of citizenship education policies stressing citizens’ rights, knowledge of 
the legislation and lawful conduct for the purpose of building a constitutional state. In 
terms of national identity, the authorities advocated a vague category of universal human 
values and encouraged the re-consolidation of sub-state national identities. Toward the 
end of the 1990s, the contents of citizenship education policies shifted radically. The state 
has re-emphasised its leading role in defining citizenship education policies with the 
main objective to craft citizens’ loyalty to the Russian state. The programmes of patriotic 
education, which appeared in the beginning of the 2000s, prioritise subordination over 
active participation, consensus over pluralism, duties over rights and collective identity 
over an individual one. 
Compared to the mid 1980s, when citizenship education in Finland was premised 
on the idea that the vitality of the Finnish nation is invariably linked to the sovereignty 
of the Finnish state, the latest curricula documents stress national culture as the prime 
source of national integrity. In its return to a predominantly cultural understanding 
of the nation, Finland exemplifies the debundling of the state and the nation, and 
nationality and citizenship. The transformation into a Kulturnation is a necessary step 
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to secure Finland’s national being in a globalising world, which transforms and weakens 
state sovereignty, without putting the legitimacy of the Finnish nation into question. 
The decoupling of nationality and citizenship opens up the possibility for a multilayered 
conceptualisation of both citizenship and nationhood. However, the national still 
constitutes the core, with the sub- and supranational layers as additional ingredients of 
the emerging citizenship recipe. 
Despite major differences in their historical and current socio-political contexts, 
Russia and Finland continue to attach strong value to national identity and national 
citizenship. However, whereas Russia, since the late 1990s, has moved in the direction of 
state nationalism and a closer bond between the nation and the state, which preclude any 
possibility for a multilayered conception of citizenship, Finland has forsaken a previously 
strong link between the state and the nation and seems to be strengthening its cultural 
identity in peaceful alliance with Europeanness.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In a multidisciplinary and comparative manner this doctoral dissertation explores 
citizenship education in the system of compulsory schooling. The general question 
posed throughout the dissertation is Why is citizenship education policy what it is? This 
question is studied in three different contexts: Russia, Finland and the supranational 
level as represented by the Council of Europe (hereafter COE) and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (hereafter UNESCO). The research 
pursues a twofold analytical agenda: 
1. To identify and interpret the supranational agenda of citizenship education. 
2. To identify and interpret citizenship education policies in Russia and Finland 
since the mid 1980s up to 2007, and to compare them to the supranational agenda 
of citizenship education. 
In particular, the dissertation examines the content and objectives of political and national 
socialisation, henceforth referred to as citizenship education (see Chapter 3). These state-
initiated educational endeavours aim to consolidate the bond between the citizen and 
the state – the political apparatus and the cultural community. The dissertation is 
premised on the assumption that the objectives of citizenship education shed light on the 
principles of the state, whereas citizenship education cannot be properly analysed if the 
analysis is abstracted from the cultural, historical and political context. This is what the 
present study is essentially about: it examines the state through the prism of citizenship 
education and interprets citizenship education objectives in relation to the state. 
The dissertation focuses on the relationship between citizenship education and the 
polity at the time of political change. More specifically, it explores the effects of state (re)
formation and nation (re)building on the revision and redefinition of citizenship, national 
identity and education in Russia and Finland since the mid 1980s. In both countries 
this period has been rich in political changes related to and leaving their mark on the 
state and the nation. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia has striven to find ways to 
regenerate national cohesion and rebuild its statehood within reshuffled borders and 
consistent with the new political ideologies of liberal democracy and market economy, 
as well as a yet ambiguous idea of the new Russian national identity. However, the 
reconfiguration of national imaginary and the development of new political institutions 
occur amidst controversy as to their very meaning and substance. Finland, too, has 
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been affected by the fall of the Soviet regime. With the collapse of the bipolar world 
order, it had to reconsider its position vis-à-vis Russia and the Western political arena. 
As a result, Finland embarked upon the integration process with Europe. Consequently, 
Finland attempts to adjust its national identity and citizenship to European integration – 
a political process that undoubtedly impinges on the authority of the nation-state. 
The Russian case provides an insight into the consequences of transitology, that 
is, the collapse, deconstruction and major metamorphosis of state apparatuses, social 
and economic stratification systems and political visions of the future which rely on 
education as symbolic and a practical means to destroy the past and redefine the future 
(Cowen 2000, 5).1 The moments of transitology unmask and undermine the taken-for-
granted political assumptions and the political categories of state, society and culture. 
Consequently, novel discourses and instruments are needed to legitimise the exercise 
of power and the reconfigured bond between the citizen and the state. The Finnish case 
could not be classified as an example of Cowen’s transitology, for the end of the bipolar 
world has not given rise to such dramatic events as the collapse of the state system. 
Nonetheless, the partial cession of state powers to the European Union (hereafter EU) and 
the shift in Finland’s geopolitical position necessitated revisions in citizenship education. 
In this vein, the dissertation surveys the modifications in citizenship education and the 
interrelationship between citizenship education and its political context in two diverse 
socio-political settings. 
While the dissertation focuses on the manifestations and effects of political and 
ideological reorientations on citizenship education, it also strives to capture the uncertainty, 
inconsistency and polyvocality intrinsic to the process. Citizenship education is perceived 
as a contentious area of education and a battlefield for political visions which compete for 
dominance over the future political direction and the loyalty of citizens-to-be. The rival 
stakeholders of citizenship education are, for instance, ministries of education and other 
state institutions, political agencies, parliaments and, increasingly so, supranational 
organisations like the COE, UNESCO and the EU (Dimitrov & Boyadjieva 2009). If 
politics is described as a struggle over legitimate power, then citizenship education, for its 
1 The notions of transitology and transition could be criticised for their linear and teleological perception of 
development from point A to point B. The transition model only focuses on the outcomes of the supposedly 
evolutionary and unproblematic journey to a predetermined destination and ignores the very process of 
transition. Some scholars even argue that it constitutes a flawed modernisation theory in disguise (Kapustin 
2001 in Silova 2009) or suggest that transitology is naïve in assuming a direct movement from socialism to 
capitalism (Verdery 1996 in Silova 2009). Alternative terms, e.g. transformation, retardation and mutation 
have been suggested to replace transition. These terms underline that various interpretations of the new 
ideas are possible and that the persistence of cultural and educational legacies inevitably contributes to the 
recontextualisation of Western ideologies. (Silova 2009.) However, Cowen’s definition of transitology is not 
concerned with the direction of the change. Its value lies with catching succinctly the complexity of the 
immediate effects of transitology on institutions and ideologies and, most importantly, the double role of 
education in this process as shaken by the immediate change and expected to contribute to the construction 
of the transitology itself (Cowen 1999; 2000 in Cowen 2009). 
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part, presents a means to legitimise and maintain power unsettled in periods of political 
change. As a result, citizenship education simultaneously reflects the controversial 
and even mutually inconsistent political views, as well as temporal crystallisations and 
ideological victories of one orientation over other(s). Consequently, citizenship education 
could be read as a legitimation script that attempts to generate stability and certainty, and 
simultaneously suppress alternative political visions. 
The study is concerned with the macro level, that is, how citizenship education is 
articulated in the policy documents on compulsory schooling produced by the state 
authorities, which means that the question of policy implementation remains a matter for 
a separate inquiry. Even though the dissertation does not focus on the implementation 
of the prescribed agenda, policies set up the general framework for the preparation 
of teaching materials, regional and school curricula, and the work of teachers in the 
classroom. This general framework shapes, both institutionally and discursively, local 
interpretations of citizenship education. Therefore the present study could serve as a 
foundation for the subsequent study at meso and micro levels.
The dissertation was written and published as a set of five articles. They constitute 
the basis of the dissertation and the summarising overview at hand. Article I discusses 
the general methodological and theoretical questions of comparative education research 
relevant for the topic of the dissertation. Article II analyses the supranational context of 
citizenship education and Articles III-V focus on the two national cases. The purpose 
of the present overview is twofold. First, it serves as a meta-narrative that sets the scene 
for the empirical study by elaborating on its conceptual, theoretical and methodological 
foundations. Second, the overview offers a synthesis and an evaluation of the separate 
publications and explains the relationship between them. Each article addresses the 
research topic from a particular angle, leading to diversity in the methods of analysis and 
theoretical underpinnings from article to article. The overview considers the research 
project as a whole and evaluates how the theoretical and methodological choices made 
in the articles have affected the final composition of the dissertation and its empirical 
findings.
My hope is that the study at hand will interest both sociologically and pedagogically 
oriented readers. For the former, the study can offer new perspectives on the relationship 
between the state and the system of education. Its findings reveal changes in the self-
perception of states, investigated through the prism of citizenship education policy 
imperatives. The dissertation also seeks to gain relevance beyond the particular 
empirical cases examined. While the national empirical cases provide insights into the 
reconfiguration of citizenship and citizenship education in Russia and Finland, the 
findings of the study could be compared to those generated in other national settings. 
Moreover, as the study traces the intertwinement of education and politics, and draws 
on multidisciplinary theoretical and methodological perspectives from comparative 
sociology, political philosophy, comparative politics, Russian studies, sociology of 
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education and others, it could be of interest to students in a wide range of disciplines 
preoccupied with the complex phenomena of political legitimacy and its reconstruction 
in very different historical and geopolitical contexts.2
For the more pedagogically oriented audience, the study attempts to contextualise 
and interpret the roots of educational objectives and prescribed policies. In this manner 
it seeks to empower educators by enhancing their understanding of the political and 
ideological linkage in pedagogical work. In addition, the study can tune educators and 
policy-makers to the complex and conflicting nature of citizenship education, which is 
commonly advocated as the prime cure for the political disengagement of the young 
generation. However, instead of asking what citizenship education can do for society 
and how it should best be realised, the study is guided by the question what does the 
very preoccupation with the subject matter tell about the current state of our societies 
and politics? The research places citizenship education in the context of the ongoing 
domestic political developments in Russia and Finland, many of which are embedded 
in the complex phenomenon of globalisation, and aspires to understand to what extent 
national and transnational changes affect these most national of institutions, namely the 
nation-state and its system of education. 
1.1 Research aims and research questions
The following table depicts the aims of the research, the research questions that have 
guided the study and the data analysed in the course of the dissertation. The table also 
identifies which article or articles address each of the research aims.
2 The concept of legitimacy is addressed in Article II.
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1.2 Organisation of the dissertation
In the chapters that follow, the dissertation addresses citizenship education policies 
at both the nation-state and supranational level. In the next chapter, I introduce the 
contents of the present study and provide justifications for the research setting. Chapter 3 
discusses the main concepts and the interpretative framework of the dissertation related 
to the impact of globalisation. A more detailed account of the data and data analysis 
is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 focuses on the comparative approach employed 
in the study, which is followed by the comprehensive analyses of the national contexts 
in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents the contents of each article, and explains how the five 
separate publications are bound. Finally, Chapter 8 draws together the findings of the 
dissertation, offers an evaluation of the whole study and provides ideas for further 
inquiry. The primary data analysed in the research is listed in the Appendix, which also 
contains the complete texts of the five original publications (Articles I–V). 
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2 CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICIES IN FLUX
Interest in citizenship and youth development has been multiplying since the early 1990s 
(Torney-Purta 2000). Growing attention to the questions of citizenship, the apparent 
desire of states to re-emphasise citizenship and the role of citizenship education, all point 
to the revaluation of citizenship as a political institution and a focus of study (Kymlicka 
2003a). In academic circles, increased attention to the topic could be illustrated by the 
burgeoning number of academic journals which have offered their readership special 
issues on citizenship education and the emergence of new journals which concentrate 
primarily on citizenship education.1 In this chapter, I explain why political developments 
on the global level and in the national contexts of Russia and Finland make the study 
of citizenship education an interesting and necessary analytical exercise. The main 
rationale behind the research setting is that school citizenship education both reflects 
and (re)produces the dominant version of citizenship and legitimises the contract 
between the citizen and the state. Consequently, the study of citizenship education at 
the macro level should draw primarily on the relationship between state, citizenship and 
education. In addition, it should take into account the challenges of globalisation to state, 
citizenship and education, so as to understand the changing dynamics of their reciprocal 
relationship. (cf. Reid, Gill & Sears 2010.) By focusing on citizenship education endeavours 
in Russia and Finland, I seek to examine two national cases previously underexplored in 
the citizenship education literature.2 The main motivation behind the selection of the 
1 Among the new journals one could mention Citizenship Teaching and Learning (former International 
Journal of Citizenship Teacher Education) published since 2005, Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 
published since 2006 and the Journal of Social Science Education published since 2000. Among the numerous 
special issues published in other than the aforementioned journals there are, far from exhaustively, Journal 
of Curriculum Studies (2009) 41 (2) ‘Citizenship education curricula: changes and challenges presented by 
global and European integration’ and 41 (6) ‘National history and beyond’, London Review of Education 
(2008) 6 (1) ‘Education for democratic citizenship: diversity and national identity’, Citizenship Studies 
(2009) 13 (2) ‘Citizenship, learning and education’, European Journal of Education (2002) 37 (2) ‘Education 
for democratic citizenship in the new Europe’, International Journal of Lifelong Education (2003) 22 (6) 
special issue on adult education and citizenship, European Education (2005) 37 (3) ‘The challenge of 
education in postcommunist Europe’ focusing on the problems of integration and identity and European 
Education (2005) 37 (4) with special interest in the problems of integration and identity in ‘postnational’ 
Europe. The titles of the special issues shed light on how citizenship education has been contextualised in 
the latest academic debates. 
2 With respect to the recent studies of citizenship, nationality and education in Finland one should mention 
the project financed by the Finnish Academy ‘Gender and nationality: constructions of being Finnish’ and 
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COE and UNESCO as the representatives of the supranational agenda stems from their 
official linkages to the national cases and previously insufficient attention to their work 
in comparison to the EU policies, for instance. 
2.1 The upsurge of citizenship education as a political issue
The need for citizenship education is often framed in terms of the so-called ‘political 
deficit’ and ‘threat to democracy’ backed by studies that show decline in voting rates, 
party membership and the overall falling interest in conventional politics. The ‘civic 
deficit’ is defined in terms of shortage in civic knowledge or, in a broader manner, as 
inadequate participation in political life (Kennedy 1997, 2). Decreased voting proportions 
are usually directly linked to low rates of participation – a hallmark feature of a healthy 
democracy (Van Deth et al. 1999 and Putman 2000 in Naval, Print & Veldhuis 2002, 
107). In this context, citizenship education is commonly perceived as a panacea that is 
expected to divert the trend, in particular among the future generation of citizens. For 
old and new democracies alike, education for democratic citizenship is plied as capable 
its central publication by Gordon, Komulainen and Lempiäinen (2002) ‘Suomineitonen hei! Kansallisuuden 
sukupuoli’ (Finnish maid hello! The gender of nationality). As the title of the book suggests, the researchers 
concentrated on the gendered aspects of citizenship and nationality. Sirpa Lappalainen (2006) completed 
her dissertation ‘Kansallisuus, etnisyys ja sukupuoli lasten välisissä suhteissa ja esiopetuksen käytännöissä’ 
(Nationality, ethnicity and gender in children’s peer relations and preschool practices) as part of another 
project titled ‘Learning to be citizens: ethnographic and life historical perspectives’. Lappalainen’s 
methodological approach is primarily ethnographic, though she also reflects her ethnographic findings 
onto the national curricula guidelines. Another set of citizenship education literature was produced under 
the auspices of the IEA’s (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement) civic 
education study, i.e. Suutarinen (2000) ‘Nuoresta pätevä kansalainen. Yhteiskunnallinen opetus Suomen 
peruskoulussa’ (Youngster into a competent citizen. Civic education in the Finnish comprehensive 
school) and Brunell and Törmäkangas (2002) ‘Tulevaisuuden yhteiskunnan rakentajat. Yhteiskunnallisen 
opetuksen kansainvälinen tutkimus Suomen näkökulmasta’ (Builders of future society. The international 
study of civic education from the Finnish perspective). In relation to Finland, the dissertation complements 
the approaches adopted in the previous studies in that it analyses a larger set of macro level data, relates the 
findings of the policy analysis to the transformation of the state and the relationship between citizenship 
and nationality and compares the findings to the emerging supranational citizenship education agenda. 
Research on Russia has proved to be more numerous and heterogeneous, both nationally and internationally. 
However, one must point to the prevalence of textbook analysis in the studies which investigate the effect of 
the collapse of the Soviet system on national identity and citizenship in the educational context: e.g. Zajda 
(2007), Bogolubov, Klokova, Kovalyova & Poltorak (1999), Vaillant (1994) and (2001), Khasanova (2005), 
Zvereva (2005) and Zimenkova (2008). The analysis of citizenship education policy documents since the 
collapse of the Soviet system is missing from this literature (as far as I know only Froumin (2003) and 
(2004), as well as Simons (2002) and Sperling (2003) on patriotic education make an exception). From the 
perspective of previous studies on Russian citizenship education, the dissertation strives to offer a more 
detailed account of changes in the citizenship education policy rationales, particularly in relation to the 
processes of state and nation building, and simultaneously look at the developments in Russian citizenship 
education through the prism of the supranational citizenship education agenda.
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of (re)-establishing the legitimacy of representative democracy and civic engagement of 
citizens (e.g. Naval, Print & Veldhuis 2002).3 The so-called third wave of democratisation 
(the post Cold War period) has played a significant role in attracting more interest to 
citizenship education and education for democracy, as the newly democratised countries 
of the former Eastern bloc strive to find ways to promote democracy and build domestic 
and international legitimacy. These developments coincide with the rising worry of 
political disengagement in the Western countries. (Frazer 1999.)
At the same time, the need for better and more citizenship education is framed around 
reforms in the European political arena and more globally. It has been stated that as 
Europe moves toward greater unity, the EU is concerned by the slow pace of adaptation of 
the European citizenship concept (Naval, Print & Veldhuis 2002). Consequently, national 
systems of education are requested to accommodate the emerging supranational political 
structures and models of allegiance; in other words, to prepare future generations for a 
deeper feeling of European identity and their political duty as European (EU) citizens. 
Moreover, global environmental problems coupled with the intensified transnational 
movements of people require new forms of education to generate global awareness, 
responsibility, tolerance and skills of intercultural communication. In other words, the 
challenge lies in finding ways to nurture citizen competences to face the envisioned 
interconnectedness of the changing world (Soysal & Wong 2006). Finally, with the 
proliferation of transnational communities, national governments are concerned about 
the national identity and citizenship skills of immigrants, in other words their level of 
social integration. The Finnish Citizen Participation Programme, for instance, identified 
immigrants as one of the central target groups for citizenship education (FMJ 2006).
Frazer (1999, 2) has suggested that the history of citizenship education, at least in the 
UK, looks like a history of “a wave of moral panics”. At the heart of the recurring panics 
lies the falling legitimacy of the state, whether manifest in the decline of voting turnouts, 
signifying citizens’ low support for the political decision-making, or expressed in terms 
of insufficient national identification with the state. For instance, to counter the latter 
issue, the Crick report (1998), which forms the basis for the current English citizenship 
education curricula, declares 
3 Some commentators challenge the prevailing negative image of young people, who are often described as 
apathetic, self-centred and uninterested in the needs of others (e.g. Roker, Player & Coleman 1999). The 
need for more effective citizenship education is justified by the argument that young people are alienated 
from political life and show little interest in social and political issues. However, contrary evidence suggests 
that young people are involved in new forms of politics, including volunteering, campaigns and single-issue 
politics; these activities could be summed under the notion of unconventional political activity (e.g. ibid). 
Torney-Purta’s (2002) conclusions drawn on the basis of the IEA study of civic attitudes and engagement 
among school pupils in 23 European countries show that there are major differences between countries 
with respect to political knowledge, engagement and attitudes. For Finland the research findings suggest 
that high levels of knowledge are not correlated with levels of political participation; there is also a widening 
gap between active and passive young people, which is greatly determined by students’ social status and 
family background (Suutarinen 2000, Brunell & Törmäkangas 2002; Tomperi & Piattoeva 2005).
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to find or restore a sense of common citizenship, including a national identity that is 
secure enough to find a place in the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and 
religions long found in the United Kingdom. (in Osler & Starkey 2001, 293.) 
In the analysis of citizenship education it is therefore essential to discern the political 
projects which impose and justify it. The principal function of citizenship education 
is to legitimise the nation-state and it is the legitimacy gap that engenders political and 
educational discussions on the role of and need for citizenship education. Curiously, in 
this regard, the national legitimacy boosting projects are increasingly confronted with 
similar endeavours of supranational nature, that is, to create a European identity or 
raise global citizens. In view of these parallel processes, it is important to ask how the 
projects of building supranational allegiance fit with the inner problems of legitimacy 
and accountability encountered by the nation-states, of which the growing civic 
disengagement is principally symptomatic. 
2.2 Citizenship education in Russia and Finland
The comparative framework of the research is based on the idea that Russia and Finland 
have inherited two qualitatively different state models embedded in different socio-
political, cultural and historical legacies. However, both countries are faced with a 
recurrent dilemma of similar nature, namely how to maintain national cohesion and 
state legitimacy unsettled by changes in the national and international contexts. The 
research setting is premised on the assumption that citizenship education is affected by 
and is expected to provide a means to resolve the dilemma. However, we can expect it 
to be resolved in different ways, due to differences in the starting points and the nature 
of the two national settings, so leading us from the shared recurrent dilemma to the 
particularity of the cases.4 
It should be borne in mind that the scope of the dilemma is different, with the 
Russian situation further complicated by the socio-economic problems of post-Soviet 
reconstruction and the depth of the identity crisis. In the Russian case, the collapse of 
the USSR has led to a fully-fledged transitology, which completely undermined the basic 
categories of statehood and nationhood. Breslauer and Dale (1997, 303, 307) called this 
situation a “post-imperial trauma” which necessitated fundamental debates on 
Who are ‘the people’ that Russia’s new-found ‘statehood’ is meant to serve, and what 
ideas might provide the normative glue for binding together the state and the citizenry 
in a relationship of legitimacy and accountability?
4 On the notion of recurrent dilemmas in comparative studies see Haydu (1998) and Chapter 5.
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The Finnish case clearly lacks the drama of state collapse, and the deconstruction 
and reconstruction of Finnishness have taken place within secure state borders and 
institutions. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union marked a significant turning 
point for Finland, also. It obscured the entire Cold War cartography, the pillars of foreign 
and security policy established in the period, as well as the Communist neighbour which 
played a central role in the Finnish national identity project (Harle & Moisio 2000, 189–
190). 
The comparative argument of the study draws on the analytical categories of empire-
state and nation-state to theorise about the state traditions of Russia and Finland 
respectively. When the state is classically defined as a polity with fixed boundaries, 
sovereignty over its territory, monopoly over legitimate violence within the state’s 
territory, and a bureaucratic and military apparatus, then the main difference between 
empire-states and nation-states lies in their opposite perceptions of integration of 
their constituent populations into a political community (Suny 1995; Parrott 1997). 
This qualitative difference is crucial for the understanding of the relationship between 
nationality and citizenship within an imperial as opposed to a national polity.
The Russian case represents an example of a serious divorce between citizenship and 
nationality which hinders the process of post-Soviet reconstruction. On the contrary, the 
Finnish case, already by looking at the etymology of the words kansallisuus (nationality) 
and kansalaisuus (citizenship), epitomises a nation-state where citizenship and nationality, 
state and nation have historically knitted together. The historical development and the 
current state of the relationship between nationality and citizenship constitute a focal 
explanatory variable in the ensuing analysis of citizenship education. Moreover, as the 
centrifugal processes of globalisation are claimed to decouple the state, the nation and 
consequently nationality and citizenship (e.g. Delanty 2000), then the study of citizenship 
education policies embedded in diverse state traditions reveals how or if the historically 
established relationships are reshuffled in consequence of globalisation. 
2.3 Citizenship education and supranational educational governance
Major theoretical and methodological reorientations in contemporary social sciences 
following the explosion of interest in globalisation call for attention to the international 
trajectories and the global embeddedness of the national polity, that is, the intertwinement 
of the global and the national. The dissertation analyses the supranational citizenship 
education agenda at work and compares it with the national citizenship education 
policies. 
The terms supranational, transnational and international are sometimes used 
interchangeably, whereas at other times they describe a qualitatively different set 
of relations. According to Lucas (2001, 805), supranationalism and supranational 
26
NELLI PIATTOEVA
organisations refer to “all organisations, institutions and political and social processes 
involving more than a single state or at least two non-state actors from different nation-
states”. The most important of supranational organisations are intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (ibid., 805). 
Supranational differs from the transnational in that the former implies policies and 
actions formed and implemented on the level beyond that of the nation-state, whereas 
transnational implies the intertwinement of political activity and decision-making of more 
than one nation-state and/or non-state actor from different states and regions, therefore 
blurring the borders of the nation-state itself. Finally, international and, by the same 
token, intergovernmental, means a more conventional type of cross-border cooperation 
which does not bear consequences for the authority and legitimacy of the nation-state. 
Lucas’s definition above employs all of these terms to analyse the work of international 
organisations. In the dissertation, the three terms are employed interchangeably in order 
to underline the complex nature of international organisations which is simultaneously 
supranational, i.e. permits some form of sovereign agenda-setting; international and 
intergovernmental, i.e. dependent on the political interests and willingness of member 
states; as well as transnational, as it involves and relies on the movement of discourses 
and intellectuals across borders and in ways that are likely to escape the watchful eye of 
the state.
While acknowledging the fact that globalisation is a multifaceted process, both 
real and perceived, whose nature and effects on diverse societal settings are far 
from homogeneous, the research setting primarily focuses on and is framed by the 
consequences of globalisation for citizenship education, which can be expected to unfold 
in two distinctive ways. First is the debundling of the linkage between citizenship and 
nationality and their genealogical association with the nation-state. Second is the rise 
of supranational educational governance which undermines the sovereignty of nation-
states in the field of education and intervenes in their national citizenship education 
policy-making (see sections 3.2 and 3.3).
The supranational agenda, examined through the documents of UNESCO and the 
COE, is perceived in the study as both a context and a reference point for the national level 
policy-making. By context I mean that national education policies are not developed in a 
vacuum, but due to the widening scope of activities of international organisations coexist 
and interplay with supranational agendas. Both Finland and Russia are member-states of 
UNESCO and the COE and references to their work can be found in the national education 
policy documents. Hence, the research concentrates on two organisations active in the 
field of citizenship education and linked to the national cases examined in the study. 
However, the limitation of the research lies in the fact that it offers a zoomed snapshot 
at the transnational educational agenda as represented by UNESCO and the COE and 
therefore does not take into consideration other actors, for instance, the EU relevant for 
Finland as an EU country; neither does it analyse possible interconnectedness between 
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the international actors, though the overlap between the organisations is acknowledged 
briefly in Article II. In the dissertation, I focus primarily on the commonalities in the 
policies of the two actors and leave potential differences for further inquiry.
The study interprets the main tenets of the supranational agenda, analyses it in 
relation to the national model of citizenship education as it has been depicted in previous 
research and finally compares the supranational agenda to the citizenship education 
policies in Russia and Finland. By doing so, the dissertation explores whether the content 
of citizenship education as well as the role of the state as a regulator of education policies 
are changing under the pressure of globalisation, which is manifested in and channelled 
through the work of supranational organisations. As a result, the research attends to the 
question of whether citizenship education policies continue to be perceived in traditional 
terms as contributing to national cohesion and state legitimacy, or has there been a 
change toward a new understanding of identity and citizenship, perhaps post-national 
or multilayered? In this manner I also examine whether the state’s legitimation politics 
is changing. 
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3 CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND THE STATE
The theoretical backbone of the dissertation lies with the profound dilemma intrinsic to 
modern citizenship, that is, the complex relationship between citizenship as a status and 
involvement in democratic institutions and citizenship as belonging to and affiliation 
with the national polity. Citizenship constitutes a package of liberal rights (e.g. freedom 
of association, freedom of speech and conscience and the general freedom to lead 
meaningful lives) and responsibilities (e.g. to exercise autonomous and critical reasoning 
in elections and surveillance of political leaders). In addition, citizenship is invariably 
defined in national terms and is bound by the national state and its institutions. Rights 
and responsibilities are protected by national constitutions, and it is by virtue of belonging 
to the national community that individuals are granted the privileges of citizenship. (e.g. 
Kymlicka 2003b, 47.) This being so, the identity aspect of citizenship is confined to the 
nation – a cultural community premised on the imaginary horizontal bond between its 
members (e.g. Anderson 1991). 
In this manner the juridical and political dimensions of citizenship are complemented 
by the cultural and communal ones. In other words, by affiliating the nation with the 
political concept of citizenship, modern citizenship incorporates not only rights and 
duties but also a sense of tradition, community and identity (Heater 2002, 99). Some 
commentators have termed this process the nationalisation of citizenship, meaning that 
citizenship had become synonymous with membership in the nation (Isin & Turner 
2007, 11). The affiliation of citizenship and nationality consolidated the dual character 
of citizenship as inclusion into a self-governing political community and into a specific 
national community marked by territorial boundaries and cultural practices. The 
dual nature also implies that by defining who is ‘in’, citizenship status simultaneously 
determines who constitutes an outsider. (Castles 2005, 689.) 
In the following, I pursue the analysis of the association between citizenship and 
nationality in the educational context by introducing the concepts of political and 
national socialisation. These concepts shed light on the dual task of education as 
preparing students for participation in the political life of the state (citizenship) and 
rooting a feeling of common national identity (nationality). The ensuing sections explore 
the multifaceted effects of globalisation on citizenship education in different country 
contexts. Their main purpose is to point to the controversial impact of globalisation on 
the double logics intrinsic to citizenship education.
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3.1 Citizenship education as a mode of political and national socialisation
In the dissertation, citizenship education is defined as a state-initiated process of political 
and national socialisation which aims at consolidating the bond between the citizen and 
the state. Political socialisation initiated and controlled by state schools is intrinsically 
linked to the political system and is expected to support and reinforce it; in other terms 
to provide system stability (Massialas 1977, 279). According to one definition, political 
socialisation is 
the process mediated through various agencies of society, by which an individual 
learns politically relevant attitudinal dispositions and behaviour patterns. These 
agencies include such environmental categories as the family, peer group, school, adult 
organisations and the mass media (Langton 1969, 5 in Massialas 1977, 278). 
Paasi’s (1998) term national socialisation enriches the above definition of political 
socialisation, as it highlights the role of national state institutions, such as the army 
and the system of compulsory education, in forging national identity. Institutionalised 
education communicates the selected symbols of common identification. Equally, it 
helps to mark the borders of national imagination, that is, the territory, the stereotypical 
images of fellow nationals, the common roots and the shared history of the nation. Thus 
states play a crucial role in the politics of naturalising the representation of the nation and 
its association with a particular geographical territory and political institutions, giving 
rise to the belief that a place equals a people equals a culture (Paasi 1998, 215; Gupta & 
Ferguson 1992). This national naturalism “presents associations of people and place as 
solid, commonsensical, and agreed – upon, when they are in fact contested, uncertain, 
and in flux” (Gupta & Ferguson 1992, 12). 
National socialisation serves the purpose of and provides the means to the wider 
nation-building policies of the state essential to the daily preservation and reproduction 
of the bond between the people and the authority, and the nation itself. Kymlicka and 
Straehle (1999, 73; also Articles III–V) emphasise that nation-states are the product of 
nation-building policies, adopted by the state in order to diffuse and strengthen a sense 
of nationhood. For that reason the authors argue that it is analytically more fruitful to 
perceive nation-states as nation-building or nationalising states, meaning that national 
identity is a contingent and vulnerable accomplishment – an ongoing process, rather 
than an achieved fact (ibid.; also Kuzio 2001). While national socialisation relies on 
and is inherently related to the state ideology and the state’s ideological apparatus, it 
simultaneously constitutes a social exchange or a social contract with the state. In other 
words, national socialisation is not simply a product of carefully planned and executed 
policies from above. Identification is exchanged for and relies on the experience that 
it provides something in return, for example, a feeling of belongingness, ontological 
security, continuity and a guarantee of certain welfare (Paasi 1998). In this manner, 
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states and citizens mutually legitimise each other. 
Roberta Sigel (1995) has elucidated five different understandings of political 
socialisation. It can be perceived as 1) the state of a person’s political knowledge and 
comprehension (henceforth K&C); 2) the developmental sequence by which such K&C 
are acquired; 3) continuity over time of K&C; 4) the process by which people acquire and 
internalise a given society’s norms and behaviour; and 5) synonymous to civic education 
or political education as it is practised in public schools. Despite the difference in focus, 
all the listed definitions share a preoccupation with the transmission of society’s norms 
and political principles, and as a result, with the maintenance of stability.1 
As the above definitions reveal, the process of political socialisation extends far 
beyond formal schooling. My aim in the dissertation is to expose and analyse the norms 
of society and the state’s political principles by looking at the objectives, contents and 
argumentation behind citizenship education policies in the system of compulsory 
schooling. The dissertation adopts the term citizenship education instead of political 
socialisation as it addresses exclusively “political education as it is practiced in public 
schools” (point (5) in Sigel’s list of definitions above). Since the term citizenship education 
has been exported by and turned into a political enterprise with a seemingly democratic 
and therefore overly positive connotation, I find it imperative to seek its deconstruction 
as being ideological and highly contentious.2 The uncritical usage of the term analogous 
to the current political vocabulary could easily conceal the incongruous nature of 
citizenship education per se. As the following quote from a survey conducted under the 
auspices of the European Commission reveals, citizenship education is regularly equated 
to critical thinking and active participation, while ignoring the fact that state schools, 
at least in the European context, have been founded on and continue to promote the 
ideology of the nation-state with the purpose of generating loyalty and national cohesion: 
(…) school education for young people, which seeks to ensure that they become active 
and responsible citizens capable of contributing to the development and well-being of 
society in which they live. While its aims and content may be highly diversified, three 
key themes are of particular interest. Citizenship education is normally meant to guide 
pupils toward (a) political literacy, (b) critical thinking and the development of certain 
attitudes and values and (c) active participation (European Commission 2005, 10).3 
1 Research on political socialisation has been criticised for its treatment of the individual as a passive consumer 
of political education (e.g. Hahn 1998). Whereas I acknowledge the array of problems and potential 
distortions intrinsic to such a narrow perception, i.e. the unproblematised linearity of the transmission of 
knowledge and attitudes, inappropriate attention to the individual agency and the potential impact of the 
historical context on the outcomes of transmission etc., I do not explore this issue further, as the role of the 
individual is outside the scope of the research tasks posed in the dissertation.
2 Who would resist the call that schools need more and better education for democratic citizenship?
3 When educational objectives are measured internationally against such a pre-determined set of indicators, 
they not only provide information, but also simultaneously foster specific pedagogical objectives and 
practices and thus implicitly intervene in national education and its policy-making process. In the long run, 
these seemingly neutral comparative practices could contribute to the convergence of educational systems. 
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The appropriateness of and the relationship between different terms would certainly 
deserve a lengthier discussion. For one thing, we could question whether the term 
socialisation is appropriate in the context of transition societies, as this concept partially 
implies transmission of taken for granted values and beliefs (Harber 1991). In periods 
of rapid political and ideological transformation what has been taken for granted 
rapidly turns into a hotly debated political issue and the contents of socialisation are 
re-negotiated. The term political education could be perceived as an alternative to 
citizenship education, but, as Frazer (1999) has suggested, some educationists find this 
term simply oxymoronic, as education is by its very nature political and its objectives 
and contents are always a product of political contestations and power struggles. Equally, 
it could also mean education in politics including political science and political studies, 
in which case its meaning is narrower than the understanding of citizenship education 
employed in the dissertation.
The above discussions indicate that due to the almost symbiotic association between 
citizenship and nationality, citizenship education has been intimately related to and 
focused on the legitimacy of the nation-state. As argued in Article IV, the dual nature 
of citizenship as participation in democratic institutions and belonging to the collective 
‘we’ of the nation leads to conflicting effects in the realm of education. In Article IV, 
we refer to these discourses as ‘citizenship education’ and ‘education for citizenship’ (cf. 
Forrester 2003). The dual task of citizenship education could also be described in terms 
of competing discourses with one revolving around “passive consumption of knowledge 
about citizenship with a strong historical focus” and the other one emphasising “critical 
and active participation”, often labelled active citizenship (Criddle, Vidovich & O’Neill 
2004, 31). Consequently, the basic dilemma intrinsic to citizenship education is to 
strike a balance between allegiance and order, on the one hand, and critical appraisal, 
participation and even disobedience, on the other. With respect to the competing 
discourses of citizenship education, some researchers claim that governments are 
resistant to a form of teaching which might foster critical questioning, and instead 
encourages passivity, conformity and dependence (Heater 1990; Harber 1991). In this 
regard, it is important to ask how the emerging notion of active and critical citizenship, 
evident in the supranational citizenship education agenda (Articles II and IV), sits with 
the traditional nationalising task of state schools.  
The concept of citizenship education is often used normatively and, when applied, 
prescribes specific pedagogical, moral and political objectives. As Tilly (1997, 599) argues, 
general discussions of citizenship also “necessarily proceed in a normative shadow”, 
as they “vindicate visions of the good civic life”. Consequently, researchers should 
distinguish carefully between descriptive, explanatory (analytical) and prescriptive 
(advocacy) studies of citizenship in order to avoid the risk of substituting “wishful 
thinking for mapping of the possible” (ibid., 602). This conclusion is also applicable to 
the studies of citizenship education, with the prescriptive position further strengthened 
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by the proximity between theory and praxis in educational research. The current work 
has adopted a descriptive and analytical approach with the main aim to understand the 
tenets of citizenship education policy in Russia and Finland and how the contents of this 
policy have been shaped by domestic and global political processes. 
3.2 Globalisation and citizenship education
In the past few decades, the cluster between national education, national citizenship and 
the nation-state has encountered challenges emanating from the complex phenomenon 
of globalisation. Globalisation, according to David Held (1996, 340), denotes a “shift in 
the spatial form of human organisation and activity to transcontinental or inter-regional 
patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power”. Globalisation implies at 
least two distinct phenomena. First, political, economic and social activity is ever more 
worldwide in its scope. Second, there has been an “intensification of levels of interaction 
and interconnectedness within and between states and societies” (ibid). In other words, 
globalisation internationalises domestic politics, fosters decision-making in international 
frameworks and consequently blurs the distinction between internal and external 
politics (Held 1996; Tønnesson 2004). However, globalisation neither leads to a singular 
condition nor could be perceived as a linear process of integration and convergence (Held 
1996, 340). Moreover, globalisation operates and affects national policy through a variety 
of mechanisms, which in itself is a diversifying factor among countries (Dale 1999). Also, 
as each domain of state action, for example, political, economic or cultural, could be 
characterised by a distinctive pattern of relationships, power dynamics and activity, the 
effects of globalisation on these domains should be examined separately (Held 1996). 
For instance, while states seek to promote global literacy and mobility of their workers, 
in order to enhance the state’s global competitiveness, workers are still expected to adhere 
to national values (Kennedy 2008). Patriotic global workers constitute a prerequisite for 
state competitiveness in the global markets, especially so because transition to knowledge 
economy has turned learning and intellectual capital into the core elements of economic 
growth and international competitiveness. Therefore, coming back to the theme of 
domains, transition from a national economy to a global economy is not necessarily 
replicated in the domain of education, least of all in citizenship education (ibid., 22). 
With respect to citizenship and education, the effects of globalisation unfold in two 
distinctive but overlapping ways, as discussed in Articles I and II. First, the traditional 
notion of national citizenship is put into question. National citizenship is increasingly 
challenged by the establishment of transnational bodies claiming people’s allegiance (e.g. 
on the EU see Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff & Philippou 2009), the institutionalisation of 
human rights which assert, by definition, that rights emanate from the humanity itself as 
opposed to membership in an indentified polity (e.g. Kiwan 2005; Soysal 1994) and the 
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growing number of national societies in which ethnic communities nourish identities 
distinct from and sometimes in opposition to the national identity (Castles 2004). 
Accordingly, it has been argued that citizenship is no longer united by and limited to a 
“coherent national framework” (Delanty 2000, 126). The claim implies that the nation-
state no longer constitutes the ultimate source of national identity nor does it hold an 
exclusive monopoly over the discourse of citizenship (e.g. Law 2004). 
The integration of nation-states into larger political alliances means that an increasing 
number of political decisions are made by institutions lacking direct political mandate 
from the citizens. Even in the seemingly democratic-parliamentarian structure of 
the EU, final decisions are made by the Commission behind closed doors. It is likely 
that these developments weaken the domestic legitimacy of the nation-state and thus 
widen the gap between the citizens and the state. As people are distanced and alienated 
from the political decision-making on the state-wide level, they search for alternative 
identities to complement or replace nationality. (Bottery 2003, 110–111.) In addition 
to being threatened from ‘above’ the nation-state is said to encounter difficulties 
from ‘within’. With the increase in the numbers of immigrants, it is important to ask 
whether traditional and largely exclusive nation-state ideologies are capable of raising 
allegiance among these groups of people. Sassen (2003), for instance, discusses the 
ascendance of transnational identities evident among immigrants tied to transnational 
households, activists in globalised struggles for human rights and environment, and 
employees of international organisations and travelling businessmen, whose identities 
become increasingly denationalised. These groups of people, though still in a minority, 
demonstrate the debundling of citizenship and national identity.
The second manifestation of globalisation analysed in Articles I and II, concerns 
the sphere of education. National educational systems are gradually integrated into the 
complex web of supranational and transnational educational governance. As a result, 
education policy making is no longer an exclusive affair of the nation-state. The work 
of international actors is particularly concerned with a global or regional interpretation 
of shared educational needs and prescription of uniform supranational responses 
(Mundy & Murphy 2001, 85; also Dale 1999). Political supranationalism and economic 
supranationalism are the key features and drivers of globalisation, also in the area of 
education (Green 2003, 86). For Dale (1999), globalisation is carried out by supranational 
organisations, albeit dominated by the same group of states that were previously involved 
separately on bilateral terms. Supranational players, for example, organisations such as 
OECD, World Bank, UNESCO and the EU, represent the “competing imaginary” to that 
of the national educational system based on the assumption that national systems have 
reached their “use-by date” (Dale & Robertson 2009).4 
4 The findings of the study with respect to the supranational agenda of citizenship education of UNESCO 
and the COE, documented in Article II, prove this vision overoptimistic, as the agenda is found to be 
inconsistent and partially repeats the traditional nation-state driven rhetoric. 
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International organisations function as “standard-setting instruments” for national 
education policies (McNeely 1995), but their modus operandi is not easy to disentangle. 
Moutsios (2009, 476), for example, concludes with respect to the work of the World Bank 
and IMF, the WTO and the OECD that transnational organisations function through 
“asymmetric, non-democratic and opaque procedures of decision making”. Dale (1999) 
cites Rosenau’s (1992) notion of “governance without government” to illuminate the 
globalisation effect of supranational organisations on national education. Governance 
without government relies on five mechanisms, i.e., harmonisation, dissemination, 
standardisation, installing interdependence and imposition, to bring about changes at 
the national level. That being so, the 
distinctiveness of globalization mechanisms lies in their extra-national locus of viability, 
their use of less ‘direct’ forms of power, the fact that they are externally rather than 
internally initiated and that their scope, as a result of the paradigm shift brought about 
by globalization, extends to policy goals as well as to policy processes [as opposed to 
mere policy instruments NP] (ibid., 11–12).
For instance, Dimitrov and Boyadjieva (2009, 164) claim that in Bulgaria, Ukraine and 
other Black Sea countries international organisations “impute to the government the 
duty of incorporating CE [citizenship education NP] into the national curriculum”.5 At 
the same time in Spain the new curriculum ‘Education for citizenship and human rights’ 
originated from the COE’s recommendation (Engel & Hinderliter Ortloff 2009). The fact 
that citizenship education is turning into a persistent theme in supranational policy-
making manifests a clear extension of supranational educational governance to goals 
and values in the area of national education fundamental for the survival of the state 
itself. The nexus of control over citizenship education curriculum still rests with the state 
(Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff & Philippou 2009). Nevertheless, the supranational agenda-
setting interferes with the national government’s autonomous position in defining the 
terms of citizenship education. As such, it constitutes a significant departure from 
the principles of national sovereignty and undivided power to govern citizenship and 
education policies. 
This crucial development could be termed a paradigm shift in policy-making 
assumptions vis-à-vis citizenship education, regarding the place of policy-making and its 
contents, values and goals. Ramirez, Suarez and Meyer (2006) argue that world standards 
advance a more universalised model of human rights education which penetrates both 
organisational links and discursive practices. (Article II.) This statement should be 
clearly identified with the neo-institutionalist or world culture theory which, due to its 
centrality in comparative education research, deserves further explication. Developed 
by John Meyer and his colleagues and students at Stanford University, world culture 
5 Dimitrov and Boyadjieva apply the term in the sense of active, participatory and critical citizenship 
education. 
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theory posits that there is a real global isomorphism of curricular categories across the 
world irrespective of national economic, political and cultural differences (e.g. Meyer, 
Boli, Thomas & Ramirez 1997; Dale 2000; Arnove 2009). They rely on macro level 
data of curricular categories which they admit to being limited and superficial, but 
simultaneously permitting “an assessment of the range and spread of general curricular 
topics across countries over long periods of time” (Meyer & Kamens 1992, 168 in Dale 
2000, 435). On the basis of this data the researchers claim that educational systems are 
converging due to and as a manifestation of both the institutionalisation of compulsory 
schooling around the world rooted in the ideas of Enlightenment and the homogenising 
impact of international organisations on nation-states perceived as the carriers of the 
world culture. 
However, another group of researchers work at the opposite end of the continuum and 
draw on cultural anthropology and thick single-country studies to claim that convergence 
appears only on the level of catchwords and that global agendas are reinterpreted and 
adopted locally in a multiplicity of ways (see Steiner-Khamsi 2009, 51–52). They claim 
that 
world culture theorists seem to have mistaken ‘brand name policy’ such as choice, 
outcomes-based education, student-centred learning, etc., hijacked from one corner 
of the world and catapulted to another, as heralds of an international convergence of 
education (ibid., 52). 
The work undertaken in the current dissertation benefits from both positions and 
could be located somewhere between the two opposite poles. It follows the argument of 
world institutionalists concerning the worldwide consolidation of the nation-state and 
national compulsory education and in Article II draws on the world institutionalists’ 
studies to illustrate the convergence of curricula across countries with respect to 
citizenship education. These studies highlight the centrality of the specifically national 
model of citizenship education worldwide. Equally, the dissertation treats international 
organisations as carriers of uniform standards. The dissertation diverges from the world 
culture theory in that it explores the impact of the national socio-political conditions on 
citizenship policies. In contrast to the anthropological approach, the dissertation focuses 
exclusively on the normative political discourses and does not make claims about their 
reinterpretation and implementation on the micro level.
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3.3 Citizenship education, nation-state and globalisation 
in the light of previous research
The observations described in the preceding section suggest that international actors 
have given rise to a new type of citizenship education which challenges the national 
model of citizenship education. With respect to the supranational citizenship education 
initiatives, Keating (2009) concludes that since the 1990s European (both EU and COE) 
citizenship education policies manifest a shift from a nationalist model of citizenship 
education stressing common European cultural roots and identity, and striving to 
construct a Nation-Europe akin to the nation-states, to a post-national model based 
primarily on rights, participation, civic principles and the individual. Moreover, there has 
been a clear departure from a mere ‘European dimension’ in national education toward a 
broader and stronger promotion of a ‘European citizenship’, though the substance of the 
European dimension to citizenship education is not always clear, even to the European 
policy actors themselves (Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff & Philippou 2009, 151). 
According to Mary Rauner (1998), who works within the world institutionalist 
theoretical framework, there has been a worldwide shift from national civic education to 
global civic education manifest in the growing emphasis on global contents and global 
perspectives in civic education across countries. She perceives UNESCO as “a major 
influence in developing and disseminating the worldwide models of civic education”, 
especially in the areas of human rights, international understanding, the individual and 
the citizenship expansion (ibid., 21). Rauner’s findings show that linkages to UNESCO are 
significant predictors of the extent to which countries incorporate global orientation in 
civic curriculum (1998, also 1999). UNESCO represents an agent of a new post-national 
orientation toward citizenship studies, which differs from that of the nation-states.6 
However, research findings with respect to the shift from the national to the post-
national at the nation-state level are ambiguous. Soysal’s and Wong’s (2006) study is 
interesting in this respect as it compares changes in the education of citizens in European 
and Asian countries with very different socio-political and historical contexts. First, 
the researchers depict a general trend across countries to re-evaluate and re-emphasise 
citizenship education teaching. Second, their study suggests that the examined countries 
(Japan, China, France, Germany and the UK), despite their different political and 
societal contexts and modes of textbook and curricula regulation, are moving away 
from the traditional national model of citizenship education. The nation is still central 
to the citizenship educational programmes, but it is presented differently. It is located in 
a broader transnational framework with much less emphasis on wars, national heroes 
and aggression. Instead, the nation is presented in a more pluralistic (e.g. inclusion of 
immigrant populations, regional and linguistic diversity, and different societal groups) 
6 In this respect, my interpretation of UNESCO’s agenda disagrees with Rauner’s conclusions (Article II). 
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and civic (rights and duties rather than tradition and culture) manner, adopting a social 
science approach. What is more, universalistic values, such as human rights, environment, 
democracy and gender equality are endorsed, which are detached from a strictly national 
environment. In other words, citizenship virtues and values abandon their national 
particularity and they are largely determined and advocated transnationally (also Soysal, 
Bertilotti & Mannitz 2005). 
Yet it is too early to claim that there has been a fundamental shift from the national 
to the post-national citizenship education. Instead, the national and the global/post-
national run in tandem (also Article II). For example, the term ‘global citizen’ does not 
enter the curriculum (Soysal & Wong 2006). Citizenship is still a national phenomenon, 
even though national citizens are increasingly expected to contribute to the transnational 
level: 
It is worth noting that, in all our case countries, teaching still emphasises national 
history, society and citizenship. No perception of a global or transnational citizen 
emerges as such, but the national is now subject to transnational reflections – this is 
where it obtains its legitimacy. Citizens are still constructed for a world of competitive 
nation-states, however, their competitiveness now comes from how much they contribute 
to what is held to be global, and thus worthy. (ibid., 85–86.)7
The claims that globalisation leads to the debundling of citizenship and nationality (e.g. 
Delanty 2000) or that the post-national model of citizenship education has outstripped 
the national one should be critically evaluated in different societies, with the so-
called new or reconfigured states providing an interesting and important context for 
examination. Studies undertaken in political contexts which have experienced rapid 
and dramatic political changes – transitologies – provide clear counterexamples to 
any general hypotheses that the bond between citizenship and nationality is becoming 
obsolete. In Ukraine, for instance, universities and secondary schools are invested with 
the task of moulding the students into “pure Ukrainians”, whereas history textbooks can 
even be accused of “nationalism, ethnic intolerance, and chauvinism towards minorities” 
(Vyshnevs’ky 1996 and Verbitskaya 2003 in Koshmanova 2006, 109). Authoritarian 
textbooks of the Soviet period are rewritten in a way that replaces communist idols, 
models and statements with monocultural, ethnocentric Ukrainian models and 
statements (Sukhomlyns’ka, 2004 in Koshmanova 2006, 116). The European identity has 
become more popular only since the advent of the Orange Revolution, but it is primarily 
associated with economic aspects and European living standards, and ignores the 
political values such as democracy, tolerance, inclusion, human and minority rights, and 
the rule of law (Filippova 2005 in Koshmanova 2006, 111).8
7 Kennedy’s (2008) conclusion that nation-states instil national values in global workers resonates with this 
statement (section 3.2).
8 For further discussion on the nation-building project in Ukraine and the uneasy balance between nation-
building and democracy in citizenship education in the Ukrainian context see Article IV.
38
NELLI PIATTOEVA
Studying post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Kissane (2005) points to the antithetical effects of 
the parallel projects of de-Sovietisation and re-Kazakhification and the development of 
a World History programme which allows for a multi-ethnic and balanced approach 
to national identity. These educational endeavours rest on contradictory visions of the 
meaning of the Kazakh national identity and its place in the world. In this manner, 
“Kazakhstan fluctuates between strong national determination and a more global view of 
its identity”, as well as between the contradictory visions of Kazakhstan as a Kazahkstani 
democratic, secular and inclusive state versus a Kazakh national state (ibid., 65). These 
controversies manifest profound disagreement and uncertainty as to the meaning of 
national identity and state ideology. They also reveal that new or reconfigured states 
are not immune to the global rhetoric stressing active citizenship and multicultural 
identities, but that these ideals are hard to reconcile with the simultaneous identity crisis 
and ambiguity with respect to the new pillars of societal unity. Concurrently, the very 
co-existence of contentious narratives demonstrates that alternative and complementary 
visions of identity and society are not silenced in the name of nation-building. 
3.4 Toward revaluation or renouncement of citizenship education?
The sections above examined tensions inherent in the concept of citizenship and its 
genealogical link to nationality. They also introduced the contemporary reconfigurations 
of the relationship between citizenship and nationality, and the changing role of the 
nation-state as a regulator of education policy. These discussions lead to a set of important 
conclusions and further theoretical considerations, which frame the empirical study of 
citizenship education policy in Russia and Finland, and UNESCO and the COE. First, the 
study of citizenship education should take into account the multidimensionality of the 
concept of citizenship, that is, its historical development as linked to the formation of the 
modern nation-state and the ideology of nationalism, and the rights and responsibilities 
of citizens in a liberal-democratic polity. Second, citizenship education in any society 
represents a fragile balance of rights and duties, obedience and criticism, participation 
and individualism, and the balance is sensitive to and reflects changes in the larger 
socio-political context. For that reason, citizenship, despite claims to universality, is a 
profoundly historical and embedded concept inseparable from the meaning of the polity 
itself. Due to this, the analyses of citizenship and nationality and their interrelationship 
will continue in the ensuing parts of the dissertation (Chapter 6), which explore the 
recontextualisation of the general concepts in two specific national settings – Russia and 
Finland. 
It is important to understand in what ways globalisation impinges on citizenship, 
national identity and national states and consequently the traditional rationale of 
citizenship education. With respect to the impact of globalisation on the state, three 
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schools of thought exist (Guibernau 2001 in Tønnesson 2004). The first posits that nation-
states are undermined or superseded by transnational companies, supranational IGOs 
and NGOs. According to the second school of thought the state retains its centrality in 
controlling populations and as the main organisational principle of international society. 
Moreover, globalisation is likely to engender new waves of nationalism and cultural 
mobilisation. The third scenario argues that globalisation inevitably transforms the 
nation-state whose citizens fail to identify exclusively with the national polity (Tønnesson 
2004, 180–181). 
These broad interpretations are echoed in an array of alternatives depicted by 
researchers concerning the impact of globalisation on citizenship education. If the link 
between the citizen and the state is ruptured in the face of globalisation, and citizenship 
is perceived primarily as one among a myriad of other individual and group identities, 
then citizenship will be replaced by the freely floating market-oriented individuals. 
Consequently, states will be likely to relinquish citizenship education altogether, or 
exchange it for an individualistically oriented curriculum embracing interpersonal 
competition and enterprise as crucial moral virtues. (Bottery 2003; Law 2004.)
On the other hand, the forces of globalisation leading to the threat of estranging 
citizens from the realm of the nation-state might force states to adapt rigorous citizenship 
education programmes. These programmes will be geared to sustaining the legitimacy 
of the nation-state and stressing the responsibilities of citizens to the state, despite the 
failure of the latter to fulfil its own, and therefore legitimating the growing disparities 
caused by ‘global forces’. According to this scenario, nation-states will remain the key site 
of identity, educational governance and political struggle of various groups. (Green 1997; 
Bottery 2003; Law 2004.) In this respect, it is essential to bear in mind that nation-states 
encounter crosscutting pressures of responding to transnational capital, global political 
structures, for example, international organisations and non-governmental agents, and 
the domestic need to preserve political legitimacy (Burbules & Torres 2000, 10). These 
intertwined national and supranational challenges inevitably change the nation-state 
from a sovereign agent to an arbiter balancing internal and external demands and 
constraints (ibid). 
From this perspective, it is unlikely that the nation-state will be able to retain its 
traditional role and keep the relationship between the nation-state and citizenship intact. 
On the one hand, the challenge lies in accommodating the intensifying linkages to the 
global economy and supranational policy-making, and on the other hand, the weakening 
bond between the state and its citizenry. Consequently, in the third scenario, states will 
widen the scope of citizenship and add subnational, regional and global dimensions 
to the traditional national one (Law 2004). In this interpretation, neither is the state 
becoming redundant nor is citizenship education getting any less meaningful. However, 
the meaning and function of the two are altered.
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4 CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICY 
AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT
This Chapter introduces the textual data generated in the course of the dissertation and 
explains the routes to the interpretation of the data. The ensuing debates with respect 
to UNESCO and the COE illuminate the selection of the international actors and make 
visible the ways in which this decision shapes and limits the conclusions of the study. 
4.1 Education policy texts
Citizenship education is said to refer to a multidisciplinary subject with contested and 
extremely varied curricula content (Arthur, Davies & Hahn 2008, 6). That being so a 
researcher of citizenship education is puzzled over the question of where to look for 
evidence of citizenship education in compulsory schooling. Contents serving the broader 
aims of political and national socialisation are integrated into the school curricula 
under different titles, for example, civics, social studies, personal and moral education, 
government, history, religion, geography, mother tongue, foreign languages and even 
biology, as well as themes that cut across different subjects (ibid; Steiner-Khamsi 2002; 
Aapola, Gordon & Lahelma 2003; European Commission 2005). Citizens are also 
constructed in everyday practices in schools (Gordon, Kumulainen & Lempiäinen 2002; 
Aapola, Gordon & Lahelma 2003). The fact that the system of state-led mass schooling 
emerged parallel to the formation of the nation-state as an imperative mechanism of 
connecting individuals and states implies that the entire school system is invested with 
the duty of raising citizens (Meyer, Ramirez & Soysal 1992; Aapola, Gordon & Lahelma 
2003). 
This dissertation is essentially about the changing ways to uphold the bond between 
the citizen and the state in the context of domestic and global political change. Citizenship 
education provides the means to uphold state power by assuring, ideally, popular support 
of the citizens. Consequently, the objectives of citizenship education rely on and reflect 
the ideological and pragmatic concerns of the state as a key institution of educational 
provision and control. As I am primarily concerned with the relationship between the 
state and citizenship education, I anchor the analysis in the education policy documents 
issued by the Russian and Finnish state authorities when exploring the objectives of and 
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argumentation behind citizenship education policies. 
The empirical analysis is based on a qualitative reading of 41 (approximately 480 
pages) Russian education policy documents, 15 (approximately 590 pages) Finnish 
documents and 18 documents (approximately 180 pages) issued by UNESCO and the 
COE. All documents were read in their original languages and the citations used in the 
articles were translated by the author. Only a minority of the national documents carry 
the term ‘citizenship education’ in their title, as a school subject under this name does 
not exist in either Finland or Russia.1 As a result, a larger group of documents belongs 
to the category of general documents which define the main objectives and standards of 
formal education, for example, laws, governmental programmes, curricula guidelines 
and committee reports. The latter type of document is only present in the Finnish case. 
Its nature differs from the Russian documents produced mainly by state bureaucrats 
in that they constitute a sort of intermediary institution between the governing bodies 
and the larger society. Nevertheless, state institutions set up the committees in order to 
articulate a predetermined socio-political problem and propose concrete ways to address 
it (Hovi et al. in Vuorikoski 1999, 65–66). I have not systematically considered the nature 
of the examined documents per se, that is, their mode of production and place in the 
documentary hierarchy. However, these factors undoubtedly influence the content of 
the documents. For one thing, the place of the document in the documentary hierarchy 
determines what rhetorical persuasive tools are used to mobilise the reader. The agenda 
can be presented as uncontested facts arranged as a list of bullet points which do not 
require further justification (as in laws, governmental programmes etc.). Alternatively, 
it can be embedded in the particular descriptions of and arguments about the current 
state of affairs domestically and internationally, which lead somewhat naturally to the 
concrete prescriptions advocated in the documents (cf. Atkinson & Coffey 1997).
Finally, I include documents which focus on history and social sciences teaching, 
geography and language teaching (the state-wide official languages) – the school subjects 
which are invested with the citizenship education task most clearly, and documents 
on political and moral education, which mainly refer to the Russian documents on 
upbringing (vospitanie). The document materials are predominantly limited to the realm 
of compulsory education, except the laws and governmental programmes that address 
the entire system of formal education.2 
The criteria for the identification of the relevant data were based on the idea that the 
data should be representative of the historical period under examination and therefore 
1 In England, for instance, following the report of Citizenship Advisory Group (also known as the ‘Crick 
Report’), citizenship was introduced as a new statutory National Curriculum subject for all students age 
11 to 16 in secondary schools since the academic year 2002. A non-statutory framework of citizenship 
and PSHE (Personal Social and Health Education) for primary schools (pupils age 5 to 11) was introduced 
already in 2000. (Council of Europe 2009.)
2 Article III exceptionally refers to two documents related to teacher education: the state education standards 
for primary teacher education published in 1995 and 2000.
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I have sought to include all state-authored education policy documents which address 
citizenship and national identity in this period. My interest in the contested nature of 
citizenship education as a battlefield for different political visions also required such 
a holistic approach. In order to understand the course of development in citizenship 
education – changes in the rationales and temporary political settlements since the 
1990s – I wanted to understand the point of departure, that is, the state of affairs prior 
to the collapse of the bipolar world and the political processes it has set in motion. I 
therefore analysed a set of education policy documents produced in the latter half of the 
1980s in Finland and Russia. In the Russian case, the scarcity of documents available 
in the journal Vestnik Obrazovania (the Education Messenger), perhaps characteristic 
of the confusion inflicted by Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) and perestroika 
(reconstruction) as to the role of education in the political transformation has made this 
endeavour rather cursive. 
Most of the online documents were collected with the help of the official websites of 
the Russian and Finnish governments and education ministries. When I came across 
references to documents which were not available on the official websites, I searched 
for them by their titles in Google or a Russian search machine Yandex. The documents 
unavailable in an electronic format, that is, the Finnish committee reports and the 
curricular guidelines for 1985 and 1994, as well as the Russian documents of the late 
1980s and the early and mid 1990s were collected in libraries. The Russian documents 
were copied from the ministerial periodical Vestnik Obrazovania which is the only official 
journal of the Russian Ministry of Education published in 12 to 24 issues annually for 
the purpose of publicising educational legislation. Despite many Russian documents 
being available online, I double-checked my pool of documents by going through all the 
issues of Vestnik Obrazovania published between 1989 and 2007. However, when going 
through the journal, I noticed that some documents available online and referred to in 
the documents which came to my possession earlier, were not cited in the journal. For 
that reason the journal is not a fully reliable source of document accumulation on its 
own. In this respect it is important to bear in mind that documents are not isolated 
from one another. Instead, they constitute a documentary space or a chain by referring 
to other documents. Therefore one way to identify relevant documents is to look for the 
references they make to other existing legislation and programmes.
Overall, the documents analysed in the course of the research discuss matters related 
to citizenship, national identity and the role of the state in various forms. Laws do it in 
a very narrow and concise fashion by simply declaring the objectives of education and 
specifying the role of schooling in society. Curriculum materials and ministerial circulars 
identify objectives and contents for specific school subjects and they often explain the 
function of the subject in greater detail. In addition to articulating the main objectives 
of teaching and learning, they reveal the themes to be covered and the attitudes, skills 
and information to be transmitted to the students. Some documents, that is, the Russian 
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programmes of upbringing and patriotic education and the Finnish committee reports 
contextualise policy objectives by discussing broad societal and political changes and 
their impact on education. 
The written sources – the state-produced policy documents – could be classified 
as data recorded without the intervention of the researcher (Silverman 2005, 119). 
The national documents analysed in the dissertation were produced by governments 
and ministries and are publicly available online or as hard copies. According to the 
classification of documents suggested by Scott (1990), who arranges sources along the 
dimensions of access and authorship, the documents employed in the dissertation belong 
to the category of open-published official state documents and they represent the largest 
class of documents available for research. 
Despite the fact that documents are produced without influence on the part of the 
researcher, it is the researcher who decides which documents become the research data 
by generating criteria for their selection. Also, documents are products of complex 
political negotiations and manifestations of power balance in society. Consequently, 
it is important to understand why policy documents are produced and what they are 
expected to accomplish, whose positions they advocate and who they primarily address 
(Atkinson & Coffey 1997, 47; also Vuorikoski 1999; McCulloch 2004; Silverman 2005). 
As documents are bureaucratic records of the modern state, they are only capable of 
illuminating the official discourses of political elites (McCulloch 2004, 26). 
Policy could be defined as any course of action or inaction relating to the selection 
of goals, the definition of values or the allocation of resources (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 
2004, 71). Consequently, policy is fundamentally about the exercise of political power, 
that is, regulation of social practices, and the language that is used to justify this process 
(Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 2004; Dunne, Pryor & Yates 2005). On a different level, policy 
can be understood as “being about conceptually ordering reality and by so doing helping 
to construct our identities”, in other words, what it means to be a social worker, teacher 
or citizen (Dunne, Pryor & Yates 2005, 111). Policy constitutes a discourse of the state, 
which is “by its very nature political and must be understood as part and parcel of the 
political structure of society and as a form of political action” (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 
2004, 71). Documents are therefore inseparable from the work of the nation-state and 
constitute its system of surveillance and social control (Scott 1990, 59). Also, the state 
represents unevenly the influence of different groups and sectors of society, and, as a 
result, state policy is inevitably ideological in its nature and effects (Olssen, Codd & 
O’Neill 2004, 71). Nation-states and their rising bureaucracies have generated records 
of their developments, encounters with interest groups and policies (McCulloch 2004, 
12). In this manner, documents both transcribe the modern state and its constituent 
institutions, as well as symbolise the very existence of the state. 
Policy analysis either provides information for policy production or it constitutes a 
critical examination of existing policies. The former has been termed analysis for policy, 
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and the latter is the analysis of policy (Gordon et al. 1977, 28 in Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 
2004, 72). The analysis of policy can take two forms: 1) analysis of policy determination 
and effects which examines “the inputs and transformational processes operating upon 
the construction of public policy” and the effects of such policies on various groups; and 
2) analysis of policy content, which examines the values, assumptions and ideologies 
underpinning the policy process. (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 2004, 72.) The dissertation 
is concerned with the latter form of policy analysis, that is, it reads the policy content 
and the socio-political context within which these policies are produced. This approach 
could be termed deconstructive or transgressive, in that it attempts to go beyond the text 
and make present the ideological and political absences within the text (Dunne, Pryor 
& Yates 2005, 115, 125). It works within the text’s own system of beliefs and values and 
borrows devices from within the text to use them upon and against it (Parker 1997, 68 
in ibid., 115). 
4.2 Studying policy content and argumentation
My main interest in the objectives of and argumentation behind citizenship education 
and their change over time has led me to focus on ‘what is said’, that is, what are the 
stated objectives and contents of citizenship education and how they are justified. For 
that reason, I am not concerned with the usage of the linguistic strategies – the ‘how it 
is said’ question – when reading the documents. In addition to the ‘what’ question, the 
dissertation seeks to interpret the findings of the policy analysis and thus answer the ‘why 
it is said’ question, that is, why one policy objective was declared rather than another. 
It is the interpretative task of the dissertation that relies on the deep understanding of 
the case contexts enhanced by the comparative approach (see Chapter 5). The questions 
which have guided the document analysis are:
1) What are the objectives of citizenship education and whether these objectives 
change with time?
2) What arguments are employed to justify the proposed objectives?
3) What contents are attached to citizenship, national identity (nationality) and the 
nation-state in the documents more generally?
Preoccupation with the meaning of the texts does not imply that the dissertation is 
invested with the task of finding the authentic ‘true’ meaning of the text. The view of the 
nature of the text embraced in the dissertation draws on social constructivism, which 
perceives language as actively construing particular versions of reality, while silencing 
or invalidating others. Different discourses and systems of meaning compete with 
each other, consequently, educational problems and their solutions can be defined in 
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different and often contradictory ways. Accordingly, the purpose of the dissertation is 
not to evaluate the accuracy of policy statements, but to make visible and analyse the 
aims of citizenship education within the reality construed in the policy documents. In 
other words, the examined documents are perceived as particular hegemonic versions of 
reality within which the suggested political action appears natural and commonsensical. 
Thus, policy objectives are studied together and inseparably from the justifications and 
descriptions of the social context employed in the documents, where such articulations 
are present. 
In this respect, the dissertation employs a strategy borrowed from the rhetorical 
analysis which studies the ways to persuade and influence in discursive or textual 
practices (Edwards, Nicoll, Solomon & Usher 2004, 3). I found particularly valuable the 
concept of exigence which signifies the problem that demands urgent response (ibid). 
Educational policies are usually produced as a response to a particular problem and 
the problem offers a legitimate context for the policy. Problems are often turned into 
“crisis narratives”, which “provide an imperative for policy action and therefore invest 
situations with political importance, almost regardless of the relative weight of evidence 
and analysis by all concerned” (ibid., 132).3 In other words, the ‘problems’ and ‘crises’ 
documented in the policy documents do not reflect or pass objective judgement on the 
state of affairs in society, but instead they reveal the means for the state to legitimise 
policy. As a result, documents provide means for understanding government rhetoric 
that legitimises particular change, constructs possibilities but simultaneously excludes 
other policy options (Ball 1990 in McCulloch 2004, 80). 
Therefore, as Bacchi (2000, 48) argues, “it is inappropriate to view governments 
are responding to ‘problems’ that exist out there’ (…). Rather ‘problems’ are ‘created’ 
or ‘given shape’ in the very policy proposals that are offered as ‘responses’”. Such a 
conceptualisation of educational problems draws on the policy-as-discourse approach 
which perceives policy not as separate from and a response to the existing conditions, 
but as “a discourse in which both problems and solutions are created” (Goodwin 1996, 
67 in ibid.). Consequently, the focus of policy-as-discourse theorists is not on problems, 
but on problematisations (Kritzman 1988, 257 in ibid.). The problematisations set limits 
on what can be said and thus become part of the resolution itself. In other words, “the 
form of a question may block us from seeing solutions to problems that become visible 
through a different question” (Postman 1992, 126 in ibid., 50). Thus, political battles 
occur not just at the level of resolution, but at the level of problematisations, too, if such 
a distinction is altogether plausible. 
Documents, in contrast to interviews, preserve genuine historical insight (Hodder 
1994, 393). They offer a significant medium to discover and understand how a given 
society has developed and where it continues to develop. Importantly, from the 
3 Compare this view to the ‘moral panics’ described in section 2.1.
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perspective of the dissertation, documents can equally reveal tensions between the past 
and the present. (McCulloch 2004.) Consequently, at best, document analysis may shed 
light on shifts in policy rationales. For instance, to refer to a concrete example from the 
dissertation, in the beginning of the 1990s national schools for ethnic communities were 
perceived as a key means to prevent the disintegration of the state, construct stability 
and cohesion, while from the end of the 1990s state unity and the existence of national 
schools are perceived as incompatible (Article V; Piattoeva 2010).
In the course of the research I conducted thematic interviews with education 
specialists and civil servants working in Russia and Finland. However, the policy 
documents constitute the primary data of the dissertation with the interviews playing a 
complementary role in the sense that they provided me with an initial entry into the field 
of citizenship education. These interviews, conducted at the early stage of the research, 
gave me an opportunity for interactive reflection about citizenship education policies 
with people involved in the policy process. However, I found the interviews problematic 
in that the interviewees reflected on the past on the basis of their current position. From 
early on it was clear that the study would not be concerned with what the interviewees 
would say about the subject matter in retrospect. Neither does the research focus on the 
process of policy production prior to the publication of any given document. Interviews 
could potentially be used to reveal what has happened behind the scenes, but I found it 
particularly hard to break the ‘power talk’ and compel the state civil servants to reveal 
the politics behind the policy. At the end, concentrating on one type of data clarified 
the empirical work, and the breadth of the documentary materials provided rich and 
multifaceted information to explore the questions posed in the dissertation.
The methods of working with the national level data (Articles III–V) share some 
common features but also exhibit differences from article to article. In all the articles, 
the analysis proceeds from the close reading of the documents and the identification of 
relevant instances to their categorisation under the general themes, such as democracy, 
nation-building and globalisation. The relevant instances were identified with the help 
of key words, i.e. citizenship, nation-state, national culture, national identity, national 
cohesion, rights, duties, national language etc. Also, in all the articles policy formulations 
were examined together with the discussions which seek to validate them. From there 
on, the means of working with the texts diverge. In Article III, relevant instances were 
grouped under the broad themes of nation-building and democratisation and the contents 
of the two categories were consequently compared to one another. This approach revealed 
that citizenship education is expected to serve both democratising and nation-building 
purposes, but the twin task engenders antithetical citizen ideals which coexist in the 
policy space. In Articles IV and V, documents were read specifically in a chronological 
order so as to identify the temporary policy settlements starting prior to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union up until recently. Summaries of the documents, containing brief 
outlines of educational objectives and argumentations behind them, helped to identify 
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how the task of citizenship education has changed and which arguments were employed 
to validate the changes. 
4.3 Supranational agenda – UNESCO and the COE – as a research target
In the current study, the evolving supranational citizenship education agenda is perceived 
as a potential rival to the national citizenship education policies, and one of the aims 
of the research is to test the accuracy of this assumption (research task 1). I therefore 
concentrate on the main tenets of the national and supranational agendas to examine 
possible conflict and convergence between the two. In this way, I attempt to address one 
of the current methodological challenges of comparative education, that is, to transcend 
state-centric epistemologies without resorting to the state’s negation (Article I). 
The study of the supranational context, documented in Article II, is concerned 
with UNESCO and the COE. The analysis is based on official documents, including 
programmes of action, declarations, recommendations and resolutions explicitly 
concerned with the matters of citizenship and human rights education. These materials 
represent the common agenda promoted by the organisations. I also studied citizenship 
and human rights education websites of UNESCO and the COE in order to get a general 
overview of the current and past activities, their objectives and arguments. Both Finland 
and Russia are member-states of the two organisations and references to their work can 
be found in national education policy documents. 
The policies of UNESCO and the COE, with respect to citizenship, have been less 
examined compared to the ones produced by the EU. Perhaps the formal status of the EU 
citizenship and the educational repercussions that it is expected to generate explain why 
studies of the European (EU) citizenship education and its effects on national citizenship 
education have been more prevalent (e.g. Ollikainen 2000; Balibar 2005; Soysal & 
Schissler 2005; Engel & Hinderliter Ortloff 2009). However, the EU is not the only 
supranational agent aspiring to shape national citizenship education. The COE is a pan-
European organisation encompassing 47 member states, from Portugal to Azerbaijan, 
with very diverse national, religious, linguistic and political composition. That being so 
its education policies are expected to influence a large and highly diverse geographical 
area. Although academics have generally acknowledged the COE’s citizenship education 
agenda and refer to it when discussing citizenship education in Europe and national 
citizenship education activities (e.g. Naval, Print & Veldhuis 2002; Osler & Starkey 2006; 
Starkey 2008), there has been little analysis of the main tenets of this agenda as such (with 
the exception of Forrester (2003), and the very recent publications by Keating (2009) and 
Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff & Philippou (2009)). This state of affairs signifies that from 
an analytical perspective, the COE’s supranational agenda is often ignored, perhaps due 
to its supposedly weak influence in comparison to the authority of the EU. 
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Keating (2009, 141) argues, referring to Corbett (2005), that by the late 1960s member 
states of the COE grew increasingly unhappy about the institutional inefficiencies of the 
organisation and started looking at the EU for new ways of educational cooperation. This 
institutional shift 
opened the door for new modes of European educational cooperation, but it also marked 
the beginning of a new phase in European citizenship education policy. Developments 
in citizenship education policy were dominated by the European Union for the next 20 
years (…) (Keating 2009, 141). 
Thus it is the presumed ineffectiveness of the COE, together with the absence of the 
formal basis of a pan-European citizenship akin to the one established by the Treaty of 
European Union signed in Maastricht in 1992, that makes the study of the EU citizenship 
education policies more meaningful. However, it has been striking to observe that the 
term ‘education for democratic citizenship’, coined by the COE at the Heads of State and 
Government meeting in October 1997 and the title of the COE’s ongoing citizenship 
education project, has entered academic and education policy vocabulary far beyond the 
COE’s own activities. 
UNESCO, with its extensive membership of 192 states, has played an important role 
in emphasising international education and fostering respect for the rule of law, human 
rights, dignity of the human person and fundamental freedoms (Rauner 1998, 74–75).4 
The importance of education for democracy was acknowledged at the International 
Forum on Education for Democracy in Tunis in December 1992, and in the World Plan 
of Action on Education for Human Rights and Democracy adopted after an International 
Congress on Education for Human Rights and Democracy held in Montreal in March 
of 1993 (ibid., 83). Democracy was also an important topic in a conference on civic 
education for Central and East European countries in 1995 (ibid., 84). Rauner observes 
a significant change in the democracy education of UNESCO. Namely that in the first 
period (1949–1969) the proclaimed democratisation of education implied democratising 
access to schooling, in other words the equality of opportunity. Later, UNESCO began to 
emphasise democracy in terms of teaching it as a political system. (ibid., 84–85.)
UNESCO and the COE should be distinguished from other major international 
agencies in that their stated key mission is to promote a more just democratic world order. 
The extended membership and the aforementioned political agenda, along with their 
modest financial resources, distinguish UNESCO and the COE from other large-scale 
intergovernmental actors, for example, the EU, the World Bank and the OECD. Therefore 
it is essential to bear in mind that their educational philosophy is not necessarily shared 
by the entire spectrum of intergovernmental organisations. (Article II.) With respect to 
4 Article IV contains an introduction to the Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) project of the COE, 
which is the reason why this section focuses primarily on the work of UNESCO in the field of citizenship 
education.
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the IMF, the OECD, G7, the World Bank and regional organisations such as the EU, 
North American Free Trade Area and the Asia Development Bank, Dale (1999, 4) writes 
that while international organisations have “different, albeit often overlapping, missions, 
approaches and capacities”, they are all driven “by a broad set of ideological preferences 
that have developed as the ‘orthodox’ response to the problems posed to rich countries 
by changing global economic circumstances”. The common ideology pursued by these 
institutions has been given the label ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 1993 in ibid.).
In Kallo’s (2009, 96) interviews with the OECD professionals and academics working 
in the field of supranational education policy, the COE, when compared to the work of 
the OECD, was perceived as “far less economically driven” and “far away from what the 
OECD is doing”. Concerning UNESCO, the OECD professionals stressed the difference 
in the operational culture of the two organisations, with UNESCO addressing a much 
more diverse audience and having a heavier bureaucracy. These comments suggest that 
international organisations pursue diverse agendas, though it is possible to group them 
according to ideological stances, geographical scope, membership and types of activities 
pursued. Kallo (2009) notes that globalisation fosters competition between international 
organisations; however, cooperation in overlapping areas of activity enhances their 
power and reinforces their authority.
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5 INDIVIDUALISING AND CONTRASTING 
– ON COMPARATIVE APPROACH
This chapter discusses the comparative framework of the dissertation and thus construes 
the particular methodological and theoretical lenses for the national cases analysed in 
the next chapter. 
The comparative dimension of the dissertation has often prompted questions 
from fellow researchers and readers of the early article manuscripts and conference 
presentations. For some, Russia would appear as a fascinating and complicated case in 
its own right, while for the others massive differences between the cases would preclude 
any possibility of meaningful comparison. These questions have forced me to revisit the 
comparative framework of the research time and again in order to refine its tertium 
comparationis, that is, generate, justify and apply the specific dimension against which 
the cases could be compared and interpreted (Steiner-Khamsi 2009, 53). In the following, 
I indicate which comparative strategy was employed in the research and explore its 
advantages and limitations. 
5.1 Individualising comparison
In the dissertation, the attributes of macro-social units are employed in explanatory 
statements (cf. Ragin 1987). This means that instead of merely pointing to similarities 
and differences in citizenship education policies in the examined countries, the study 
attempts to explain them in terms of variations between macro elements, that is, the 
perceptions of state, nation, nationality, and citizenship in the Russian and Finnish 
political contexts. In this way, the dissertation adheres to the concept of comparative 
education synthesised, for instance, by Broadfoot (1999; also Article I). She writes that 
comparative education is not 
(…) descriptive accounts of ‘what is’, however carefully done. It is not de-contextualised 
comparisons of particular dimensions, [as] they lack the theoretical framework that is 
essential to justifying the drawing of any conclusions from the gathered data. (ibid., 29.)
As Broadfoot (1999) emphasises, careful theoretisation of the context is the prerequisite 
of educational comparison. This understanding of comparative education stresses that 
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comparative education studies the interplay between education and society in different 
contexts, and that in order to interpret variation in the educational phenomenon we need 
to analyse the context within which it occurs. This line of thought is congruent with the 
classical logic of comparison based on the search for concomitant variation (Tilly 1984). 
The comparative setting of the dissertation comes close to what has been termed 
‘individualising comparison’ by Tilly (1984) and ‘contrast of contexts’ by Skocpol and 
Somers (1980). In this method, the point is “to contrast specific instances of a given 
phenomenon as a means of grasping the peculiarities of each case” (Tilly 1984, 82), 
as well as “to bring out the unique features of each particular case included in (…) 
discussions, and to show how these unique features affect the working–out of putatively 
general social processes” (Skocpol & Somers 1980, 178). The logic of the individualising 
comparison is well captured by the metaphor of the mirror: one national setting is treated 
as a reversing mirror that sheds light on the distinct characteristics of the other case (cf. 
Tilly 1984, 90).1 In this manner, the cases offer a commentary on one another’s character 
(Geertz 1971 in Skocpol & Somers 1980, 179) and therefore “increase the ‘visibility’ of 
one structure by contrasting it with another” (Bendix 1977, 16–17 in Skocpol & Somers 
1980, 180). These qualities of the comparative approach have been highlighted also by 
comparative education researchers who claim, for instance, that cross-societal and cross-
cultural comparison “makes the familiar strange” and functions as a “cultural critique 
of ourselves”, meaning that it reveals the taken for granted assumptions and practices in 
our home societies (Article I; Broadfoot 1999, 26; Sadler 1900 in Phillips 1999, 18; Fischer 
1986 in Mason 2007, 192).
In the dissertation, the highly homogeneous nation-state with a strong historical 
bond between nationality and citizenship (Finland) is contrasted to a heterogeneous 
empire-state which fixed nationality and citizenship to different levels of the state 
system (Russia). The second dimension of reflection is attributed to the fact that Finland 
represents a stable nation-state which faces the need to redefine national identity and 
its relationship with the global system relatively secure with its state borders and the 
legitimacy of state institutions. Russia, on the other hand, is a recently reconfigured state 
which encounters globalisation simultaneously with the dramatic disintegration of the 
state, and uncertainty with respect to the new political ideology and the national idea 
that would resonate with the people.
The unit of analysis deployed in the study is the national state and the arguments and 
conclusions presented in the dissertation apply to the national level. This point should 
be borne in mind in the light of the political structure and educational administration 
in the studied countries. In both Russia and Finland, decision-making with respect 
1 For the purpose of simplification of expression, I use the term ‘individualising comparison’ to encompass 
both Tilly’s ‘individualising comparison’ and Skocpol’s and Somers’s ‘contrast of contexts’ because their 
comparative logic is similar. Also, the authors refer to the same example – Richard Bendix’s Kings or People 
– when illustrating the application of this type of comparison.
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to compulsory schooling is decentralised and we can expect variation between 
municipalities in Finland and regions and municipalities in Russia as to the interpretation 
and implementation of the state-authored policies.2 
The advantage of the individualising method lies in its integral treatment of cases as 
irreducible wholes with complex and unique sociohistorical configurations (Skocpol & 
Somers 1980, 178). The analytical return is maximised when as different cases as possible 
are chosen for comparison, giving most value to clearcut differences between the cases 
(ibid., 179). Attention to the integrity of cases means that research is often concerned 
with a small number of cases as opposed to a large number at high levels of abstraction. 
It is likely that familiarity with historical circumstances and particular characteristics 
of the cases will decline if research deals with many cases (Tilly 1984, 77). After all, 
comparative study is a labour-intensive research and only allows mastery of a handful 
of cases (Haydu 1998, 342).3 In comparative education research, the method of contrast 
has often led to ideologically driven and de-contextualised dichotomisation of cases, as 
well as to primary concern with and emphasis on difference (Steiner-Khamsi 2009).4 
The individualising comparison method documented in this chapter, while drawing 
on the notions of difference and contrast, is careful to highlight the importance of 
understanding the context in its entirety to avoid de-contextualisation. Preoccupation 
with difference advocated by Skocpol and Somers (1980) could divert attention from 
2 In Finland, the Basic Education Act regulates which subjects are included in the curriculum and student 
counselling. The Government decides on the curricula timeframe by defining the minimum number of 
lessons for core subjects in basic education. Concerning the national core curriculum and its relation to 
the local curriculum, the Finnish Board of Education states the following: “The national core curriculum 
is determined by the Finnish National Board of Education. It includes the objectives and core contents 
of different subjects, as well as the principles of pupil assessment, special-needs education, pupil welfare 
and educational guidance. The principles of a good learning environment, working approaches as well as 
the concept of learning are also addressed in the core curriculum. The present national core curriculum 
for basic education was confirmed in January 2004 and it was introduced in schools in August 2006. The 
education providers, usually the local education authorities and the schools themselves draw up their own 
curricula for pre-primary and basic education within the framework of the national core curriculum. These 
curricula may be prepared for individual municipalities or institutions or include both sections”. (FNBE 
2009.) In Russia, the Law on Education (1997 [1992]) sealed the tripartite organisation of the curriculum 
dividing it into three distinct components: the federal one taking up to 75 per cent of the teaching time and 
compulsory for state accredited state, municipal and nonstate educational institutions, and the remaining 
30 per cent divided between the regional and the school components. The latest amendment to the Article 
7 of the Law on Education (2008 [1992]) abolished the tripartite education standard and replaced it with a 
single federal standard. 
3 Comparative studies are also labour-intensive in terms of the linguistic and interpretation skills they often 
necessitate. They rely on data from different countries and cultures, whose collection and analysis requires 
much time and contextual sensitivity.
4 Steiner-Khamsi (2009) illustrates her point by drawing on the examples from the US comparative education 
research during the Cold War era. These studies often contrasted the US education model with that of the 
Soviet Union in order to understand the unprecedented technological success of the Soviets. Mainly for 
ideological reasons, the similarities between the cases were never addressed out loud.  
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similarities between the cases and therefore lead to abrupt binary positioning of cases. 
One of the key limitations of the method lies in the fact that it does not aim at 
inferring general explanations. Skocpol and Somers (1980, 192) argue that comparative 
historians who apply this type of methodology pursue their research with a sort of 
“‘self-denying ordinance’ against endeavours to develop new explanations”. In other 
words, the descriptive holism characteristic of this method precludes the development of 
explanatory arguments (ibid., 193). In this respect one should bear in mind that Skocpol’s 
and Somers’s discussion is embedded in the discipline of history and its methodology. In 
comparative social sciences, which aim at explaining variation, a different stance is also 
possible. Haydu (1998, 342) asserts that while individualising comparisons discourage 
generalisation, they rely on descriptive accuracy in search of an adequate explanation of 
particular outcomes. Consequently, explanations arise not from the comparative practice 
per se, but from acquiring a deeper understanding of the cases by means of contrasting 
their various instances with one another. In the dissertation, the variation between the 
cases, made transparent by contrasting cases with each other, contributes to explaining 
differences in the phenomena under study, that is, the reconfigurations of citizenship 
education and the relationship between citizenship and nationality as expressed in the 
education policy documents. 
In this respect, the logic of individualisation is combined with the logic of variation-
finding. The latter seeks to “establish a principle of variation in the character or intensity 
of a phenomenon by examining systematic differences among instances” (Tilly 1984, 
82). Often, variation-finding comparisons seek to infer causation, that is, establish 
which variation is crucial in causing variation in the outcome(s). The logic of variation 
strengthens the individualisation approach by drawing attention to variation in instances 
meaningful for the interpretation of the phenomenon. In the dissertation, the variation 
focuses on the relationship between nationality and citizenship and its consequence 
for and manifestations in citizenship education. The combination of several sets of 
comparative logic is not uncommon; Tilly suggests that almost all comparison would 
be variation-finding as the very logic of comparison rests with variation between cases 
(ibid., 116). However, a mixture of logics can lead to ambiguity in the ultimate message 
of the research (Skocpol & Somers 1980, 190). 
With respect to the mixed comparative logic of the dissertation, we could express 
the ambiguity by asking whether the purpose of the research is to infer or at least 
suggest a causal generalisation that could be tested further across other types of cases 
or to highlight the individuality of each case. Adopting from Bendix (1976, 247 in ibid., 
180), the present dissertation asks the same question of divergent materials, that is, 
different socio-political and school systems, leaving room for divergent answers. The 
aim is to make more explicit and understandable the ways in which diverse societies 
have responded to the common modern challenge of retaining legitimacy and unity. In 
this manner, generalisations take the form of recurrent dilemmas which are resolved 
54
NELLI PIATTOEVA
differently in different contexts and the aim of the research is to answer why one solution 
was pursued rather than another (Haydu 1998; Steiner-Khamsi 2009). This being so, 
explanations cannot be generalised beyond the studied cases. Nevertheless, they point to 
instances that should be considered but not automatically expected to carry explanatory 
power in a different time-space setting. In this manner, the inductive approach adopted 
in the dissertation could pave the way for a more deductive methodology and inclusion 
of new cases. 
As has been argued in Article I, globalisation literature lacks a truly global perspective, 
as it often makes generalisations and far-reaching conclusions on the basis of limited 
empirical evidence, often focusing on Western countries (e.g. Tikly 2001). Also, the 
customary preoccupation with stable European states where the nation-state is easily 
taken for granted has turned the nation-state into an explanatory category rather than one 
in need of analysis and explanation itself (cf. Dale & Robertson 2009). These assumptions 
lose ground once the research setting is relocated to new or recently reconfigured states. 
Comparing a reconfigured state to a stable state allows for the probation of antithetical 
hypotheses in settings which represent qualitatively different state traditions and levels of 
stability. For instance, does citizenship education in a reconfigured state cater exclusively 
for the nation-state, whereas a stable nation-state loses interest in, and a need for, 
citizenship education altogether or allows subnational and supranational categories to 
dominate? This question is linked to a broader issue, namely does a reconfigured nation-
state primarily attempt to reconcile nationality and citizenship and therefore strengthen 
the bond between the state and the nation, whereas a stable nation-state fosters divorce 
between the two? These dichotomous statements were at the background of the research 
as hypotheses to be explored through the education policy data. The analysis of the 
documents demonstrates whether the presumed dichotomy can be sustained. 
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6 TWO COUNTRIES, TWO STATE MODELS
In order to interpret the evolution of citizenship education policies in times of political 
change, it is necessary to understand and analytically designate the socio-political 
and historical contexts within which the change occurs. The aim of this chapter is to 
substantiate the comparative framework of the dissertation by analysing Russian and 
Finnish state traditions and current dilemmas faced by the two countries. The comparative 
framework of the research is based on the idea that contemporary Russia and Finland 
have inherited qualitatively different state models and therefore carry different socio-
political, cultural and historical legacies. Both have had to find solutions to the task of 
forging stability, peace and legitimacy amidst internal heterogeneity, but have relied on 
different policies to handle the matter. In relation to globalisation, the cases of Russia and 
Finland present the researcher with an opportunity to study how disparate states address 
the challenges of global integration. 
The specific qualities of the two states are briefly discussed and compared in Article 
V, as well as in Articles III and IV with respect to Russia, and some issues discussed in 
the following text replicate the articles. However, this chapter seeks to provide the reader 
with a more detailed and comprehensive comparative analysis of the state contexts 
crucial to the interpretation of citizenship education policies.
6.1 Empire-state and nation-state as contested categories
6.1.1 On the nation-state 
Since the French and American revolutions, the nation-state emerged as the predominant 
and almost the only legitimate model of political organisation and a vehicle of 
collective identity (Smith 1998, 70). It came into being with the advent of the doctrine 
of nationalism with two major consequences. First, nationalism as a ‘civic religion’, to 
borrow Hobsbawm’s (1987) expression, served the interests of the emerging bureaucratic 
secular state. From this perspective, nationalism provided a means of connecting people 
to this modern institution. Second, nationalism asserted that nations should strive for 
more autonomy because the highest measure of national freedom is possession of an 
independent state (Habermas 1994). 
Nationalism, therefore, emerged as both a form of homogenising and unifying policy 
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of the state, as well as a political movement striving to overtake, mould or withdraw 
from the state. In other words, the nation can be evoked as a legitimate justification 
for almost opposite political projects, that is, state-wide unifying policies and separatist 
claims. In this connection, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of the nation and its 
link with the ideology of nationalism because the key attribute of the nation-state is the 
state’s close affiliation to the nation. The definitions of the nation range from objective/
normative to subjective/self-reflexive and from premordialist (realist) to modernist and 
constructivist. In the modernist perception, the nation is defined in terms of nationalism 
and the struggle for political autonomy, whereas in the premordialist view nations 
represent human collectives with distinct and rather permanent cultural features akin 
to ethnic communities. In the constructivist interpretation, the nation is perceived as 
an imagined community within which there is a general belief in the objective nature of 
the nation and a desire to attain self-governance (e.g. Anderson 1991). The perspective 
adopted in this study shares with the constructivist and modernist position the idea that 
nations are products of nationalism; they are created and maintained as an artefact of 
nationalism. As Levy (2004 in Norman 2006) has stated, the political programme of 
nationalism is built into the category of the nation to start with; nations and nationalism 
are inseparable and the former cannot be understood without the latter. 
However, it is difficult to define nationalism per se. It could be described as a process 
of building and maintaining nations or nation-states, a mental consciousness and 
worldview, or a political ideology and a political movement which strives to realise the 
will of the nation (Smith 2001). Nationalism could also be identified with the rhetoric 
of forming and maintaining nations. In fact the rhetorical or discursive element is 
particularly important. Nationalism as discourse (Calhoun 1997; also Billig 2002) goes 
beyond the debate of whether nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds 
that the nation and the state should be congruent (Gellner 1983) or manifests an entire 
form of seeing and interpreting the world (Billig 2002). Rather, nationalism is a rhetoric 
that can be employed to justify very different political projects including, but not being 
limited to, the construction and maintenance of the modern territorial state. The usage 
of nationalistic arguments in very diverse political projects manifests their political and 
social credibility. 
As has been noted by Smith (1998) and Breully (1993), nationalism plays an important 
role in maintaining nation-states and the political project to obtain and exercise state 
power. For Breully (1993), nationalism is principally a form of opposition politics, while 
the state-led governmental nationalism is more difficult to define. Nonetheless, the link 
between nationalist politics and the state has remained weak only for as long as the nation 
was not yet conceived as the basic source of political legitimacy of the state. The situation 
reversed once the nation itself became the main source of political legitimation. (ibid.) 
Anderson (1991, 86–87, 109–111) also stresses that official state nationalisms developed 
after and in reaction to the popular national movements. They “concealed a discrepancy 
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between nation and dynastic realm” (ibid., 110). Eventually, dynastic and imperial states 
were either relatively successfully transformed into nation-states (Britain, France) or 
disintegrated into a number of independent nation-states (the fate of the Hapsburg, 
Russian and Soviet empires). In the increasingly nationalistic political culture, imperial 
explosions and the following construction of nation-states were commonly perceived 
as natural and legitimate processes. This way, nationalism successfully disguises the 
artificial character of the nation-state itself. 
The hegemony of the national(ist) state model is obvious (Castles 2005, 690). It suggests 
that genuine societies are only those where social, cultural and political dimensions 
coincide (McCrone & Kiely 2000, 23). As a result people claiming to constitute a nation 
strive to form an independent state and can be recognised as such by the international 
community. Moreover, states continue to assert that they are composed of and represent 
a unitary nation even when the multicultural composition of their citizenry is more than 
obvious. In this context, new states are likely to seek a stronger bond between nationality 
and citizenship, often at the expense of their ethnic minorities. 
To recapitulate, nation-states, ideally, possess the following unique features: there is a 
common assumption that the political jurisdiction (the state) coincides with the cultural 
grouping (the nation) and correspondently citizenship and nationality are perceived as 
two sides of the same coin. The government is just only when supported by popular will 
and when it can claim to serve the interests of ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’. And finally, 
individuals are perceived as integral constituents of the nation and in this manner equal 
to other citizens regardless of class, gender or ethnicity. Metaphorically speaking, nation-
states are often described and imagined in terms of horizontal fraternity. The people are 
sovereign within the state just as the nation-state is sovereign in the world of other equal 
but mutually exclusive nation-states. 
6.1.2 On the empire-state
Beissinger (2005) argues that the meaning of empire has shifted over time and it is now 
commonly perceived as an illegitimate form of domination. It is as if history has given 
its verdict against empire in favour of the nation-state. At the same time, empire has 
constituted a highly politically charged and polemical term, illustrated for instance, by the 
historical rivalry between the Soviet Union and its ‘Western enemies’ with both parties 
labelling each other imperialists (Lieven 2003, 3). Empires are regarded as illegitimate 
due to the fact that they are said to violate the principles of national self-determination 
and state sovereignty, which constitute the main and the sole legitimate pillars of the 
modern state system (Beissinger 2005, 42). The perception is closely related to the “rise 
of global norms of state sovereignty and national self-determination and the triumph of 
anti-colonial struggles” (ibid., 89). Accordingly, empires are believed to be doomed to 
disintegration (Lieven 2003, 330). 
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In fact, states are usually labelled as empires post factum. For instance, the Soviet 
Union has been described as an empire only after its collapse, thus sealing its illegitimate 
nature and failure to integrate heterogeneous peoples into a cohesive nation (Suny 1995, 
187). Furthermore, in the world of nation-states, empires are perceived as the “nation-
state’s alter ego and the significant other against which nations struggle” (Beissinger 
2005, 90). In the context of this study, the empire-state is evoked as an analytical category 
which sheds light on and helps to theorise about the historical legacy and contemporary 
challenges of the Russian Federation, while I am aware of the conceptual, theoretical and 
empirical imprecision and ideological charge of the concept.1 
Empire-states and nation-states are characterised by almost opposite perceptions of 
integration of their constituent societies into a political community (Parrott 1997, 7). To 
start with, empires adhere to a different conception of legitimacy. Nation-states draw 
legitimacy from the nation; they are perceived as legitimate as long as the state can claim to 
serve and represent the nation. Empire-states, on the other hand, lack broad legitimation. 
In fact, we could ask whether the entire idea of legitimation was at all relevant to empires 
prior to the age of nationalism and the birth of mass politics in the 19th century. 
Empires are usually characterised by absolute and autocratic rule, whose legitimation 
lies in divinity, hereditary right or a form of universalistic (as opposed to particularistic, 
as in nationalism) ideology. While the Romanov empire adhered to the divine rule of 
the emperor and proclaimed Orthodoxy the unifying identity for all those living on its 
territory, the Soviet state equally legitimised its rule in terms of the supra- or anti-national 
international and socialist ideology (Rowley 2000). Hence, in empires sovereignty and 
the right to rule do not reside with the nation, but with an individual or an institution, 
such as the Soviet Communist Party or the emperor. Moreover, the state is not in place to 
serve and represent the nation; the relationship between the two is reversed. In imperial 
Russia, for instance, people did not legitimise the tsar’s right to rule. The right was 
conferred by God, by conquest, by hereditary right or other equally non-nationalistic 
justifications. (Suny 2001.)
Empires expose people to unequal rule and simultaneously do not strive to constitute a 
cohesive and culturally homogenous nation (Doyle 1986 in Suny 1995, 197; Parrott 1997). 
As a result, non-integration occurs in two respects. Politically, people are subjected to 
authoritarian regime, as opposed to being equal citizens endowed with rights and duties. 
Consequently, the ruling and the ruled constitute a vertical and unequal relationship (Suny 
& Martin 2001, 9). Culturally, empires do not seek to create a culturally and linguistically 
homogenous nation equivalent to the state. Instead, modern empires are characterised 
by an existence of a metropolitan society – one powerful nation – that controls the 
sovereignty of subordinate nations (Parrott 1997). The centre is not necessarily defined 
ethnically or geographically. It could also be a ruling institution with a status or a class 
1 This statement is equally true of the category of the nation-state.
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character, e.g. nobility, political class, imperial family or the Soviet nomenklatura. (Suny 
2001, 25–26.) Empires are always constituted of a number of distinct nations, which is 
the reason why they cannot explicitly adhere to a nationalistic ideology privileging one 
nation over others at the expense of internal stability. Consequently, empires opt for 
supra- or anti-national ideologies (Rowley 2000) and are best described as multinational 
and differentiated entities of unequal power distribution.
In addition to the objective/normative differences, empires are perceived and 
imagined differently from nation-states. The subjective element is at least as important 
as the objective one, especially when considering reasons for imperial disintegration. 
Subjectively speaking, an important issue is whether state policies are accepted as ‘ours’ 
or resisted as ‘theirs’ (Beissinger 1995, 155). Imperial policies are commonly viewed as 
‘theirs’ and therefore by definition illegitimate (ibid). From this perspective, one of the 
central innovative features of the nation-state lies in the realisation that state policies 
should be subjectively perceived as ‘ours’ by a broad spectrum of citizens, if stability of 
the state is to be preserved (also Article III). 
In the following, Russian contemporary politics are analysed in the context of the 
effective conceptual and institutional post-imperial heritage that Russia strives to come 
to grips with in order to gain legitimacy among its constituent population and in the 
wider world of nation-states. The role of empire has been overwhelming and needs to 
be understood in the context of the ongoing redefinition of Russia’s identity and future 
(e.g. Lieven 2003). In addition to the actual institutional and conceptual legacy, it is 
equally important to acknowledge the mental and imaginary baggage left by the Soviet 
period. The accusations of empire are easily resurrected every time Russia’s internal 
or external political legitimacy starts to raise distrust (Beissinger 2005). This reveals 
that the imperial legacy is neither static nor objective. It is rather a moral judgement 
passed on the legitimacy of past and present policies. From this perspective, education 
policies related to national identity and citizenship could be interpreted as an arena that 
is both affected by and contributes to the re-evaluation of the imperial past and future. 
In moments of transitology, the past is destroyed, reinterpreted and harnessed to serve 
current and future political goals. 
In addition to its centrality for Russia, the category of empire deserves attention in 
the context of the ongoing transformation of the nation-state. Just as former empires 
were accused of assimilation and, faced with a threat of disintegration, had to consent to 
the demands of cultural minorities and rising ethnonationalism, contemporary nation-
states, too, are confronted with pending questions of a similar nature. With the nation-
state under siege, we could ask what is the alternative, taken that our arsenal of state 
categories does not leave many options to choose from. For instance, Lieven (2003, 73) 
writes that “as the nation state weakens, the possibility grows that power will form and be 
legitimised according to different models in the twenty-first century”. Remarkably, the 
newly reconfigured states, such as Russia, encounter the paradox of striving for a nation-
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state at the time of its recession. While Russia is currently seeking to strengthen its 
statehood and reconsolidate the link between citizenship and nationality, the centrifugal 
processes of globalisation are said to decouple the state, the nation and consequently 
nationality and citizenship. Therefore in the Russian case there is a double challenge 
to the state-building process, that is, to deal with the imperial legacy along with the 
impinging global forces. 
6.1.3 Empire-state and nation-state compared
The following table offers a comparative synthesis of the main ideal characteristics of the 
empire-state and the nation-state discussed in sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2.
Table 2. Empire-state and nation-state compared
Empire-state Nation-state
Legitimation supranational and anti-national nation
Inclusion/Membership habitation and/or conquest ethnic descent and/or 
adherence to common political 
principles
Rights and privileges multiplicity of memberships, 
differentiated statuses, 
uneven distribution of rights 
(undemocratic)
single status, uniform and 
universal
6.2 Russia as a heterogeneous empire-state
For present day Russia, one of the key challenges is to forge a national identity, while 
the Soviet imperial legacy is likely to intervene in the process of nation-state building. 
However, the Soviet Union did not entirely fit into the ideal type of empire. Beissinger 
(2005, 41) suggests that instead of perceiving the USSR as the last empire, it should be 
examined as a new type of empire. The USSR differed from its historical predecessors in 
two important ways: its denial of its imperial nature and the use of the main principles 
of the nation-state – autonomy and sovereignty – to rule over a polyethnic population 
which lacked consensus to being ruled (ibid.). As Brubaker (1996, 8) has succinctly stated, 
the Soviet regime “institutionalised both territorial nationhood and ethnocultural 
nationality as basic cognitive and social categories”. However, as will be discussed later 
in the text (also Article V), the main principles of the nation-state were not effectively 
attributed to the entire Soviet Union. Instead, the controversial and mutually antithetical 
policies of Russification, nativisation (korenizatsia), ethnoterritorial federalism and 
ascriptive nationality engendered and institutionalised nationhood on a sub-state level. 
61
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICIES AND THE STATE
In other words, the Soviet regime attributed the ‘national’ to component parts of the 
state and its citizenry and thus codified ethnic heterogeneity as national heterogeneity 
(Brubaker 1994, 50; Brubaker 1996, 29). 
Beissinger’s (2005, 94) perception of empire obscures any clearcut distinction between 
empire-state and nation-state and, theoretically and methodologically speaking, it allows 
for a new way to study empires beyond rigid classifications and definitions, but rather 
as a context instead of structure, and a problem instead of a diagnosis. Equally, Lieven’s 
(2003, xiv) broad definition of empire rests on the idea that empire is a very great power 
that has played a significant role in international politics; it is a polity that rules over 
wide territories and many peoples, and it is not a democracy. Though these criteria 
differentiate between empire-states and nation-states or multinational states, some states 
claiming to be nation-states would share a few of the above characteristics, for example, 
India, China, USA and Indonesia. Thus, we are alerted to the thought that the borderline 
between empires and nation-states is blurred and that the questions of nationalism and 
nation-building are central to the study of modern empires too. 
In this manner, Beissinger (2005, 44–45) calls for the study of empires analogous 
to Brubaker’s institutionalist view of nationhood. Brubaker (1996, 16) argues that “we 
should not ask ‘what is a nation’ but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural 
form institutionalised within and among states”. Neither empires nor nation-states are 
natural categories of analysis or ‘things’ to be accurately described; rather they represent 
categories of practice which give rise to certain perceptions, and therefore are products 
of a socio-political process (Beissinger 2005, 44; Özkirimli 2000). Consequently, empires, 
akin to nations, are imagined in people’s minds and rely on popular identifications and 
perceptions. 
The most controversial characteristic of the Soviet polity springs, on the one hand, 
from its simultaneous policy of nation-building on the sub-state level, and on the other 
hand, from the inculcation of a subjective perception of empire (Suny & Martin 2001). 
The USSR revealed its imperial character in the asymmetrical and hierarchical treatment 
of people based on, primarily, their nationality. In other words, in the Soviet Union 
entitlements to rights were not determined by citizenship, but by one’s national affiliation 
(ascribed by the authorities). At the same time, the friendship of peoples forged by the 
Russians served as a metaphor for the supranational imagined community of the Soviet 
people (Martin 2001, 81). This supranational political doctrine was supposed to function 
as a unifying ideology. In the long run, the Soviet Union did aim at constructing one 
nation, but not a Russian nation. The goal was the merger (sliianie) of all ethnicities into 
one Soviet people who identify with common political principles.
As has been discussed already, the main difference between empires and nation-states 
lies in the unwillingness or inability of the former to create a culturally and linguistically 
homogeneous nation equivalent to the state (Article V). In the Russian (Soviet) case, 
the very conception of the nation was relegated from the state-wide to the sub-state 
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level – the level of the numerous republics, autonomous republics, national okrugs and 
other ethnically defined constituents of the state (Brubaker 1994, 52). The relegation of 
nationhood to the sub-state level constitutes an important feature of Russian political 
thinking, which has led to the emergence of nationality as separate from citizenship and 
statehood. Brubaker (1994) explains that the principle of nationality as distinct from 
citizenship was consolidated on two levels. First, the Soviet Union was structured on 
ethnic basis granting many nationalities their own territories with varying autonomies. 
Second, nationality was consolidated on the personal level by ascribing it to each 
individual. The latter was reinforced by the Soviet passport formalities, which required 
each citizen to specify his/her nationality in the personal identification papers (the so 
called ‘fifth entry’ in the internal passport). The nationality indicated in the official 
documents was inherited by blood from one’s parents, while the category of Soviet 
nationality did not even exist. (Article V; Brubaker 1994; Simonsen 1999.) 
Ethnofederalism and the practice of the fifth entry only helped to further solidify 
the role played by the sub-state nationality. Brubaker has concluded that due to the 
institutionalisation of nationality it “became and remained a basic institutional building 
block of the avowedly internationalist, supranationalist, and anti-nationalist Soviet 
state (…)” (Brubaker 1994, 54, emphasis added). More so, the Soviet state “established 
nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from the 
overarching categories of statehood and citizenship. In doing so, it prepared the way for 
its own demise”. (Brubaker 1996, 23.) 
However, despite the institutionalisation of nationality and its crucial role in the 
disintegration of the Soviet system, ethnic Russians lacked a sense of unified nationhood, 
a common understanding of what it means to be Russian, as opposed to Soviet. As 
Sakwa (2008, 39) argues, Russia has been “more subsumed” into the Soviet identity than 
other Soviet republics, leading to confusion between Russia and the Soviet Union. The 
position of the Russian republic (RSFSR) – the territorial predecessor of contemporary 
Russia – was different from the other national territories in not being defined as a 
homeland for ethnic Russians. Instead, it was the centre of the Soviet Union and a base 
for its fundamental political and cultural institutions. The RSFSR did not have its own 
Russian Communist Party or the Academy of Science. And the history of the USSR was 
in fact the history of Russia; Russia did not have a separate history from that of the 
USSR (Kuzio 2001, 111). Paradoxically, Russians did not feel privileged on the territory 
of RSFSR divided into autonomous republics and national formations to accommodate 
non-Russian nationalities. Also, the great majority of Soviet elites were either Russian 
by nationality or residents of the RSFSR. (Brubaker 1994.) Hence, the party elite were 
Russian in ethnicity, but Soviet in loyalty. They hardly distinguished between Russia and 
the Soviet Union, and they took pride in the Soviet empire that for them represented the 
most valuable aspect of the Russian history and culture. (Lieven 2003, 318.)
The high degree of overlap between the USSR and Russia explains why a survey 
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conducted in the late 1970s and the early 1980s found that 80 per cent of Georgians and 
Uzbeks considered their titular republic as their homeland, whereas 70 per cent or more 
Russians, regardless of where they lived, named the Soviet Union as their homeland 
(Kolstø 2000). These findings reveal that there was no single Soviet identity shared by 
all those residing in the territory of the USSR. Instead, the Soviet Union gave rise to two 
forms of identification: one strongly linked to the sub-state nationhood, as in the case of 
non-Russians, and a supranational identity of Russians and Russophones. Consequently, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union was most difficult for the ethnic Russians, as it took 
away their main reference point (e.g. Tishkov & Olcott 1999, 66; Payn 2004, 37). By the 
same token, for a significant segment of Russian elites, whose self-understanding was 
never embedded in the RSFSR, Russia did not constitute an adequate territorial and 
institutional framework for the emerging Russian national statehood (Brubaker 1994, 
70). Evidence suggests that Russian political leaders incorporate at least some segments 
of the former Soviet citizens into the realm of the modern Russian nation (Tolz 1998a; 
1998b; Shevel 2009).2
In addition, the establishment of Russian statehood was accompanied by a conflict 
between internal state-building and external withdrawal, giving rise to a feeling of defeat 
and failure (Sakwa 2008, 39). From the perspective of power politics, Russia ended as the 
biggest loser of the Cold War period, as it gave away a statehood crafted in the course 
of millennium (ibid., 212). In this situation, neither the Russian political leaders nor 
the public were ready to view the territory and the institutions of the new Russia as a 
legitimate base for the Russian national statehood. Consequently, in Russia, the territorial 
and institutional issues have been more vigorously contested than in other former Soviet 
territories. (Brubaker 1994, 70.) This explains why the national-patriotic argument 
claiming that Russia’s problems of state-building are to be blamed on its separation from 
some of its historical territories and peoples has been popular throughout Russia’s recent 
history (ibid). 
The reconfigured Russia continues the Soviet legacy of decoupling citizenship 
and nationality. As has been described by Tishkov and Olcott (1999, 64–67), Russia is 
still a form of “institutionalized multiethnicity”. At present, the Russian Federation 
consists of 83 autonomous formations (subjects of the federation), with 21 republics 
being simultaneously federal units and proto-nation-states (Constitution of the Russian 
Federation 1993). Another uncertainty lies in the existence of different visions of what 
2 Shevel’s (2009) discussion shows how the elite’s perception that the Russian nation extends beyond the 
territory of the Russian state plays a central role in the evolution of citizenship legislation, although it is 
confronted by political realities and pragmatic concerns over Russia’s military and political stability and 
material security. Also, the high frequency with which new citizenship laws and amendments to them 
appeared, illustrates how uncertain and contested the issues of citizenship and national identity have been 
since the dissolution of the USSR. The latest amendments attest to the view that the significance of the 
identity overlap between Russia and the Soviet Union is getting weaker and citizenship legislation is mostly 
guided by pragmatic concerns and a territorial definition of the Russian nation. 
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Russian nationhood and citizenship should constitute. Since the collapse of the Union, 
the executive branch has promoted three visions of the Russian nation. First is the nation 
in civic terms as rossiiane, a community of citizens regardless of their ethnic affiliation 
expressing loyalty to the new political institutions of the Russian Federation. Second is 
the understanding of Russia as a community of Russian speakers, which brings Russian 
speakers living in the newly independent states or the so-called ‘near abroad’ into the 
realm of the Russian nation. According to the third interpretation, the Russian nation 
extends to the borders of the former Soviet Union and often contains a Slavic bias, 
limiting itself to ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. (Tolz 2001; Article V.) 
The official understanding of nationhood is further coloured by the tension between 
ethnic and civic meanings of the term, with the ethnic conception deeply rooted in the 
Russian political culture (e.g. nationality inherited by blood from either parent).3
Boris Yeltsin was the first Russian leader to abandon the imperial conception of 
Russia. He promoted Russia’s national independence from the Soviet Union just as the 
Baltic States or Armenia insisted on theirs. (Rowley 2000, 35–36.) Russia declared its 
sovereignty on 12 June 1990 and effectively seceded from the USSR on 8 December 1991. 
The declaration was greatly affected by the perception that the USSR was an empire 
and that Russia needed a clearly defined nation-state of its own in order to preserve and 
develop its unique identity. In this manner, the USSR was perceived as an economic 
burden for the Russians and a destroyer of the Russian culture and traditions (Tolz 2001, 
206–207). However, Russia emerged as the “residual legatee of the Soviet state following 
the latter’s dissolution in December 1991” (Sakwa 2008, 36). Despite that, the reborn 
Russia had no precedents; neither in terms of geographical borders nor the principles of 
the polity (ibid).4 In addition, Yeltsin was guided more by “imperatives of holding power 
than by the principles of civic nation building”, whereas political decisions were affected 
by the necessity to purge communism rather than to build new forms of political loyalty. 
(Tishkov & Olcott 1999, 71–73.) 
Yeltsin’s administration had tried to promote a civic understanding of citizenship 
– a notion of rossianin, as a citizen of Russia, as opposed to russki, an ethnic Russian – 
immediately after Russia proclaimed its independence. However, Tolz (2001, 253–254) 
3 Lieven (2003, 384) writes that Russian national identity is not easily described by the categories of civic 
versus ethnic identity. On the one hand, the French- and English-born political identity based on the 
notions of citizenship, participation and civil rights had no fertile grounds to develop in an authoritarian 
state. On the other hand, it does not fit the ethnic notion based on determination to preserve a threatened 
language, culture and separate national existence. Russia has historically perceived itself as an imperial 
polity containing peoples of different ethnic origin and religion.
4 Statistically speaking, the territory of Russia is 76 per cent of that of the USSR; Russia acquired 11,000 km 
of new borders as a result of the disintegration of the USSR; according to the census of 1989, the population 
of reconfigured Russia, approximately 147 million, constitutes 51 per cent of that of Soviet population with 
the majority (around 80 per cent) identifying themselves as ethic Russians, in contrast to just half in the 
Soviet period. Thus over 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves outside the new Russia. (Sakwa 2008, 
36, 207–208.) 
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claims that the idea of a civic nation was too new for Russians, whereas the understanding 
based on language and culture carries a longer historical legacy. In 1995 Yeltsin urged 
people, on the pages of the government-supported Rossiiskaia Gazeta, to search for the 
Russian national idea. Most proposals, published in the newspaper, resurrected the idea 
of state patriotism. This vision was earlier adopted by many Russian rulers, including 
the Communist Party, and is based on “pride in belonging to and serving a strong state”. 
(Tolz 2001, 255–256; Article IV.)
Most tangible measures directed at rooting state patriotism were taken by Yeltsin’s 
successor, president Vladimir Putin. His stance was characterised by strengthening the 
central state and lessening the power of ethnically defined administrative territories. 
Putin created seven federal districts with administrators possessing powers to intervene 
in the work of Russia’s subjects (ibid., 261). For some, this measure represents a new form 
of Russian centralism, particularly evident in the top-down execution of the political 
reform, whereas others argue that Putin’s reassertion of central authority offers an 
opportunity to move away from asymmetrical federalism. With respect to citizenship 
this means, at least in theory, a more universal and homogeneous type of citizenship 
across Russia, which does not depend on one’s place of residence (Sakwa 2008, 228, 282): 
Universal citizenship sought to undermine not only segmented regionalism but also 
challenged the emergence of ethnocratic states in some of the republics, where the titular 
populations were privileged over the rest (ibid., 228).
Another important measure was the ratification, only in 2001, of the Russian state 
symbols, the white-blue-red tricolour flag, the two-headed eagle coat of arms and the old 
Soviet hymn with new lyrics. Boris Yeltsin’s administration never succeeded in gaining 
parliamentary approval of the state symbols – another fact revealing the difficulty of 
finding consensus on the new national foundation. The symbols agreed upon in 2001 
represent a mixture of the tsarist past (the flag and the coat of arms) and the Soviet legacy 
(the hymn). The army regained its Soviet red flag as a manifestation of its link to the 
victory of the Soviet army in the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945). 
The programmes of state patriotism issued by Putin’s administration reveal that the 
authorities are deeply uncertain about the loyalty of the people to the state. This quote 
follows similar argument: 
The state continues to hang above society; it remains for the vast majority of inhabitants 
a distant and alien ‘significant other’ to be deceived and feared, simultaneously an 
object of distrust and of booty. In the Soviet period, the distinction between subject and 
citizen was thoroughly blurred; everyone was simultaneously cast into both roles. In 
post-Soviet times, the distinction remains clouded, if only because the population has 
yet to discern features in prevailing authority that would allow it to recognise it as ‘ours’. 
(Beissinger 1997, 177–178.)
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Lieven (2003, 386) compares post-Soviet Russia to the Second Austrian republic which, in 
contrast to Russia, managed to win people’s loyalty after imperial collapse thanks to the 
economic prosperity it provided. In Russia, on the other hand, the economic hardship, 
which cumulated in the financial crisis of the late 1990s and the crash of the rouble in 
1998, further helped to undermine public confidence in democracy and the westernising 
course. Economic collapse and disillusionment deepen public alienation and undermine 
loyalty to and confidence in the state. These events are generally associated with Russia’s 
loss of prestige and its subordination and vulnerability to the hegemony of the ‘West’ 
(Hedetoft & Blum 2008). Such public perceptions establish conditions to support the 
return to a more conservative model of governance and a nationalistic agenda based on 
claims of Russia’s uniqueness and a political path of its own (Piattoeva 2010).
Lastly, the institutionalisation of nationality on the sub-state level leads to questions 
such as how to strike a balance between subnational and all-state identities. These 
issues are further complicated by the fact that around 25 million ethnic Russians live 
outside Russia in the former Soviet republics. Nevertheless, Russian authorities continue 
to claim that these people are their responsibility, as the war in Georgia has recently 
demonstrated. Under these circumstances, defining the limits of Russia’s territory and 
finding a set of common cultural symbols present challenges to Russia’s state leaders 
(Sperling 2003, 239). 
6.3 Finland as a homogeneous nation-state 
In the dissertation, Finland is conceptualised as a nation-state, which has been politically 
constructed as a homogeneous monocultural polity. When the terms nation (kansa), 
nationhood (kansakunta) and citizenship (kansalaisuus) were translated into the Finnish 
language in the mid 19th century, they acquired a common root – kansa (nation). The choice 
of translation manifested the strong bond between nation, nationality and citizenship 
in the Finnish political culture (Pulkkinen 1999, 119). However, national cohesion and 
ethnic homogeneity constitute a long-term political project, and these perceptions have 
had to be anchored in the minds of the people living on a vast and scarcely populated 
territory (Lepola 2000). The system of education, the army and the media have played 
significant roles in this political endeavour. Finland has been perceived as ethnically 
homogeneous despite the fact that it is populated by a number of ethnic minorities and 
an indigenous population. In this respect, even Finland exemplifies the artificial nature 
of the nation, as ethnic homogeneity is primarily based on denial or even purposeful 
destruction of ethnic and cultural diversity. (Article V.)
The ideal of national unity emerged at the start of the Finnish nation-building project 
in the 19th century and was especially strong in the early independence period (1917) and 
after the world wars (Lepola 2000). After the 1905 general strike and especially after the 
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civil war, national unity was expected to override political differences. The usage of the 
national unity discourse in such a manner is typical of nationalism. National identity is 
expected to supersede all other identifications, including ethnic and political sentiments. 
(Article V.) Until the beginning of the 1990s, Finland remained a country with almost 
non-existent immigration and one of Europe’s tightest immigration legislations, 
therefore it could hold onto the myth of cultural homogeneity for longer than many 
other European states. Consequently, it entered the post-Berlin Wall era with a strong 
and rather exclusive or closed national identity (cf. Saukkonen 1999).5 That is why for 
Finland, both immigration and rising ethnic diversity require a deeper change in the 
mindset than in other European countries (cf. Lepola 2000, 21).
The Finnish nation-state was originally built on two different and yet complementary 
ideologies. The first one springs from the heritage of the Fennoman movement, which 
proclaimed the Finnish culture and language the only legitimate foundation for the 
Finnish state and national unity. J.V. Snellman, whose ideas became the foundation of 
the Fennoman ideology, wrote that the Finnish state character lies in its linguistic and 
cultural distinctiveness and unity (Pulkkinen 1999). For Snellman, Finland constituted 
a state due to its linguistic and cultural distinctiveness, even though in juridical terms it 
still belonged to the Russian empire in the 19th century (ibid, 128-129). These ideas were 
crystallised in the Finnish political thinking in the following manner:
1) Nation as a political unit within which there is no division into rulers and ruled. 
Instead, all are united by the new concept of citizen
2) Nation as an ethnic concept which naturalises the political unit
3) A Hegelian idea of political unit as single mentality striving for self-governance. 
(Pulkkinen 1999, 127; Article V.) 
The Fennoman movement put emphasis on language as a means of achieving national 
self-assertion and liberation from the Swedish cultural dominance, as well as to 
counterbalance the political dependence on Russia (Alapuro 1988, 95). In other words, for 
the Fennomans linguistic and cultural unity enabled Finland to resist Russian dominance 
(ibid., 96).6 The slogan ‘one language, one mind’ has had far-reaching consequences for 
5 In the beginning of 1980 there were 12,063 foreigners in Finland constituting 0.3 per cent of the entire 
population. In 1992 the figure grew to 37,643 (0.7 per cent). The magnitude of the change could be illustrated 
by the fact that between 1989 and 1991 the number of foreigners residing in Finland increased as much as 
three times compared to the entire decade of the 1980s. (Lepola 2000, 18–19.) Finland rapidly turned from 
an emigration country to an immigration country with 143,256 foreign citizens (2.7 per cent) by the end of 
2008. In addition, around 90,000 Finnish citizens have been born outside Finland. In linguistic terms, there 
are 4,844,047 (90.9 per cent) Finnish speakers, 289,951 (5.4 per cent) Swedish speakers and 1,778 (0.03 per 
cent) Saami speakers. Other than Finnish, Swedish or Saami speakers constitute 190,538 or 3.6 per cent of 
the entire population. (Statistics Finland 2009.)
6 Harle’s and Moisio’s (2000, 57–64) account of the development of Finnish cartography demonstrates 
the importance of drawing a clear borderline between Finland and Russia as a symbol of Finnish 
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the Finnish society. This vision is based on a primordial understanding of the nation 
and an assumption of historical continuity of distinct nations, which awaken to reach 
a sovereign state status. It resembles the ethnic type of nationalism, which asserts that 
nation-states are held together by virtue of common ethnicity and mentality. Such ethno-
nationalistic arguments often arise before an independent state is established. They are 
typical of national groups who strive to reform or exit a state by politicising ethnicity. By 
the same token, a nation can reach absolute freedom only by acquiring a state of its own.
Finland also exhibits elements of a ‘civic religion’ type of nationalism, that is, 
nationalistic arguments developed and maintained by the state in order to foster in 
citizens a sense of obligation toward the state and simultaneously eliminate obligations 
toward other groups and centres within or outside the territory (Alapuro 1988, 87). These 
were already employed in the 19th century when Finland was increasingly perceived as a 
proto-state, prior to its independence in 1917. Finland’s status within the Russian empire 
was exceptional in that it allowed for a considerable amount of political autonomy in 
comparison to many other constituents of the empire. Especially since the second half of 
the 19th century, drawing on the Swedish constitutional tradition, Finland was perceived 
as an autonomous unit with its own administrative apparatus (ibid., 90). (Article V.)
At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century the elite increasingly 
envisioned Finland as separate from the tsarist empire and required a common national 
ideology to draw a clear line between Finland and Russia. In this respect, ethnic 
ideology was employed for state-building purposes. As Alapuro (1988, 98) writes, while 
Fennomans strove to create a unilingual Finnish national culture, the Swedish-speaking 
liberals stressed Finland’s position as a separate political unit and the importance of 
preserving the constitutional legacy and the political institutions established under 
the Swedish rule. Importantly, the two ideologies merged peacefully into a shared 
nationalistic political culture (ibid., 98, 198). This culture could be summarised in Matti 
Klinge’s words as ethnically, legally and religiously non-Russian Finland with a Finnish 
or Nordic style of administration and parliament (quoted in Harle & Moisio 2000, 80). 
National identification was also clear in the emerging working-class movement, which 
shared ideas developed by Snellman (Alapuro 1988, 147). 
Though predominantly drawing upon ethnicity and culture, the homogenising 
project of the political elite had some important civic traits. By turning the Finnish 
language into the official language of the polity, the state provided opportunities for 
political participation of the Finnish speaking population and reduced the clearcut gap 
between the Finnish-speaking common people and the Swedish speaking elites (e.g. 
distinctiveness, both ethnically and institutionally, and as an intermediate stage in the process of Finnish 
state-formation and nation-building. Another goal of this project was to pave the way for Finland’s entry 
into the international community of nation-states as a sovereign nation in its own right. In this respect, 
the aim was to bring Finland closer to the Western Swedish frontier as part of the so-called Fenno-Scandia 
because Sweden was perceived as a carrier of more refined Nordic and European political and cultural 
traditions (ibid., 62, 92–93). 
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Pulkkinen 1999). Liikanen (1997) writes that the Fennoman notion of the ‘nation’s will’ 
was not a mere celebration of ethno-cultural unity and a call for citizen subordination 
in the name of the nation. He offers an alternative interpretation that the nation’s will 
stood as an important impetus for the development of civil society and a political notion 
of citizenship. By turning the nation into the highest source of power, it gave rise to the 
modern democratic idea of a hegemonic struggle for the right to represent the nation 
(ibid., 349). 
In the Finnish case it is especially interesting to note that the very definition of 
democracy – kansanvalta (literary nation’s power) – shifted from the individual to the 
collective level. Around 1910, democracy was primarily linked to the liberation of the 
Finnish nation and its right to decide independently on its internal affairs rather than 
democratic participation of citizens in a parliamentary democracy. (Arola 2003, 15–16.) 
Therefore, the perception of Finnish kansa (nation) as ethnos has been more prominent 
than the demos interpretation. It is the predominantly ethno-cultural understanding of 
the nation that is common to the political vocabularies of Finland and Russia. 
After the wars, the ethno-cultural and the civic-territorial and state-oriented discourses 
have existed side by side (Lepola 2000, 323). The ethno-cultural ideology developed by 
the Fennomans to underline Finnish distinctiveness and national character in a foreign 
body of the Russian empire was harnessed to serve state building and, in the aftermath 
of independence and the Finnish civil war, national reconciliation and national unity 
projects of the state, therefore giving rise to a reciprocal relationship between the state 
and the nation. Since then, the birth and development of the independent Finnish nation-
state have constituted the core narrative of the Finnish history writing (Liikanen 2005, 
223). This means that until recently, academic research has been mainly preoccupied 
with constructing a ‘true’ progressive history of the nation-state rather than studying 
the relationship between the state and the nation as an independent research question. 
(Article V.)
However, since the 1980s the perception of Finland as a homogeneous nation-state 
started to be questioned (Alasuutari & Ruuska 1999, 236). Keränen (1998, 9) suggests 
that the ‘opening’ of Finland, due to its entry into the EU, marked a deconstructive 
moment for the Finnish nation-state. In other words, the taken for granted national 
identity project started to crumble and was put under scrutiny. The integration process 
led to discussions, deconstruction and reconstruction of what Finland and Finnishness 
are. Even though Finnish key politicians have largely interpreted Finland’s entry into 
the EU as a natural manifestation and continuation of its cultural and institutional 
proximity to Europe, the fact that transnational institutions impinge on state autonomy 
and sovereignty remains.7 In the Finnish case, this is particularly interesting in the light 
of the historically developed fusion between the state and the nation, further solidified 
7 See Harle and Moisio (2000) for direct citations from politicians asserting to the view that Finland is part 
of Europe. 
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by the policy of neutrality between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ since the end of the Second 
World War. The unity between the nation and the state, prior to the collapse of the 
bipolar world, was strengthened by the permanent threat of war, which called for national 
consensus and readiness for national defence. With the old threats losing credibility, the 
meaning of state sovereignty itself is put under question (Joenniemi 1993, 19).
An important issue is, therefore, how the Finnish nation is redefined following the 
end of the great power confrontation, Finland’s entry into the COE, the EU and due to 
a steady inflow of immigrants. In this respect, Finland is confronted with a similar task 
facing Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union – how to re-define its national unity 
in a reconfigured international and national context. As in the Russian case, Finland 
has several options in redefining Finnishness and the bond between citizenship and 
nationality. When the sovereignty of the state is weakened by supranational actors and 
globalised economy, one alternative lies in re-enforcing a purely cultural and ethnic 
definition of the nation-state. This argument is explored by, for example, Alasuutari 
& Ruuska (1999). However, the danger is that this discourse could pave the way for 
discrimination, exclusion and racism towards those not born to ethnically Finnish 
parents. Another option is to define Finland as a constitutional state, in a civic liberal 
manner, but this tradition is presumably much weaker in Finland (Stenius & Turunen 
1995 in Lepola 2000, 325).
6.4 Russia and Finland compared
The following table synthesises comparatively the focal legacies and recurrent dilemmas 
of Russia and Finland analysed in sections 6.2 and 6.3.
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Table 3. Finland and Russia compared
Finland Russia
Nation-state nexus Reciprocal relationship between the state 
and the nation, i.e. the nation united by 
virtue of ethnic descent, shared language 
and common mentality requires a 
sovereign state, and the state realises the 
will of the nation.
The nation defined in ethnic and cultural 
terms is relegated from the state-wide 
level to the sub-state level, leading to a 
clear divorce between the state and the 
nation.
Citizenship-nationality 
nexus
Citizenship and nationality are 
synonymous, i.e. citizens share national 
identification with the Finnish nation by 
definition. 
The emergence of nationality as separate 
from citizenship; citizenship resembles 
subjecthood and citizen rights depend on 
one’s nationality
Recurrent dilemma(s) In the light of the historically consolidated 
bond between the state and the nation, 
nationality and citizenship, how to maintain 
the symbolic sovereignty of the nation-
state and reconsolidate the bond between 
the citizen and the state in the international 
context which fosters their decoupling
In the light of the historical divorce 
between the state and the nation, 
nationality and citizenship, and the 
international context which fosters further 
decoupling between these entities, how to 
root the perception of the state as ‘ours’ 
and build a national identity shared by the 
entire population of the country
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7 INDIVIDUAL PUBLICATIONS
In this chapter I elucidate the articles as the constitutive parts of the dissertation by 
providing brief summaries of the content of the articles and situating each of them in 
relation to the overall research setting. The dissertation consists of five independent 
publications bound by the general research setting and the research questions posed 
in the research. Each article has its specific place in the research. Article I is a general 
introduction to comparative education and the current methodological challenges 
in the field relevant for the topic of the dissertation; Article II analyses the emerging 
supranational citizenship agenda appraised from the perspective of the link between 
education and the nation-state; Articles III–V present and interpret the findings of the 
national cases. 
7.1 Comparative education and the nation-state (Article I)
This article could be perceived as a prologue to the issues explored closely in the dissertation 
in Articles II–V, and it also points to questions for further inquiry untouched in the present 
dissertation. It introduces the discipline of comparative education, and emphasises the 
centrality of the nation-state and its national culture as the key interpretative lenses in 
comparative education research. The discussion reveals the genealogical association 
between the nation-state and public education from a disciplinary perspective, that is, 
how it has affected and is manifest in the main tenets of comparative education. As its 
main focus, the article explores how globalisation has reshaped the nation-state and its 
educational operations. These developments call for changes in the comparative study 
of education across national borders. The main argument is that we should no longer 
regard the nation-state as axiomatic, but turn it into a subject of analysis in its own right. 
In other words, we need to re-conceptualise and re-theorise the shift in the state from 
a static and relatively closed container of socio-political relations (including educational 
ones) to a plurilateral structure increasingly embedded in and contested by subnational 
and supranational interactions. Articles II–V address this analytical task in the context 
of citizenship education, studying the reconfiguration of the nation-state through 
citizenship education policies.
Globalisation is manifested in the rise of alternative cultures and cultural identities, 
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as well as cultural hybridity, which demystify national culture and its proclaimed 
homogeneous unity. As global forces endanger the uniformity of the nation, they also 
reveal its exclusionary nature. Thus conceived, the ‘national characteristics’, which used 
to provide an important explanatory framework in cross-country analyses of education 
systems, appear increasingly problematic. These developments equally impede on one 
of the key tasks of public schooling – to ensure national integration by transmitting the 
shared national culture to the new generations. As the substance of the national culture 
blurs, it becomes increasingly unclear what should be transmitted and whose definitions 
should count.
With respect to the theme of the dissertation, it should be borne in mind that there 
appears to be an extraordinary conflict between the emergence of the new configurations 
of territoriality and the consequent fragmentation of the state, on the one hand, and the 
simultaneous strengthening of the nation-state as the only legitimate and desired form 
of socio-political organisation, on the other hand. This observation paves the way for 
the theoretical assumptions of the dissertation discussed in the article. First, the effects 
of globalisation on nation-states are not homogeneous, but engender diverse and even 
opposing reactions in different socio-political contexts. Second, this article points to the 
role of supranational organisations in the reconfiguration of the nation-state and the 
rise of transnational educational governance. The state is no longer solely responsible for 
the definition, provision and control of formal education. Moreover, national education 
policies are embedded in the emerging global policy rhetoric. Dale & Robertson (2009) 
claim that supranational players represent the “competing imaginary” to that of the 
national educational system, based on the assumption that national systems have reached 
their “use-by date”. Article II explores whether or not supranational and national agendas 
are truly incompatible, with particular focus on citizenship education.
7.2 Citizenship education and supranational actors (Article II)
This article analyses the supranational context of the dissertation by focusing on the 
historical evolution of citizenship education linked to the formation of the nation-state 
and the emerging preoccupation of supranational organisations – UNESCO and the 
COE – with citizenship education. In the article, I argue that we need to understand 
the complex relationship between the essentially national model of citizenship education 
as a basic function and symbol of the nation-state and the new agenda-setting of 
international actors. The strong linkage between citizenship, sovereignty and legitimacy 
explains why international actors have traditionally refrained from intervening in the 
matters of citizenship and citizenship education. From this viewpoint, it is reasonable 
to ask whether citizenship education projects of supranational actors undermine the 
established rationale. The main question posed in the article is whether citizenship 
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education programmes developed by international agents advocate a post-national 
ideology of citizenship which is at odds with the national model of citizenship education 
generated along the consolidation of the nation-state and public schooling. 
The state controlled education assumed the primary responsibility for spreading the 
national language, forging a national identity, encouraging patriotic values, inculcating 
moral discipline and rooting citizenship in terms of justification of the state to the people 
and the duties of the people to the state (Green 1990). These objectives could be perceived 
as the central virtues of the citizen of the emerging nation-state as well as the main 
pillars of the national model of citizenship education. Numerous analyses of educational 
documents and curricula from the 1980s onwards prove that the nationalising task 
of education has remained largely intact. Simultaneously, references to universal 
principles, including world citizenship, tend to grow more strongly (Amadio, Gross, 
Ressler & Truong 2004). These results reveal both the consolidation of the national 
model of citizenship education and the simultaneous dispersion of a post-national 
agenda advocating universal principles. In the light of these findings, the article explores 
citizenship education agendas of UNESCO and the COE with the objective to map them 
in relation to the two citizenship education ideals. 
In contrast to the national model, the agendas of UNESCO and the COE advocate a 
proactive political participation of the individual. They emphasise active participation, 
encourage critical scrutiny and legitimise action against the state, as opposed to 
advocating uncritical obedience and order. The centrality of human rights on the agenda 
implies that citizens are protected against their home governments and can initiate action 
against the state on the basis of universal human rights. The imperative of human rights 
illustrates that both organisations adhere and seek to promote the post-nationalisation 
of citizenship premised on universal personhood, instead of national and particularistic 
peoplehood. In addition, supranational agents strive to enhance a set of universal values, 
such as peace, tolerance, global solidarity, democracy and justice, as opposed to the 
particularistic values which emphasise the uniqueness of each nation. 
Adherence to diversity and a multi-level conception of citizenship identity are the 
qualities which substantially distinguish the post-national model from its national(istic) 
rival. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental character of the organisations and their origin 
embedded in the consolidation of the nation-state system lead to the repetition of the 
traditional citizenship rhetoric and caution with respect to the definition of citizenship 
education. Therefore the article concludes that the supranational script appears 
inconsistent, as it adheres to and promotes both the principles of national sovereignty, 
by equating society with the territorially demarcated nation-state, and universal human 
rights which, by definition, transcend national borders and transform the very meaning 
of sovereignty. The inconsistency of the transnational context implies that nation-
states construct their citizenship education policies in an increasingly complex and yet 
ambiguous environment. Whereas supranational actors could be perceived as carriers 
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of the post-national ideal of citizenship education, they are far from renouncing the 
national model.
7.3 Antithetical citizenship education policies and the 
problem of stateness in Russia (Article III)
This article is the first publication of the dissertation and reports on the empirical analysis 
still in progress then. It analyses Russian citizenship education documents collected up 
to that point (documents published in 1992–2003). Viewed from the general comparative 
setting of the research, this article highlights the specificities of the Russian context with 
particular attention to the simultaneous processes of nation and state building set in 
motion by the disintegration of the USSR. These processes have conflicting logics and 
encumber the consolidation of democracy (Linz & Stepan 1996). The discussion is framed 
around the problem of stateness, which arises when there are profound differences about 
the territorial boundaries of the political community’s state and profound differences 
as to who has the right of citizenship in the state, and, consequently, to constitute the 
political community which legitimises and oversees the state (ibid., 16). In other words, 
in Russia, the crisis of the non-democratic regime was intermixed with uncertainties as to 
the political community and the population who should be members of the community 
(ibid.). 
As long as the Russian state refrained from nation-building, the objectives of citizenship 
education adhered to the logic of constructing a democratic constitutional state and did 
not contain clear antithetical definitions. Contentious notions of the ideal citizen arise 
with the development of patriotic education programmes embedded in the state’s effort 
to engender state cohesion and national integrity. Consequently, patriotism and patriotic 
education are in many respects antithetical to the liberal definitions of citizenship (and 
citizenship education). In patriotic education, subordination is prioritised over active 
participation, consensus is prioritised over pluralism, duties over rights and individual 
identity has to make space for a collective one.
The controversies apparent in the definitions of citizenship education are in line with 
the general arguments of Linz and Stepan (ibid., 25), namely that when a state starts to 
pursue what Rogers Brubaker has called ‘nationalising state policies’ with the objective 
to increase cultural homogeneity by privileging, for instance, the cultural symbols of 
the dominant nation (e.g. flag, anthem), the policies of nation-building and democracy 
become increasingly incompatible. This article continues the topic of the taken-for-
grantedness of the nation-state discussed in Article I in relation to comparative education 
methodology. Article III, for its part, introduces criticism towards the place of the state 
in theories of democracy in general and democratic transition in particular (e.g. Linz 
& Stepan 1996; Canovan 1998). It has been argued that literature on democracy has 
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generally ignored the significance of a solid and unanimous nation-state in democratic 
consolidation and the complex relationship between democracy, state and nation. The 
reason for this lies in the fact that general conclusions are often drawn on the basis of the 
experience of stable Western states, where the processes of state and nation building were 
historically separated and the consolidation of democracy appeared within a relatively 
solid political community. Moreover, the proponents of democracy tend to forget that 
national identities are products of lengthy historical developments. Consequently, as 
Canovan (1998, 16) concludes, theories of democracy are developed on a tacit assumption 
about a stable nation-state. 
These observations lead to similar general methodological conclusions as those 
drawn on the basis of the discussion in Article I. First, that the nation-state itself requires 
rigorous analysis, respecting the integrity and complexity of each case. And second, that 
we learn more about the perplexities of the recurrent dilemmas shared by a variety of 
states, such as that of democratic transition examined comparatively by Linz and Stepan 
(1996) or the reconstruction of the bond between the citizen and the state – the focus of 
this doctoral dissertation – if we study them in dissimilar socio-political contexts.  
7.4 The three phases of Russian citizenship education policies (Article IV) 
This article, written jointly with Dr. Jan Germen Janmaat, is a parallel comparison 
between the evolution of citizenship education policies in Russia and Ukraine since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. The case of Ukraine is left outside the scope of the 
dissertation because in the joint publication Dr. Janmaat held sole responsibility for the 
collection and interpretation of the Ukrainian data, while I concentrated on the case of 
Russia. 
Nevertheless, a parallel examination of Ukraine and Russia has undoubtedly 
contributed to the interpretative framework of the dissertation, as it enabled comparison 
between two former Soviet republics sharing the socialist past and the scale of the 
political and economic transformation catalysed by the disintegration of the Soviet 
empire. Both inherited educational legacies from the Soviet regime, proclaimed 
“aspiration to embrace Western educational values” (Silova 2009, 295) and share the 
“post-socialist education reform package” (e.g. student-centred learning, liberalisation 
of textbook publishing, democratisation of school management and teacher-student 
relationship, decentralisation of educational governance and finance) transferred to the 
post-socialist countries (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi 2008 in ibid., 313–314). With respect 
to the latter, the EDC (Education for Democratic Citizenship) project discussed in the 
article could be perceived as a common component of the package, which is supposed to 
enhance democratic transformation and simultaneously improve the legitimacy of the 
post-socialist countries in the international community of democratic states. A deeper 
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contextualisation of the cases, however, highlights the diversity of the Soviet and post-
Soviet experiences, for example differences with respect to the position of the national 
language and culture in the USSR and the status of the two independent countries in 
international politics today. Overall, assessing Russia within the post-socialist framework 
sheds light on the particularities of the Russian case from a different angle than in the 
Russia-Finland comparison. 
Article IV contributes to the overall dissertation in two ways. Based on an expanded 
set of policy documents (1990–2004), it claims that the development of citizenship 
education policies in Russia since the end of the 1980s could be divided into three 
intertwined periods distinct in emphasis. Between the last years of perestroika and the 
first years after the collapse of the USSR, preference was given to the de-legitimation of 
the Soviet experience, particularly the political and moral task of the school to nurture 
party-loyal virtuous citizens. In terms of national identity, the state openly encouraged 
the re-consolidation of subnational identities by fostering, at least in theory, education 
in national cultures and languages. The second period (1992–1999) could be termed an 
intermediate phase marked by ambiguities. In this phase, the development of citizenship 
education policies stressing knowledge of the legislation and lawful conduct, as well as 
the rights of citizens, was justified in terms of the need to build a constitutional state. The 
reappearance of a clear citizenship education policy agenda manifests the re-introduction 
of political teaching contents, this time in the name of democratisation. With regard to 
national identity, this period demonstrates both the continuation of the political line 
voiced in the previous phase and an emergence of a competing agenda which argues for 
the need to build a common all-Russian national identity. 
In the third period, 1999–2005, the state has re-emphasised its leading role in defining 
citizenship education policies, with the main objective to craft loyalty to the Russian state 
as opposed to one’s subnational culture. I return to the issue of state patriotism in the 
final article (V). Here it would suffice to say that even though state patriotism co-exists 
with a more liberal notion of citizenship education, the administrative significance of the 
documents advocating patriotic education is considerably greater than those representing 
the latter agenda.1 Overall, the “temporary policy settlements” (Gale 2001) manifest in 
the three relatively distinct phases reveal that citizenship education policy is sensitive 
to the political climate of the period and could least be described as a consensual and 
evolutionary process. 
Building on the theoretical discussion in Article III, that is, the tension attributed 
to the simultaneous processes of nation-building and democratisation, and on the 
more general philosophical debates on the contentious nature of citizenship education 
as nurturing both conformity and political activeness, Article IV explores the role of 
1 On p. 545 of Article IV I write that the Programme of Democratic Citizenship Education is still awaiting 
approval. This document was never adopted (personal correspondence with a former project officer 
involved in the preparation of the programme). 
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the COE in promoting education for democratic citizenship in Russia (and Ukraine). 
In this respect, the question posed in the article is, can the COE’s critical, pluralist and 
active vision on citizenship education be observed in the educational policies of the two 
countries? Explicit attention to the possible convergence between the international agenda 
and the national citizenship education policies distinguishes this article from Article III, 
whereas contextualising the objectives and arguments of citizenship education policies 
against the antithetical political processes links it to the theoretical framework employed 
in the third (III) publication. It is argued that the international discourse on citizenship 
education privileges active and multicultural citizenship (also Article II), which is hard to 
reconcile with the domestic political pressure to ensure national unity and state cohesion. 
In this vein, the international discourse is visible in the national policy documents only 
when this agenda coincides with the national policy prerogatives. 
7.5 Citizenship-nationality nexus in Finland and Russia (Article V)
This article describes and interprets comparatively citizenship education policies in 
Finland and Russia since the second half of the 1980s. The main task is to investigate 
how the relationship between citizenship and nationality is reshuffled in consequence 
of political changes, and whether the two concepts acquire new or modified meanings. 
With respect to Russia, the article draws mostly on the documents analysed for Articles 
III and IV, though it also includes several new documents published or identified later, 
for example, the second patriotic education programme and the Russian language 
programmes. The results of the study regarding Finland were not reported earlier. The 
interpretative frame of the article rests with the notions of nation-state and empire-state, 
in particular, the different associations between citizenship and nationality engendered 
in these state models. 
In the case of Russia, this theoretical lens enables further interpretation of the 
documentary findings. For instance, it helps to understand that the primacy of subnational 
identities advocated in the first phase of citizenship education policy (Article IV) was 
rooted in and continued the legacy of the Soviet political thinking which institutionalised 
citizenship and nationality as distinct categories. In other words, this policy was not a 
product of the new era of democracy and externally imposed multiculturalism alone. From 
this perspective, the notion of state patriotism manifests a concrete political attempt to 
overcome the imperial heritage and, simultaneously, recentralise the Russian state itself. 
The closer that citizenship and nationality are tied together, the less possibility there is 
left for a multiple conception of nationality and citizenship advocated by international 
actors. 
By incorporating the conceptual legacies into the interpretative framework, it is 
possible to observe that policy is, to a significant extent, an interplay between the de-
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legitimation and re-legitimation of the existing conceptual and discursive frames. In the 
policy documents, the Soviet past constitutes one of the central reference points for the 
political decision-making in general and education policies in particular. The USSR is 
either depicted in negative terms as a faulty mentality to be dismantled, or it is regarded 
as a source of pride and past glory to be restored. In this way, the contested past of the 
nation is continuously renegotiated.
In the case of Finland, also, the conceptual heritage plays a significant role. Due to 
political changes which impinge on the sovereignty and authority of the state, and in 
the light of the symbiotic relationship between the nation and the state in the Finnish 
political tradition, it becomes important to find new sources of vitality for the nation. On 
the basis of the examined documents I conclude that Finland has returned to a cultural 
understanding of the nation which is not dependent on the sovereignty of the nation-
state per se. In other words, the partial cession of the political decision-making powers 
to transnational actors does not put the legitimacy of the Finnish nation into question. 
The decoupling of nationality and citizenship opens up the possibility for a multilevel 
conceptualisation of both citizenship and nationhood. This means that students can be 
simultaneously cast into their roles as Finnish, European and global citizens without fear 
of loyalty conflicts. Yet the national element still remains the nucleus of the multilevel 
conception of citizenship. In terms of nationhood, this development enables the co-
existence of multiple identities. 
This article shows how two dissimilar socio-political settings deal with the task of 
reconstructing the means to maintain the bond between the citizen and the state. The 
comparison between Russia and Finland highlights the unique qualities of the post-
imperial entity which differ in a considerable way from the nation-state model central to 
the Western political thinking and international relations. 
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8 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Chapter 7 presented summaries of the individual articles, introduced the theoretical 
and methodological underpinnings in each of them and explained how the articles are 
bound. These overviews also summarised the results of the individual articles. In this 
chapter, I revisit the research findings documented in the five publications. As time has 
passed since the publication of the original articles, I have found new perspectives on the 
research findings and for that reason in the following I both recapitulate and expand the 
conclusions reported in the publications.  
Identifying the final conclusions and their constraints inevitably goes hand in hand 
with considering the directions for future studies. Possibilities for further research are 
numerous, and the ones presented in this chapter constitute a small fraction of them, 
focusing deliberately on the research tasks embedded in comparative methodology. 
8.1 Focal findings
8.1.1 Supranational citizenship agenda
In the present work national and supranational policy documents were analysed for 
the purpose of understanding the contents of citizenship education in modern Russia 
and Finland, as well as UNESCO and the COE. The agenda of the supranational actors 
parallel and intersect that developed in the national contexts, though with the rise of 
global educational governance separation between national and global is only plausible as 
a theoretical analytical exercise. Whereas national policies of education persist, they are 
construed in interaction with other players, among which the supranational organisations 
like OECD, EU, UNESCO, WTO and COE act as significant reference points. That being 
so I found it essential to incorporate supranational actors into the research setting, 
because to omit the global element and concentrate only on the national units would 
distort our understanding of the nature of education policy-making at present. After 
all, the rules and definitions of the global system increasingly provide models for and 
restrictions on actions and policies at the national level (Soysal 1994, 6). The dissertation 
argues that the emergence of supranational citizenship education policies which promote 
universal human rights, multilayered citizenship and critical appraisal of the state, 
and simultaneously condemn states for casting citizens into exclusive and prejudiced 
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roles, constitutes a paradigm shift and a clear extension of supranational educational 
governance to goals and values in the area of national education fundamental to the 
survival of the state itself. The meaning and potential implications of this development 
have been assessed in Article II, but a more systematic look into the motivations of 
national and non-national players remains a task for the future. 
The picture that emerges from the analysis of the COE and UNESCO in Article II 
is neither tidy nor consistent. There is no one clear modality of citizenship education 
embraced by the supranational actors. The organisations are embedded in the main 
pillars of the international system based on the centrality of the nation-state and, by 
the same token, in the ideas of Western schooling, i.e., state formation, nation-building, 
identity, productivity and citizenship (Jones 2005). The histories of nation-states and 
supranational organisations are closely intertwined and both have expanded greatly since 
the Second World War (Meyer et al. 1997). The contentious discourses of citizenship 
education promoted by the examined organisations adhere to both the national and the 
post-national models of citizenship education. In the former, citizenship (status, rights 
and duties) and nationality (identity) are tightly bound together. More so, in the national 
model, the national state dictates the limits of citizenship and citizen duties in a top-
down manner, emphasising order, obedience and unquestioned loyalty (cf. Green 1990). 
The post-national model, on the contrary, promotes diversity and multiculturalism, as 
well as a multi-level conception of citizenship. It decouples citizenship from nationality 
by positioning citizen rights within a wider global context and detaching them from 
the realm of the nation-state, while simultaneously assigning identities to national, 
subnational and supranational communities (Soysal 1994; Delanty 2007). The promotion 
of multi-level citizenship and identity is in stark contrast to the ideology of nationalism, 
which asserts that the nation-state supplies individuals with an exclusive and all-
embracing identity. 
8.1.2 Citizenship-nationality nexus in flux
The lenses applied to the research data have sought to capture changes in the objectives 
of and argumentation behind citizenship education in formal schooling from two 
intertwined vantage points: 
1. the relationship between citizenship and nationality 
2. the dual task of citizenship education to immerse into the nation and prepare for 
participation in democratic institutions
The competing discourses with one transmitting a passive internalisation of national 
identification and the other emphasising active and often critical participation for the 
sake of democracy manifest the profound dilemma implicit in citizenship education. 
This dual function stems from the historical merger between citizenship and nationality 
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rooted in the ideology of the nation-state. Consequently, citizenship education balances 
between the two approaches and the swing of the pendulum from one side to the other 
reflects how citizenship and nationality are defined in a particular geopolitical context 
at any given historical moment. Temporary equilibrium is interrupted by domestic and 
international political reorientations, when these impinge on the notions of citizenship 
and nationality.
The two national cases examined in the dissertation live through turbulent times 
that demand and lead to the reformulations of citizenship, nationality and their 
interrelationship, and consequently the task of citizenship education itself. The complex 
phenomenon of globalisation is expected to put an end to the historically sealed union 
between nationality and citizenship by demystifying national culture, weakening the 
state and decoupling the state and the nation. As Delanty (2000, 132), for instance, claims: 
Rights have become embodied in discourses that extend far beyond the legal reach of the 
nation state; responsibility has shifted from a discourse of personal obligation focused 
on the state to a discourse of co-responsibility for nature and for future generations; 
participation is less focused on the national community than on others’ spaces, which 
have been opened up as a result of subnational mobilization linked to globalization; 
and identity has become pluralized to the extent that citizenship must now contend 
with reconciling the pursuit of equality with the recognition of difference. 
The changes described by Delanty signify a new turn in the history of the nation-state. 
However, he seems to assume that the world, prior to the advent of globalisation, has 
constituted a perfect palette of nation-states within which nationality and citizenship 
were tightly bound. As the case of the Russian Federation shows, some states carry a 
very different legacy and, contrary to the above predictions, search for ways to bring 
citizenship and nationality together. Therefore the question of how states are affected by 
the destabilising impact of globalisation is a much broader one and should be examined 
from the perspective as to how globalisation and nation-building feed into each other in 
different contexts. 
In the present work, this question was studied in two national contexts. As should 
be clear by now, at the heart of the theoretical framework of the dissertation was the 
relationship between nationality and citizenship, examined from different perspectives. 
Consequently, the comparative logic of the research and the selection of Russia and 
Finland as the comparative cases were based on their opposite conceptions of the 
relationship between nationality and citizenship. The study of citizenship education 
policies embedded in diverse state traditions revealed how the historically established 
relationships are reshuffled in consequence of domestic and international changes. 
Tønnesson (2004, 186) argues that the historical legacy of each nation will undoubtedly 
influence the way it copes with globalisation. Moreover, the various routes to nationhood 
have often overlapped within the same nation, and nations have followed one root in one 
period, and another in the next. Therefore, he concludes, “there is a complex roadmap 
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behind each nation, and today’s leaders may choose which of the available historical 
narratives they want to promote and build upon” (ibid.). 
The dissertation illuminates precisely the interplay between past narratives and 
present and future political prerogatives. In a multi-national and multi-confessional 
Russia the nation remains highly contested, therefore it is more viable, politically, to 
articulate national identity as a state-oriented identity manifest in the notion of state 
patriotism. Russian patriotic education draws heavily on the Soviet tradition of political 
upbringing. It leads to the militarisation of citizenship both in terms of highlighting the 
role of military service as a fundamental citizen responsibility and reducing citizenship 
to a mere exercise of loyalty and self-sacrifice. In the documents on state patriotism, 
patriotism is perceived as the core spiritual component of Russia and the basis of the 
Russian nationhood. In the discourse of patriotism, a sub-state identity is superseded 
by a state-wide one. Moreover, patriotism is premised on the priority of social and 
state affairs over individual interests and constitutes the highest purpose of life and 
actions of individuals and social groups. Whereas in democracy freedom could only 
be guaranteed through political involvement – to avoid the arbitrary will of others – 
in the Russian discourse of patriotism freedom comes from the act of unquestioned 
loyalty itself (Piattoeva 2010). The centrality of loyalty is linked to and expressed in the 
distinct military character of state patriotism. As argued in Article V, the militarisation 
of patriotic education turns a citizen into a soldier with loyalty, duty and self-sacrifice to 
the state as the central citizen virtues.
The finding that the Finnish national identity is reverting from state to culture is 
significant in the context of the historically developed bond between citizenship and 
nationality and preoccupation with teaching national identity as state identity (Suutarinen 
2004). Suutarinen’s conclusions are based on the examination of curricula and textbooks 
published in the mid 1990s. My conclusions support earlier findings in that they also 
discerned orientation toward the state, apparent in the topics such as state symbols, state 
sovereignty and independent Fatherland. This narrative equated the development of the 
nation to the development of the state and therefore codified national sovereignty as state 
sovereignty. From this perspective, the discussions observed in the committee reports 
and the latest curriculum guidelines, which stress the integrating role of the national 
culture, manifest the debundling of the state and the nation and therefore signify a 
remarkable shift in the perception of the relationship between the state and the nation 
and, consequently, nationality and citizenship. The transformation into a Kulturnation 
is a necessary step to secure Finland’s national being under the supranational umbrella 
of the EU, which transforms the meaning of state sovereignty. 
In terms of the effect of globalisation on Russia, that is, the debundling of citizenship 
and nationality, the inherited divorce between nationality and citizenship could have 
fostered the materialisation of the effect of globalisation on Russia. In fact, this is what 
we generally witnessed in the beginning of the 1990s – that is, national identity being 
equated with ethnic identity and, continuing along the Soviet lines but in a much more 
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positive and rigorous fashion, relegated to the sub-state level. Whereas citizenship 
in its new form of Rossianin – the citizen of the Russian Federation – introduced by 
president Boris Yeltsin’s administration, turned into a civic and secular form of political 
identification with the state on the basis of shared political norms such as the rule of law. 
These civic elements were combined with the ambiguous notion of universal human 
values, which do not rest with the peculiarity of the national society and culture. These 
values, though never identified, were treated as a ‘neutral’ alternative to the highly 
ideologicised value basis of the Soviet school. The category of the universal human values 
(obchechelovecheskiie cennosti) links Russian citizenship education to, and provides 
an entry point for, the citizenship education agenda promoted by the supranational 
actors, which is based on universal personhood instead of national and particularistic 
peoplehood. Education in human rights was perceived as a pressing obligation of the 
new Russian state which quickly signed a number of international declarations in order 
to affirm its commitment to respect and promote the principles of the international 
community (Antonov 1996, 50). Russia’s entry into the COE facilitated education in 
human rights, in line with the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on 
Teaching about Human Rights. 
These principles, that is, adherence to human rights and universal human values, 
mark a breaking point (whether imagined or real) with the Soviet legacy, and link 
Russian citizenship education to the supranational agenda. As suggested in Article II, 
the sovereignty and legitimacy of the nation-state are no longer solely subjected to the 
scrutiny of the national citizenry, but are linked to the governments and citizens of other 
countries (Lucas 2001). This way, legitimacy increasingly takes a supranational form. In 
order to uphold international legitimacy, national governments are forced to adopt the 
language produced in the supranational arena.
Russia’s experience differs from the rest of the former Soviet republics that followed 
a classical path of ethnic nation-building from the very outset of independence (e.g. 
Ukraine in Article IV). The difference between Russia and other former republics in 
the nation-building strategies adopted by the state elites could be explained by the 
unique position of the RSFSR in the Soviet system. The ambiguous place of the RSFSR 
in the Soviet ethnofederal hierarchy precluded any possibility of the development of a 
proto nation-state thinking, as has happened in the rest of the Soviet territories, where 
a demarcated quasi-autonomous polity was associated with a group of people sharing 
a common national identification. Moreover, Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union 
found it much harder to relinquish its imperial identity in favour of a nation-state. In 
other words, the Soviet experience of the Russian Federation paved the way for the 
possibility to experience a new kind of citizenship-nationality nexus in line with the 
predicted effects of globalisation. However, following a clear change in the political 
stance of the power elites, the situation has reversed since the mid 1990s and the Russian 
authorities have embarked upon the process of bridging nationality and citizenship. 
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8.1.3 Arguments and justifications
In the 1990s, Finnish policy documents explicitly argued that the main task of the 
comprehensive school was to transmit national culture and strengthen the national 
identity of students (Article V). Even though Finland was not experiencing any major 
identity crisis, calls to rethink the task of education were framed around the threat 
of weak societal unity, stemming from the ongoing financial crisis, growing social 
disparities and multiculturalism. Another justification came from changes in the 
democratic decision-making, as the state was preparing grounds to relegate some of its 
decision-making powers to the supranational actors. From the arguments employed in 
the documents we can draw a conclusion that the nation-state model is not undermined. 
Rather, it is reformulated and updated in accordance with the perceived changes in the 
domestic and international context. 
In Russia, even the nationalisation of education was reasoned in terms of the threat of 
state disintegration (Dneprov 1998). Whereas in the late 1980s and early 1990s national 
schools, whose task was to enhance the development of sub-state national identities, were 
recognised as crucial to the preservation of unity, since the second half of the 1990s 
they have been increasingly treated as having a harmful effect on inter-ethnic relations 
and state integrity. The category of the common national values (obchenatsional’niie 
cennosti), though not identified, is gaining in strength at the expense of universal human 
values and national cultural values. From early on, approximately from the mid 1990s, 
there have been calls for a solid system of common national values, whose absence was 
said to hinder the development of new curricula and textbooks. As an extension of this 
trend, vospitanie in general and patriotic upbringing in particular have been resurrected 
as the principal responsibility of the state. 
The Soviet past constitutes one of the central reference points for the political decision-
making in general and education policies in particular. The USSR is either depicted in 
negative terms as a faulty mentality to be dismantled, or it is regarded as past glory to 
be restored and taken great pride in. For instance, in the early 1990s, the very concern 
with constitutional culture and citizen rights was presented as entirely different from the 
Soviet regime’s preoccupation with patriotism and citizen duty, disregard for laws and 
ignorance of citizen rights expressed in the Constitution. The argumentation employed 
in the latest education documents, on the contrary, attests to the growing popularity 
of the discourse which takes pride in Soviet achievements. National security and 
aspirations to re-establish Russia as a superpower in world politics are used as legitimate 
claims for the construction of a patriotic vision of citizenship education which has little 
in common with the programmes of citizenship and human rights education advocated 
by the supranational agents. (Piattoeva 2010.)
The following table provides an overview of the study findings.
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8.2 Evaluation of the research and directions for future studies
In retrospect, it should be noted that the comparative dimension of the dissertation 
turned out unbalanced in the sense that Russia constitutes the prime focus of analysis, 
at least if assessed by the number of articles which focus on Russia. In this respect the 
contents of the articles reflect the research process where the greatest challenge has 
proven to be in construing a meaningful comparative framework for the incorporation 
of the national cases examined in the dissertation. Only toward the end of the process 
(Article V) have I finally managed to crystallise the comparative dimension of the 
research. The overall composition of the dissertation also reflects the comprehensive 
logic employed in the research, as I have sought to examine the national cases in their 
entirety, as opposed to dismantling complex socio-political processes into variables at 
high levels of abstraction. In this respect, the articles unveil the search for appropriate 
theoretical and methodological tools that would enhance my understanding of the cases 
and therefore document in a genuine way the dialogues between the data and the theory 
undertaken at different stages of the research process. 
The comparative axis of the dissertation has provided the research with a solid 
backbone, as it has helped to train my analytical gaze on the crucial variation between the 
cases. In this manner, it has narrowed down and sharpened the theoretical framework 
of the dissertation, and eventually provided logic to the present overview. In any case, 
the analytical lenses applied to the Russian data remain more versatile. In particular, the 
perspective taken in Article III, that is, the focus on the incongruous character implicit 
in citizenship education, was not applied to the Finnish documents. This was due to 
the actual theoretical framework employed at this stage of the research, which focused 
on the effects of nation and state building in a reconfigured state and the problem of 
stateness inflicted by their simultaneous appearance.
One theme briefly explored in Article I but untouched in the overall research 
focused on the political usage of comparative education studies. Researchers (e.g. 
Nóvoa & Yariv-Mashal 2003) claim that comparison, particularly cross-national 
studies of educational achievement, has turned into a means of soft regulation aiming 
at convergence of national education systems. Though this topic was left outside the 
scope of the dissertation, evidence of the role of international comparisons surfaced 
in the examined documents. For instance, the gap between civic knowledge, civic 
participation and attitudes, highlighted by international studies, provided legitimation 
for the Civic Participation Policy Programme adopted by the Finnish Government in 
2004 (FMJ 2007). International comparisons are embedded in uniform indicators and 
benchmarks applied to very different contextual settings. As a result, they should be 
seen as political interventions that might lead to gradual homogenisation of national 
policies. Further research on citizenship education should explore possible intersections 
between international studies and national policies, as well as the usage of the study 
88
NELLI PIATTOEVA
findings in policy-making. With the first findings of the latest International Civic and 
Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) already published, it would be important to ask why 
states engage in these comparisons in the first place.
Further studies could refine the research setting in order to gain a comprehensive 
grasp of the entire spectrum of non-national policy actors – both IGOs and NGOs – 
active in the field of citizenship education policy and practice. This approach would 
allow for the identification of differences and similarities between the supranational 
scripts unexamined in the present dissertation. My focus on the COE and UNESCO 
derived from the supposition that the research is more consistent if it concentrates on 
the group of players relevant for all the examined cases, even though my intention has 
not extended to the assessment and comparison of the occurring policy transfer between 
the organisations and the national units. In this regard it should be borne in mind that 
each nation-state is embedded in its own transnational web composed of both strong 
and weak strings, and national policies can be expected to combine elements from the 
different constituents of the web. This assumption leads to a further question as to when 
and how strings weaken and strengthen, new strands occur and the old ones get re-tied 
or unravelled. 
This research setting could prepare grounds to study holistically how supranational 
players interact with national policies. Recent studies on policy transfer and 
recontextualisation of global policy rhetoric focus predominantly on the effects of just 
one or two supranational actors, lacking such an all-embracing perspective. A holistic 
approach would make possible to examine ‘whose policies get most say’, whether in 
terms of concrete effects or as reference points and international justifications in the 
national policy framing. In one of my interviews, the respondent explained that in Russia, 
citizenship education in subnational units reflects the constellations of international 
players working in this particular region and their relations with the local authorities. 
In this vein, there is a possibility that transnational actors, both intergovernmental and 
NGOs, bypass the national level, therefore significantly rescaling the entire process of 
education policy formation.
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Abstract
This chapter concentrates on recent reorientations in comparative education as a
field of research and an academic discipline in relation to the overarching theme
of globalisation. My first aim is to synthesise and reflect on the methodological
and  theoretical  debates  that  point  to  the  necessity  to  re-think  the  scales  of
analysis, conceptions  and  categories  employed  in  the  research. I  argue  that
comparative education researchers need to re-conceptualise and re-theorise the
shift in the state from a static and relatively closed container of socio-political
relations  (including educational  ones)  to  a  plurilateral  structure  increasingly
embedded  in  and  contested  by  sub-national  and  supra-national  interactions.
Second, I shortly raise the impact of globalisation on the ethical dimension of the
research, more precisely its political usage and links to policy-making. In this
respect I concentrate on the fact that globalisation is simultaneously a political
buzz-word  and  a  “paradigmatic  intellectual  supercomplexity” (Cowen  2006).
Moreover, comparison itself has become a mode of governance and a political tool
which is used to foster integration and convergence among educational systems
without resorting to changes in legislation and traditional politics  (Nóvoa &
Yariv-Mashal 2003).
Introduction
In this chapter my aim is to discuss to what extent and in which ways
globalisation is changing the principles of comparative education as a
research field and an academic discipline. In particular, I will explore
the consequences of globalisation for the analytical units and theoretical
lenses commonly employed by comparative education researchers. The
9
“globalisation  thesis” can  be  used  to  explain  almost  anything  and  is
widely  employed  in  policy  documents  and  analysis  (Ball  1998). The
chapter is premised on the assumption that “globalisation has never been
an objective historical reality, but simply a term that we use to interpret
rapid changes in the world, caused by the shifting patterns of social and
economic  relations” (Rizvi  2004, 169). Thus  globalisation  is  a  set  of
interacting, overlapping and uneven processes, as opposed to a single
condition  (Tikly  2001). In  the  following, I  am  not  concerned  with
unfolding the full complexity of the processes related to globalisation.
My primary emphasis is on the globalisation-driven and globalisation-
reasoned reconfigurations of the state as a key institution of educational
provision and control, and as a central interpretative lens in comparative
education. I attempt to reflect on and offer a synthesis of the ongoing
academic debates with respect to the changing character of the nation-
state and its consequences for the “doing of comparative education”. 
I  will  also  briefly  explore  the  political  aspect  of  comparative
education. Since its birth, comparative education has been expected to
contribute  to  education  policy  making  by  supplying  the  so-called
successful  “lessons  from abroad”, i.e. information on the educational
systems of foreign countries that could be transferred to one’s own (e.g.
Cowen  2006).  Globalisation  has  changed  the  political  posture  of
comparative education, as comparison itself has been turned into the
means  of  soft  regulation  that  aims  at  the  convergence  of  national
systems. Moreover, central research concepts are simultaneously widely
employed  political  slogans  and  justifications  of  political  action  or
inaction. While the political nature of comparative education is hardly
new to researchers in the field, we should reflect on the changes it has
undergone in the name of globalisation.
I will start with a brief definition of the field of research that this
chapter is concerned with.
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Comparative Education
Generally  speaking,  comparative  social  sciences  involve  comparing
times  and  places,  i.e.  different  historical  periods  and  societies.
Comparison helps to establish whether generalisations hold across cases
or  it  highlights  crucial  differences  in  the  examined  cases  (such  an
approach  is  also  called contrast  or  juxtaposition). At  the same time,
cross-societal  and  cross-cultural  comparison  “makes  the  familiar
strange” and functions as a “cultural critique of ourselves”, meaning that
it reveals the taken for granted assumptions and practices in our home
societies  (Sadler  1900  in  Phillips  1999, 18; Fischer  1986  in  Mason
2007, 192; Broadfoot 1999, 26). Thus the main purpose of comparative
studies is  not limited to describing differences and similarities of the
examined cases. The overall aim is to understand and explain macro-
social  variation  (e.g.  Sartori  1994;  Ragin  1987).  However,  as  the
following  statements  demonstrate,  the  main  tenets  of  comparative
education are far from unequivocal or unanimous. 
Steiner-Khamsi (2002a, 179) cites Noah (1985) to identify the
four major uses of comparative education, with the comparative defined
in terms of  data from one or more country or region. Comparative
studies  attend to  all  or  just  one of  the  following  tasks. Firstly, they
concentrate on the description of  educational  systems, processes  and
outcomes.  Secondly,  they  assist  in  the  development  of  educational
institutions  and  practices.  Thirdly,  they  interpret  the  relationship
between  education  and  society.  And  finally,  comparative  education
establishes  generalized  statements  about  education  that  are  valid  for
more than one country. Broadfoot (1999), on the other hand, adheres to
a narrower definition of the research field. She writes that comparative
education  is  not  “(…)  descriptive  accounts  of  ‘what  is’,  however
carefully  done. It  is  not  de-contextualised  comparisons  of  particular
dimensions, [as] they lack the theoretical framework that is essential to
justifying the drawing of any conclusions from the gathered data” (ibid.,
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29).  Therefore  for  Broadfoot  (1999),  careful  theoretisation  of  the
context  is  the  prerequisite  of  educational  comparison.  Due  to  the
importance  of  both  understanding  the  context  and  constructing  a
theoretically sound framework which explains variation between cases,
the main challenge for comparative research lies in striking the balance
between the integrity and historicity of cases, and their theoretisation,
operationalisation and abstraction for comparative purposes. 
Although there is  a  general consensus that  comparison relies on
data from different societies, there are diverse views as to the unit of
analysis,  i.e.  the  definition  of  society  and  thus  the  context  of  the
educational  phenomenon  under  study.  Most  commonly,  the
interpretative lens of comparative research is premised on and limited
to the national scale (see discussion in the ensuing section). However,
Bray and Thomas (1995, 488) argue that “(...) much, and perhaps most,
research requires multilevel comparative analysis in order to achieve a
full  and  balanced  understanding  of  its  subjects”.  Noah  &  Eckstein
(1998) write that the most appropriate kinds of units for investigation
lie not at the national, but at the sub-national level, since the amount of
variation  in  any  particular  educational  phenomenon  is  often  greater
within nation states rather than between them. 
In terms of its academic tribe, comparative education could be
located under the umbrella of the sociology of education, for it studies
education,  society and  the  relationship between  the  two  in  different
national,  sub-national  and  supra-national  contexts  (Noah  1985  in
Steiner-Khamsi  2002a).  Thus  conceived,  comparative  education  is
primarily about comparing macrosocial and intrasocial relationships, or,
in  other  words,  establishing  relations  between  relationships  across
different cultural settings (Schriewer 1999)2. Comparative studies focus
2 The notion of relations between relationships should not be equated with any form
of linear causality. On the contrary, it alerts the researcher to the complexity of
causal networks and the impact of the intra-social context which, in most cases,
cannot be abstracted into clear-cut social variables (see Schriewer 1999).
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on the embeddedness of educational phenomena, i.e. its relation to and
interaction  between  education  and  the  context  (e.g.  Cowen  2006).
Therefore, the  question  of  the  unit  of  analysis  is  not  merely  about
choosing the most appropriate one or studying educational phenomena
on  different  levels,  but  it  is  rather  about  exploring  changing
relationships between levels and their inter-penetration (cf. Ball 1998).
These  relationships  are  embedded  in  and  mediated  by  cultural  and
institutional arrangements. 
As will be discussed later, debates that concern the appropriate
level  of  analysis  are  not  merely  related  to  the  professional  query
regarding which (and whose) research counts as comparative. They are
linked to  the major  theoretical  and methodological  reorientations  in
contemporary  social  science  following  the  “explosion  of  interest  in
globalisation studies” (Brenner 1999, 40). The advent of globalisation as
a socio-political reality and an analytical lens in social sciences has made
these  debates  indispensable,  as  globalisation  unfolds  and  further
unsettles the ambivalent and yet frequently taken for granted scales of
analysis,  objects  of  study  and  terms  and  concepts  employed  in
comparative research (e.g. Dale & Robertson 2009), whose nature as
politically and socially constructed fluid entities has come to the surface.
Thus  globalisation  has  not  simply  challenged  the  previously  relevant
analytical lenses of research. It has rather unmasked the shortcomings
and  the  unproblematic  theorising  of  comparative  studies  “prior
globalisation”, so to say. (cf. ibid.).
In the above, I briefly outlined the main tenets of comparative
education  and  also  pointed  to  the  fluidity  of  the  field. In  the  next
section  I  will  unfold  the  “global”  challenges  in  methodological  and
theoretical terms. 
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Unmasking Globalisation
Roger Dale has provocatively argued that “globalisation implies a clear
threat to comparative education” (2000, 87). First and foremost, the
“threat” springs from the changing nature of the nation-state in terms of
its internal and external functions. The state has traditionally lied at the
centre of comparative research as the ultimate supplier and definer of
education  (Carnoy  2006,  4).  Even  in  the  private  sphere,  the  state
usually gets to decide the very meaning of the private and controls the
mechanisms of licensing and funding private institutions. As Carnoy has
put it, “the ways changes take place in educational  systems is  largely
defined by the political relationship of the nation’s citizenry to the state
and  the  ways  that  the  state  has  organised  the  educational  system
politically”  (2006,  4-5).  In  fact,  in  his  presidential  address  at  the
Comparative  and  International  Education  Society  (CIES)  on  the
occasion  of  its  fiftieth  anniversary, Carnoy stated  that  comparativists
should  be  primarily  concerned  with  the  state,  when  it  comes  to
analysing educational matters (ibid., 5). 
The state has been the key explanatory factor in understanding
the  workings  of  educational  systems (e.g. Welch  1993). The  field  of
comparative  education  is  genealogically  related  to  the  state,  as  it
developed parallel to the rise of national education systems coined by
nation-states (Noah & Eckstein 1969 in Green 2003, 83). The role of
national  education  system was  conceived  of  as  a  “massive  engine  of
integration, assimilating the local to the national and the particular to
the  general” (Green 2003, 85). As  the  state  constituted  the  primary
regulator  of  the  educational  enterprise,  scientific  explanations,  too,
relied on the analysis of macro national variables. The nation-state was
widely  perceived  as  the  container  of  society,  which  meant  that
“societies”  became  associated  with  nation-states  (Dale  &  Robertson
2009).  This  conception  locked  social  scientists  in  the  so-called
“territorial  trap”  in  which  states  represent  “the  self-enclosed
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geographical  containers  of  socioeconomic  and  politico-cultural
relations”  (Brenner  1999.  40).  Consequently,  early  comparative
education studies sought to address variations between systems mainly
in terms of national characteristics (Green 2003, 85). 
Recent developments in domestic and international politics have
often been described in terms of the reconfiguration of the state and
even its gradual disappearance due to the changing relationship between
states  and  supranational  forces  (Dale  2000,  87-88).  Political
supranationalism together with economic supranationalism, are the key
features and drivers of globalisation, also in the area of education (ibid.,
99; Green 2003, 86). Supranational players, e.g. organisations like the
OECD, World  Bank, UNESCO, European Union etc., represent  the
“competing imaginary” to that of the national educational system based
on the assumption that national systems have reached their “use-by date”
(Dale & Robertson 2009)3 4. However, we should bear in mind that
there never was a golden age of absolute state autonomy. For centuries,
states have been, to various extents, incorporated in and affected by the
international  economic  system. Second, national  educational  systems
were not constructed in isolation from one another. The central ideas of
modernization  transcended  national  borders  and  gave  rise  to
educational systems which demonstrate impressive similarity in terms
of form and content (Dale 2000, 88-89). 
Globalisation has  given rise  to social  processes  that  “appear  to
operate  below,  above,  beyond  or  between  entrenched  geopolitical
3 For instance, the total number of international governmental organisations has
grown from 37 in 1909 to nearly 300 in 1989 (Zacher 1993 cf. Held 2002, 346).
4 Based on my analysis of citizenship education agenda of UNESCO and the Council
of Europe I argue that supranational organisations adhere to a dual agenda which
simultaneously reinforces the national world order and promotes transnational
educational governance and citizenship agenda that undermines the traditional role
of the nation-state. Thus the supranational imaginary cannot be conceptualized as
opposite to the national one. It is better to perceive it as incoherent and
intrinsically contradictory (Piattoeva 2009 forthcoming).
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boundaries” (Brenner 1999, 40). Social relations have thus surpassed the
static geographical container of a bounded nation-state. Brenner argues
that  it  is  the  “wide-ranging  effort  to  transcend  state-centric
epistemologies” that constitutes the “unifying theme of contemporary
globalisation research” (ibid.). At the same time, globalisation has made
the existing relationships between national education systems, national
states  and  supranational  forces  more  explicit  (Dale  2000,  89).
Moreover, “the relationships between nation states, the institutions that
comprise them, including their educational systems, and their citizens
are  changed”  and  new  relationships  and  networks  are  constantly
emerging (ibid., 91). 
The  cultural  context  of  the  nation-state,  whether  defined  in
terms  of  “national  culture”  or  “minority  cultures”  or  “individual
identities” have  also  been  altered  by  globalisation. For  the  founding
fathers  of  comparative  education,  education  was  an  expression  of
“national  life  and  character” (Sadler  as  quoted  in  Green  2003, 85).
Comparativists  rarely  explored  cultural  minorities  or  intra-state
cultural  differences  (Green  2003).  Lately,  comparativists  have  re-
emphasised the significance of  culture and context  (e.g. Grant 2000;
Broadfoot 1999; Welch 1993) which have either been overshadowed by
a focus on the institutional environment or, as is often the case in the
cross-national studies, reduced to variables at a high level of abstraction.
Welch, writing in 1993, suggested that it is the explicit focus on culture
and cultural relations that should distinguish comparativists from their
colleagues  in  other  disciplines.  However,  those  who  take  culture
seriously do not share a common understanding of the term. It is either
perceived  as  a  neutral  integrative  force, and  as  a  fixed  and  unitary
tradition  that  encompasses  and  is  shared  by  all;  or,  alternatively,  it
represents  a  contested  arena  of  conflicting interests  and struggle  for
dominance.  In  this  view, culture  is  not  neutral;  it  is  selective  and
exclusionary,  and  it  represents  the  culture  of  the  dominant  group.
(Welch 1993.)
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The role of culture in the analysis and the very ambiguity of the
term are issues we are bound to confront in the context of globalisation
which manifests itself in the complex processes of transnationalism and
cultural  hybridisation.  These  processes  are  said  to  lead  to  the
fragmentation of (national) culture. Simultaneously, there are ongoing
discussions  on  the  gradual  homogenisation  of  culture,  due  to  the
asymmetrical cultural flows between nations, i.e. from the “West” to the
“Rest”, as well as the commodification and commercialisation of identity
markers  (Rizvi  2004). On the  one  hand, cross-cultural  comparisons
encounter similar challenges as those drawing on the state and society,
as  culture has often been implicitly equated with the nation-state and
perceived in terms of a shared state-wide cultural identity (cf. Mason
2007). Cultural  globalisation  is  manifested  in  the  rise  of  alternative
cultures  and  cultural  identities,  as  well  as  cultural  hybridity  which
demystify national culture and its  proclaimed homogeneous unity. As
global forces endanger the uniformity of the nation, they also reveal its
exclusionary nature. Thus conceived, the “national characteristics” which
used to provide an important explanatory framework in cross-country
analyses  of  educational  systems  cease  to  exist  or, at  the  very  least,
appear  highly  dubious. Consequently, the  first  approach  indicated  by
Welch  (1993), which  treats  culture  as  a  neutral  integrative  force, is
increasingly inadequate5. 
However,  cross-cultural  analyses  are  not  necessarily  cross-
national. Due to the difficulty of identifying the cultural unit, which, to
mention  just  one  simple  aspect,  lacks  clear  geographical  borders,
researchers  in  cross-cultural  settings  are  perhaps  better  equipped  to
question the units of analysis they apply, as well as to analytically cope
with the consequences of simultaneous fragmentation and integration.
5 This does not imply that states have given up on the myth of national culture and
the institutions and discursive practices which seek to promote it. But we are now
better equipped to deconstruct the largely taken for granted idea of national
culture and to understand the heterogeneity and resistance which lie within and
without the national layer.
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However, they, too, should move from an anthropological definition of
culture as something that “is” to that which perceives it in sociological
terms, as  something constructed both discursively and in interaction
(Mason 2007). In this respect and regarding the reconfiguration of both
the  state  and  (its)  national  culture, research  should  re-focus  on  the
relationship between the state and (national) culture, in view of their
historical interdependency and ongoing reshuffling. As Green argues, a
strong national identity will still be in demand to unite the heterogenic
communities  within  states,  as  well  as  to  legitimate  the  growing
disparities caused by the global forces (Green 1997, 169-179). 
In addition to the manifestations of globalisation in relation to the
state and culture, there is a third way to conceive of the phenomenon.
From a discursive perspective, “globalisation” is becoming a new kind of
das Internationale Argument employed by policy-makers when it comes to
constructing favourable environment for implementation of educational
reforms  (on  Jürgen  Schriewer’s  original  concept  see  Steiner-Khamsi
2002b). In this manner, globalisation is not a mere uncontrollable force
of nature which inevitably impinges on the nation-state and the national
culture. It is a productive instrument and an assertive figure of speech
that  national  players  can  activate  for  various  purposes.  Thus  the
discourse of globalisation is shaped and fostered by national players, as it
is  harnessed  to  serve  national  prerogatives.  The  discursive  view  of
globalisation underlines that nation-states are not just passive recipients
or  victims  of  globalisation.  And  it  also  points  to  the  fact  that
globalisation  cannot  be  deconstructed  into  a  set  of  objective  social,
political and cultural processes. The discourse of globalisation can serve
very different interests, both cosmopolite and nationalistic.
The difference to the earlier “lessons learned from abroad” type
of  argument,  which  drew  external  reference  points  from  foreign
systems,  lies  in  the  fact  that  national  actors  increasingly  refer  to
supranational agents and players whose agency cannot be identified with
any single nation-state. Perhaps, the persuasive power and legitimacy of
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the  “globalisation” argument  lies  precisely  in  the  fact  that  it  is  not
reducible to a single nation. When something is happening “globally”,
i.e. everywhere, there is not much that can be said against it or done to
counteract the “inevitable”. I have no intention to deny that there are
problems  of  global  nature,  e.g.  global  warming  or  transnational
terrorism that no country can sufficiently address on its own. However,
globalisation  is  manifested  in  the  prescription  of  global  needs  and
universal responses to specific and context-bounded political, cultural
and  educational  maters. The  pool  of  potential  “problems” is  perhaps
bottomless. Thus comparativists should ask themselves how and which
matters  become constituted as  global  problems deserving  a  uniform
supranational response.
Reconceptualising the State
While the rise of “global architecture of education” bounds education
with global dynamics, ideologies, norms and structures (Jones 2007), it
has not eroded national control over education per se (Green 2003, 86).
Human skills remain immobile, while it is the skills and the intellectual
and innovate potential of the human mind that governments rely upon
to  ensure  their  competitiveness  in  the  global  knowledge  economy
(ibid., 86-97). Thus we could argue that education remains crucial to
the nation-state, and perhaps even more so than ever. What needs to be
understood  is  the  loss  of  some  of  the  state’s  activities  to  both
supranational bodies and sub-national or non-state actors (Dale 1997,
274). In other words, the state is no longer solely responsible for the
definition,  provision  and  control  of  the  educational  sphere.
Nevertheless,  the  state  continues  to  be  in  the  “driving  seat”,  as  it
coordinates where and who carries the educational work (ibid.). 
The emergence of supranational educational governance with its
proclaimed homogenising effects  on national  educational  systems has
not yet resulted in the convergence of educational systems. For instance,
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Green’s studies have revealed that while the global policy rhetoric is
emerging, it  is  adopted very differently in accordance with the local
context (2003, 87). For Dale, globalisation is a “states-driven process”
capable of re-strengthening the states, as they transfer activities to other
players  and re-join  forces  to  fulfil  their  central  functions  in  a  more
efficient  manner  (1997, 2002). States  have  fostered  globalisation  by
dismantling national forms of economic and socio-political organisation
and replacing these with new political and institutional forms in order
to attract foreign capital, innovation and flexibility (Brenner 1999, 65).
Moreover, these are not simply defensive measures in the face of fierce
economic competition, but  rather  “concerted  strategy to  create  new
scales of state regulation to facilitate and coordinate the globalisation
process”  (ibid.,  65-66).  Thus,  changes  in  state  power  cannot  be
conceptualised in terms of de-regulation. It is through the process of re-
regulation  that  states  have  promoted  the  globalisation  process.
Globalisation inevitably forces comparative researchers to re-think their
methodological and theoretical toolboxes. What should be answered is
how the context around the nation-state has been re-shaped due to and
in  the  name  of  globalisation  and  how  the  nation-state  has
accommodated itself to the reconfigured context.
However,  we  should  be  careful  not  to  overemphasise  the
proactive  role  of  the  nation-state  in  the  face  of  globalisation. Tickly
(2001) questions the relevance of “Western” accounts of globalisation in
post-colonial low-income countries. He argues that it is important to
specify  the  context  within  which  different  theoretisations  of
globalisation are applicable, as there is no “one superior vantage point
from which global  forces  can best be understood” (Tikly 2001, 151-
152). Thus we could argue that a paradox and a serious limitation of the
extensive  theoretical  literature  on  globalisation  is  its  lack  of  a  truly
global  perspective, as  it  often  makes  generalisations  and far-reaching
conclusions on the basis of limited empirical evidence, often focused on
the  Western  countries. Countries  located  in  the  periphery  of  global
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economy and politics have a very different starting point in mediating
the influence of globalisation, compared to the dominant ones (ibid.,
155).
Thus  an  important  challenge  lies  in  creating  a  new
conceptualisation of the state without resorting to the state’s conceptual
negation. As Brenner (1999) argues, the strand of globalisation research
which proclaims the state obsolete and turns to the de-territorialised
notions of “global culture” and “borderless world”, ironically, operates
within  the  same  conceptual  discourse  that  it  claims  to  undermine.
Empirically, we are confronted with an extraordinary conflict between
the  emergence  of  new  configurations  of  territoriality  and  the
consequent  fragmentation  of  the  state,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the
simultaneous strengthening of the nation-state as the only legitimate and
desired  form  of  socio-political  organisation.  Schriewer  (1999,  45)
writes that attempts at supra-national integration go hand-in-hand with
the  strengthening  of  the  nation-state.  Simultaneously,  supranational
integration engenders linguistic, ethnical or cultural diversification on
the sub-national level (ibid.). These contradictory processes give rise to
new scales of territoriality, socio-political  relationships and power, as
well as new relationships between and within the scales (cf. Brenner
1999). As the political developments since the fall of Yugoslavia and the
USSR  illustrate,  the  nation-state,  perceived  as  a  bundle  of  culture,
language  and  politics  within  a  demarcated  territory,  continues  to
preoccupy the political imagination of state elites, particularly so in the
so-called  new  or  developing  states.  With  this  context  in  mind, the
nation-state  should  be  regarded  as  in  need  of  explanation  and  re-
theoretisation  rather  than  as  a  part  of  explanation  itself  (Dale  &
Robertson 2009). 
One explanation of the taken-for-grantedness of the nation-state
lies in the country cases chosen by researchers. Perhaps, comparativists
have been too often concerned with the so-called stable nation-states.
However, this  model  has  not been the reality for a  great number of
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places outside the “West”. Moreover, the general economic and political
stability in Europe since the Second World War did not offer researchers
empirical cases of what Cowen has accurately termed “transitologies”
(2000). Cowen visualises transitologies as “lightning storms” on “dark
days” which “reveal to us, behind their drama and their rhetoric, the
educational patterns that are ordinarily, in ordinary daylight as it were,
difficult to see” (2000, 6). Transitologies  – the moments of  collapse,
deconstruction and major  metamorphosis  of  state  apparatuses, social
and economic stratification systems and political visions of the future
rely on education as symbolic and practical means to destroy the past
and redefine the future. These crucial moments reveal that equilibrium
is “an unusual condition” . In moments of transitology, theoretically and
empirically speaking, it is simply impossible to take the notions of state,
society and culture as given. What is of particular interest here is the
interplay  between  reconstruction  and  metamorphosis,  as  well  as
deconstruction, discrediting and even destruction of the past (ibid. 5). 
In addition to spotting the moments of transitology, which throw
temporary  empirical  and  conceptual  equilibrium  in  the  air,  it  is
important  to  deconstruct  the  activities  that  constitute  educational
governance and the levels or scales of activity (Dale & Robertson 2009).
There is a functional and scalar re-division of educational activities along
sub-national, national and supranational lines and between institutions
of coordination, including the state, market, community and household
(ibid.). The state is not eroded in this process, but it is decentred “both
as  a  self-enclosed  container  of  socio-economic  relations  and  as  an
organisational interface between sub- and supranational scales” (Brenner
1999, 52). In this respect, we require novel categories that are capable
of describing and analysing emerging relationships and consequently re-
conceptualising the embeddedness of the educational phenomena. For
instance,  Cowen  (2000)  argues  that  the  supra-national  and  inter-
national categories of regions and rims should replace the nation-state
as a powerful unit of analysis. Another new category has been suggested
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by Hoogvelt (1997 in Tikly 2001) and refers to different postcolonial
formations, such  as  sub-Saharan Africa, militant  Islam, East  Asia  and
Latin America. 
However, we would be mistaken to  think  that  new categories
have  only  become  relevant  since  the  reshuffle  of  the  relationship
between the nation-state and supranational and sub-national forces. Nor
is  it  an  ultimately  new  perspective.  Belkanov  (2001, 82-83)  in  his
discussion  of  the  Western  studies  of, Soviet  pedagogy  and  schooling
argues  that  the  analytical  category  of  “Eastern  Europe”  was  widely
employed in comparative education research prior to the collapse of the
Berlin Wall. It was perceived not as much in territorial terms but as a
zone of Soviet influence. Thus it was the shared ideological platform,
the  ideological  block,  as  opposed  to  clear-cut  state  borders  that
determined  the  choice  of  the  scale  of  analysis.  These  categories  of
analysis  overlapped  with  the  political  vocabulary  of  the  antagonistic
period,  thus  indicating  the  proximity  of  politics  and  comparative
research. Globalisation  discourse  appeared  after  the  collapse  of  the
Berlin  Wall  which  dismantled  the  established  balance  of  power, old
borders  and  the  polarised  ideological  camps  and  thus  gave  rise  to
anticipations of the borderless world (Rizvi 2004). However, national
borders are, in fact, getting re-strengthened, when perceived in terms
of the growing emphasis on national security and intensifying control
over people’s cross-border movements (ibid.). New ideological camps
are emerging, such as? the “West” and the “Muslim World”. These new
political categories are often perceived in antagonistic terms and thus
remind us of the earlier historical confrontations. 
The  emerging  “pluri-lateral” forms  of  state  power  lead  to  the
decoupling  of  sovereignty  and territory. To quote  Burawoy (2000  in
Nóvoa & Yariv-Mashal 2003, 434): “The dense ties that once connected
civil  society  to  the  state  are  being  detached  and  redirected  across
national boundaries to form a thickening global public sphere. Yet these
connections and flows are not autonomous, are not arbitrary patterns
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crossing  in  the  sky, but  are  shaped by the  strong magnetic  fields  of
nation states”. However, we should also bear in mind that the central
role of the state as an interface and mediator between supra-national
(inter-national,  high)  and  sub-national  (local,  low)  levels  is  being
considerably re-shaped and there is a chance that the state level will lose
its  grip  on  the  movements  between  the  “high”  and  “low”  levels
(Anderson 1996 in Brenner 1999, 67). 
The Political Posture of Comparative Education
In  the  above,  I  explored  the  relationship  between  the  state  and
comparative  education  in  methodological  and theoretical  terms with
respect  to  the challenge of  globalisation. I  also briefly  described the
historical  connection  of  the  state  and  the  discipline  of  comparative
education, which developed simultaneously with the rise of  state-led
schooling and the nation-state itself. In relation to and as a continuation
of this discussion, I shortly turn the political link between comparative
education and the state. From its birth, comparative education was not
exercised  in  ivory  towers  to  satisfy  the  intellectual  appetite  of
academics. Comparative  research  has  been invested  with  the  task  of
improving  educational  policy  and  practice  by  searching  for  and
introducing valuable lessons from abroad to the policy-makers and the
general public (Carnoy 2006; Cowen 2000, 2006, Green 2003). Thus,
comparative  research  has  aspired  to  be  useful  in  a  very  practical-
political  understanding  of  the  term. Adopting  Cowen’s  (2006, 562)
terminology,  we  should  understand  how  comparative  education  is
expected  to  act  upon the  world. And, I  would  add, how the  world
impinges upon comparative education. I emphasise these questions in
terms of research ethics, i.e. what and for whom comparative research
is,  and  what  is  its  role,  once  it  leaves  the  trembling  hands  of  a
comparative  researcher.  In  addition,  the  political  context  around
comparative education inevitably has a bearing on the topics chosen, the
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concepts and categories employed and the conclusions derived. 
Two developments could be mentioned as we review the ethical
question  of  comparative  education  research  in  the  context  of
globalisation. Both point  to  the epistemological  diversification of  the
field, on the one hand, and its re-politisation. By the latter, I particularly
refer  to  the  rising  importance  of  comparative  education  for  and  in
educational  policy-making. First, many  new  concepts  and  categories
applied  by  researchers,  e.g.  globalisation,  life-long  learning,
Europeanisation,  international  development  etc.,  are  salient  policy
topics and discourses. Thus researchers should be aware of the potential
consequences of the vocabulary overlap. As argued earlier, globalisation
is not only an assemblage of distinct processes, globalisation is “tamed”
and  re-constructed  in  discursive  practices.  An  overview  of  recent
debates  on  the  theoretical  and  methodological  reorientations  in
comparative  education  research  points  to  the  catalysing  role  of
globalisation. As academics take part in the debates, they simultaneously
feed the discourse of globalisation and consequently the phenomenon
itself.  Thus  it  is  not  all  the  same  how  we  come  to  grips  with  the
concept. 
Second, the  field  of  comparative  education  have  come  to  be
populated  by  cross-national  large  scale  studies.  Perhaps,  the  most
publicly  known  are  the  Programme  for  International  Student
Assessment (PISA by OECD) and those conducted by the International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA and its
studies in mathematics and science TIMSS, civic education CIVIC and
ISSC, and  PIRLS  in  literacy). These  studies  mainly  aim at  providing
information  about  educational  achievement  of  students  in  various
school subjects, i.e. they measure educational outcomes. It is the ability
of students to apply school knowledge in real-life situations that is the
primary focus of the studies. Thus only skills and knowledge perceived
as having practical relevance are worth the measurement. The aim is to
present  “objective”  numbers  on  the  educational  achievement  and,
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importantly, to rank participant-countries on the basis of their scores.
Thus Green (2003, 86) has ironically called it a kind of cross-national
Olympics.  As  education  is  increasingly  perceived  in  terms  of  its
contribution  to  economic  competitiveness  on  the  global  market,
measurements of educational efficiency, quality and individual potential
are treated as reflections of the overall economic well-being, investment
attractiveness  and  innovative  potential  of  nation-states.  The  inter-
national nature of these studies coupled with their growing popularity
could be taken for clear manifestations of globalisation, as they reveal
the  emergence  of  educational  surveillance  which  transcends  national
borders and is managed by organisations of supranational nature. This
development  exposes  the  establishment  of  the  so-called  mutual
accountability  (Nóvoa & Yariv-Mashal  2003) which positions national
systems  against  one  another  thus  feeds  the  common  incentive  for
endless development and improvement of quality. However, ironically,
these studies also re-strengthen the nation-state as they take the state  as
their primary unit of measurement (Green 2003, 86). 
It  is  not  only  the  growing  prevalence  of  the  cross-national
comparisons per se that is of primary interest here. It is also and perhaps
more importantly, the generation of uniform indicators and benchmarks
applied  to  very  different  contextual  settings  and  their  potential
implications that we should be concerned with. As Nóvoa and Yariv-
Mashal  (2003,  428)  demonstrate,  the  European  Union  employs
systematic comparison between countries using indicators, outcomes,
benchmarks  and  guidelines.  By  doing  so,  it  engages  in  political
intervention in the educational system which, in the EU regulation, is
otherwise left to the authority of the member-states. The authors assert
that “the construction of comparable indicators serves as a ‘reference
point’ that will eventually lead the various national institutions to adopt
freely the same kind of actions and perspectives within the educational
field” (ibid.). Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal call comparison the new mode of
governance which relies  on the  educational  researchers  to  develop its
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conceptual and methodological basis. Thus the method of comparison
itself, in addition to the knowledge it generates, is increasingly applied
in and for politics. 
Conclusion
In  this  chapter  I  discussed  recent  reorientations  in  comparative
education as a field of research and an academic discipline in relation to
the overarching theme of globalisation. My first aim was to synthesise
and reflect on the methodological and theoretical debates that point to
the  necessity  to  re-think  the  scales  of  analysis,  conceptions  and
categories  employed  in  research. Comparative  education  researchers
need to re-conceptualise and re-theorise the shift in the state from a
static  and  relatively  closed  container  of  socio-political  relations
(including  educational  ones)  to  a  plurilateral  structure  increasingly
embedded  in  and  contested  by  sub-national  and  supra-national
interactions. This  theoretical  and methodological  reorientation should
avoid the negation of the state, but instead acknowledge the importance
of its contextualisation. 
As Cowen (2003, 16) argues, the reactions and consequences to
the processes assembled under the fuzzy term of globalisation are not
equal. States adopt various strategies and ideologies in the face of the
phenomena, depending  on their  economic, political  and  institutional
capacities. The concepts of power, hegemony, fragmentation, core and
periphery enter the discussion, as we try to map states in relation to
globalisation. There should be conceptual plasticity and sensitivity to the
homogenising  effects  of  globalisation,  on  the  one  hand, as  well  as
modifications  and  resistance  they  endanger,  on  the  other.  Thus
conceived, the research agenda could re-orient itself toward a critical
examination  of  the  globalisation  processes  and  their  claims  to
universality and homogeneity. The overall consequences and challenges
endangered by the paradigmatic shift are intriguing. For one thing, it
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becomes ever more complicated to identify the appropriate scale(s) of
analysis and their interrelationships.
Second, I shortly raised the impact of globalisation on the ethical
dimension of the research, more precisely its political usage and links to
policy-making.  Comparison  has  historically  provided  policy-makers
with  ideas  and  practices  that  could  ameliorate  national  schools  and
arguments  necessary  to  legitimise  national  policies.  Recently,
comparison  has  turned  into  a  mode  of  governance  (Nóvoa  & Yariv-
Mashal  2003) as a  way to foster integration and convergence among
educational  systems  without  resorting  to  changes  in  legislation  and
traditional politics. This tendency is linked to the overarching theme of
the chapter, i.e. globalisation and the nation-state, as it manifests new
means of global educational governance which undermine the authority
of  the  state  as  the  regulator  of  the  educational  sector.  Thus,  the
challenge of globalisation is not merely related to the methodological
and theoretical reorientations, but equally to the ethical dimension of
the research. In other words, the choices we make with respect to the
methodological and theoretical aspects reveal the political position of
the research and its relation to the educational policy-making. Lastly, we
need  to  realise  that  there  is  a  general  vocabulary  overlap  between
politics  and  comparative  education. Globalisation  is  simultaneously  a
political  buzz-word and a “paradigmatic intellectual  supercomplexity”
(Cowen  2006, 562). Thus  researchers  are  faced  with  a  challenge  of
employing the vocabulary without falling into the trap of its unreflective
replication.
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NELLI PIATTOEVA
5. CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
Contrasting the national model to the emerging post-national agenda
INTRODUCTION
The worldwide legitimacy of the nation-state is increasingly challenged by the
complex phenomenon of globalisation. Global economic competition has raised the
stakes for nation-states and has attached states to supranational trade agreements
and financial markets which limit the scope of national independence and make
states ever more vulnerable to economic instability beyond national borders. The
cutbacks of welfare schemes are often justified in terms of fierce economic
competition which leads to rising disparities within societies. The integration of
nation-states into supranational political alliances means that decisions shaping
lives of individual people are made by institutions lacking direct political mandate
from the people (Bottery, 2003.). Simultaneously, the institutionalization of human
rights regimes and instruments, safeguarding cultural rights of minorities, enable
individuals and groups to make claims against the state on the basis of international
declarations and commitments. The so-called global civil society and transnational
advocacy networks make political activity that transpasses the state level ever more
viable (Munday & Murphy, 2001).
 Nation-states also encounter challenges from within, as separatist or autonomy
seeking movements expose the artificial nature of the nation. Furthermore, it is
becoming evident that the traditional nation-state ideology, based on an exclusive
notion of a homogeneous national culture, is not sufficient to raise allegiance
here, undermine the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its constituent citizenries.
As people are distanced and alienated from the political decision-making on the
state-wide level, they search for alternative identities to complement or replace
nationality. Moreover, the bond between the state and the citizen has weakened,
(Bottery, 2003.)
 These circumstances have led to the revaluation of citizenship, contrary to
he concept loses importance in the emerging socio-political
reality, characterized by the detachment of citizenship from the state (Kymlicka,
2003; Isin & Turner, 2007). The ongoing debates on the nature of citizenship
education across diverse national societies confirm the persistence of citizenship.
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In fact, numerous studies of citizenship education attest to the intensifying interest
toward citizenship education on the national level. Governments around the world
re-evaluate national educational policies and curricula regarding citizenship
education, introduce new schools subjects or cross-curricular themes to enhance
competences.
This kind of surveys rank young people on scales of activity/passivity and generate
quantified and comparative information on their loyalty to and knowledge about
national and international institutions.1
 Globalisation is also manifested in a deep qualitative change in the involvement
of international actors, such as formal intergovernmental organisations and
nongovernmental agencies in national educational policies. We are witnessing a
gradual shift from viewing education in national terms to post-national imaginaries,
along with new ambiguous ways of educational governance nested in networks,
peer review, agreements, cross-national statistics and benchmarking (Nóvoa, 2002).
The work of international actors is particularly concerned with a global or regional
escription of uniform
(Mundy & Murphy, 2001: 85). International organisations increasingly function as
-
Citizenship education, too, has become a matter of concern for international actors.
For instance, the world standards advance a more universalised model of human
rights education, which penetrates through both organisational links and discursive
practices (Ramirez, Suarez & Meyer, 2006).
 In the following I attempt to position citizenship education as the foundation
stone of the education system and national societies against the on-going shift from
national to supranational educational governance. As Ramirez, Suarez and Meyer
(2006) have already suggested in their discussion on the rise of human rights
education as a form of global post-national educational paradigm, it would be
important to contrast human rights education with other more traditional models. In
other words, there is a pressing need to understand the complex relationship
between the essentially national model of citizenship education as a basic function
and symbol of the nation-state and the new agenda-setting of international actors.
The ongoing revaluation of citizenship across states makes this research agenda
particularly interesting.
 I focus on the work of two formal intergovernmental organisations, UNESCO
and the Council of Europe (COE). The influence of these actors extends over a
large geographical area diverse in its political and social character. The organisations
share key political and moral ideals of developing a more just democratic world
order, and recognise the crucial role of education in these pursuits. The extended
membership and the aforementioned political agenda along with their modest
financial resources distinguish UNESCO and the COE from other large scale
intergovernmental actors, e.g. the European Union, the World Bank and the OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Thus it should be
borne in mind that their educational philosophy is not automatically shared by the
entire spectrum of intergovernmental organisations.
 My aims in this chapter are twofold. First I present a general historical account
of the emergence of state schooling and the traditional model of citizenship
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education closely associated with the rise of the nation-state. Second, I analyse a
set of documents issued by UNESCO and the COE in an attempt to interpret the
main tenets of their citizenship education agenda. The empirical materials analysed
in the course of the study are limited to the official documents and project
descriptions issued by UNESCO and the COE. Thus I am only concerned with the
general discursive agenda-setting and leave its influence on domestic education
policies for other researchers to pursue.2 I offer a provisional analysis of this
agenda in light of the traditional citizenship education rationale and discuss
potential implications of the emerging supranational discourses for the nation-state.
The main research question is whether citizenship education programmes developed
by international agents advocate a post-national ideology of citizenship with
significant consequences for the nation-state.
EDUCATION AND THE NATION-STATE A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The rise of the nation-state model
The linkage between citizenship and education should be examined in relation
to the nation-state as a political principle radically different from its predecessors,
i.e., the feudal state and the absolutist state. The nation-state emerged in the historical
context of the spread of nationalism, which asserted that the nation and the state
should be congruent (Gellner, 1983). Nationalism turned the nation, defined in
cultural and linguistic terms, into the main source of political legitimation of the
state. It extended state monopoly to the cultural sphere, as a high degree of political
and cultural integration was crucial to the survival of the nation-state.
 The term nation-state, strictly speaking, could only be applied to polities
where  single ethnic and cultural population inhibits the boundaries of the state,
the boundaries of that state are coextensive with the boundaries of that ethnic
states could be described as genuine nation-states (Connor, 1994; McCrone &
Kiely, 2000). Nevertheless, the nation-state has become a hegemonic state model
(Castles, 2005). It is both a national model, legitimising the state in terms of
common nationhood, and an international model, conceptualizing the world as
divided into coherent, homogenous but mutually exclusive national units. The
artificial nature of nation- -building policies,
adopted by the state in order to diffuse and strengthen a s
among its heterogeneous population (Kymlicka & Straehle, 1999: 73). Nation-
building is a process through which a dominant culture tends to become a
hegemonic culture of conversion and assimilation claiming a universalistic effect
within the territory of the state (Zambeta, 2005). It depends on the effectiveness
of various institutions and discourses that promote and legitimise common
nationhood (Kymlicka & Straehle, 1999).
 The modern concept of citizenship developed in the 18 th and 19th centuries as a
crucial precondition for the existence of the nation-state. Citizenship incorporated
rights and mutual obligations binding state agents, and defined persons exclusively
by their legal attachment to the state (Tilly, 1997: 7). It became a symbol of and a
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prerequisite for the political and cultural integration of the nation-state. Individuals
are accorded the rights and duties of citizenship only through membership of the
people the nation. Only those who share in the public culture of the people and
1990; Smith, 1995; Castles, 2005). In other words, the nationalization of citizenship
made citizenship synonymous to nationality defined as attachment to and identification
with the nation (Isin & Turner, 2007: 11).
 The interrelated concepts of state legitimacy and sovereignty acquired particular
meanings with the advent of nationalism. Legitimacy came to be perceived
exclusively in the framework of the national polity, united by common myths and a
homogenised and standardised culture of the nation. The state is legitimate only if
it corresponds to the will of the nation and translates the national will into credible
policies. In other words, the professional bureaucratic state strives to become our
state, whereas political institutions assert to belong to and express the people
(Canovan, 1998 emphasis original).
 Sovereignty, too, acquired a national connotation and came to be defined in
upreme political control over a given territory (Encyclopedia
of Nationalism, 2001). Sovereignty incorporates an internal and an external
dimension with both of them strongly related to the notion of the self-determination
of the nation the right of the nation to exercise political control over itself
(Encyclopedia of Nationalism, 2001). Domestically, a nation possesses an absolute
right to undertake decisions concerning its fate within the realm of the national
state in line with the principle of popular sovereignty (Mayall, 1990). Sovereignty
resides with the people on the basis of national self-determination, which is
increasingly viewed as a fundamental human right (Encyclopedia of Nationalism,
2001; Soysal, 1994). Externally, sovereignty is related to the representative rights
of the nation in the international arena of sovereign and autonomous nation-states.
is the nation that
possesses legitimate political power and acts sovereignly in international society.
At the same time, the national world order relies on the international society for
supporting, promoting and maintaining the hegemony of the nation-state.
 Citizenship both symbolises and constitutes means to sovereignty and legitimacy
of the nation-state as a status imposed on the individual by the state. The state has
retained monopoly over the definition of citizenship and the terms of acquiring and
practicing citizenship. Only recently have nation-states begun to change their
national legislation to accommodate double or multiple citizenship (Urry, 1999).
However, national governments continue to regard multiple citizenship as a threat
to loyalty and national security (Isin & Turner, 2007: 11). Historically sub-national
identities were deliberately eliminated or made subservient to the state-wide national
identity (Urry, 1999). The state authority over citizenship and nationality manifests
the sovereignty of the state both nationally and internationally. Only citizens
constitute the nation which legitimises the state, and the state has traditionally
been accountable to its legal citizens only. The linkage between citizenship,
sovereignty and legitimacy explains why international actors have traditionally
refrained from intervening in the matters of citizenship. The principle of national
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sovereignty equally extended to the realm of national education. From this
viewpoint, it is reasonable to ask whether citizenship education projects of
supranational actors undermine the established rationale. Before that, we should
understand how the nation-state and education grew together.
State education and citizenship
nd state formation in a number
 fundamental
mechanism, connecting individuals and states, and it appeared precisely where the
nation-state model emerged (Meyer, Ramirez & Soysal, 1992). Since the 19 th
century, control over school education in Europe passed from the Church to the
State. Educational participation was expanded from the tiny elite to the ever more
heterogeneous masses, followed by the emergence of compulsory school laws.
The standardisation of curricula, the introduction of entrance requirements, the
inspection and licensing of schools and the certification of teachers by state
authorities manifested the growing role of education in the political sphere and
the transformation of the relationship between schooling, society and the state
though unfolding across Europe at different points of time, should be interpreted in
relation to the process of state formation.
 The process of state formation included the construction of the political and
administrative apparatus of government and all other government-controlled
agencies comprising the public realm. Importantly, state-making was complemented
by the process of nation-building, focusing on the formation of collective beliefs
and the legitimation of the emerging state power in terms of shared nationhood and
national character. Green criticises earlier theories for explaining the rise of public
education as resulting from economic reorganisation, changing social conditions or
political democratisation. In relation to the latter, he convincingly shows that,
despite the popularity of the idea of education as a vehicle of human freedom and
educational development, dominant educational ideologies were mostly preoccupied
with social control, moral conformity and political acquiescence (Green, 1990).
 More so, the spread of democratic ideas and institutions appeared to be poorly
connected to the consolidation of state-led mass schooling. In fact, the authoritarian
and absolutist monarchies of Prussia and Austria undertook educational expansion
among the first states in Europe (Green, 1990). Even in the more liberal England
the Education Act of 1870, establishing a quasi-national system of education,
1867 (Green, 1990). A similar line of argument could be detected in Finland the
first European country to grant universal suffrage in 1906. The political reform led
to serious discussions concerning, among other issues, the introduction of
compulsory education. The debates were premised on the assumption that the
newly enfranchised citizens needed more education in order to use the powers
invested in them wisely and to put the good of the Motherland ahead of personal
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interests (Kivinen, 1988). Accordingly, the first standardised basic education
curriculum in Finland the Rural School Curriculum argued that civic education
should refrain from encouraging young people to examine controversial issues
related to society and the state. Instead, it should concentrate on explaining the
laws and the order of society (Council of State, 1925).
 The main purpose of state controlled mass system of education was to become
an integral part of the state apparatus and a vital means of promoting the new social
order (Green, 1990). It was increasingly recognised that education constitutes a
potentially powerful instrument in raising political loyalty and creating a cohesive
national culture, as it was envisioned by the political elite. The new system of
education assumed the primary responsibility for spreading the national language,
forging a national identity, encouraging patriotic values, inculcating moral
discipline and rooting citizenship in terms of justification of the state to the people
and the duties of the people to the state (Green, 1990). These objectives could be
perceived as the central virtues of the citizen of the emerging nation-state as well
as the main pillars of the essentially national model of citizenship education.
CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE POST-WORLD
WAR II ERA
The general democratisation of European societies in the post-war period added a
more democratic orientation to the conception of citizenship education. However,
de-colonisation and the disintegration of the multinational states of USSR and
Yugoslavia further consolidated the world-wide legitimacy of the nation-state
model, as a myriad of new states strove to create coherent nations within demarcated
state borders (Lucas, 2001). Due to the universality of the nation-state principle
and the continuing justification of state power in terms of shared nationhood, the
nationalising task of education has remained largely intact.
 The universalisation of the nation-state model accounts for the striking
similarities in the expansion of mass schooling across varying national contexts,
intensifying in the post-World War II period (Meyer, Ramirez & Soysal, 1992).
A set of data analysed in the course of a comparative study of the general aims of
education across world regions in the 1950s and the 1970s has shown an increase
in the number of countries expressing loyalty and patriotism as the aims of
education. Democracy has also shown up as a central issue, whereas world
citizenship has spread to a more modest extent (Fiala & Lanford, 1987). Another
study conducted in the 1980s and the 2000s indicated a general consensus on the
aims of education identified as equality, national identity, citizenship and democracy,
whereas world citizenship appears to a lesser extent (Amadio, Gross, Ressler &
Truong, 2004). The category of national ideals, which embraces national citizenship,
national identity and religion, is consistently more prevalent in both the 1980s and
the 2000s. However, references to the universal principles, including world
citizenship, tend to grow more strongly (Amadio, Gross, Ressler & Truong, 2004).
 The findings of the two comparative studies presented above reveal that the
dispersion of the nation-state model across the world has led to the consolidation
of citizenship education, based on national ideals and attachment to the nation.
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However, the results also demonstrate that the national and the post-national run in
tandem, with the latter growing rapidly in recent years. The emergence of a more
universal conception of citizenship education does not seem to weaken the position
of the national model, but the latter is increasingly complemented with new
elements, such as diversity and multiculturalism (Amadio, Gross, Ressler &
Truong, 2004). We could attribute the increasing reference to the universal
principles to the ever more prominent influence of the post-national education
agenda spreading through the work of intergovernmental organisations.3
CITIZENSHIP AGENDA OF UNESCO AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
Supranationalism
The terms supranationalism and supranational organisations l
organisations, institutions and political and social processes involving more than a
single state or at least two non-state actors from different nation-
2001: 805). The most important supranational organisations are intergovernmental
organisations (IGO) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (Lucas, 2001).
This chapter focuses on the work of two large-scale IGOs, UNESCO and the COE.
 UNESCO and the COE originated in the post-World War II era (1945 and 1949
respectively).4 Their agenda and activities are strongly embedded in the ideology of
human rights, rule of law, justice and democracy. The organisations strive to realise
these goals on universal (UNESCO, 192 member states) and regional (COE, 47
member states) levels. Written in 1945, the constitution of UNESCO promotes four
principles of education: world citizenship and international collaboration, equality
and democracy (McNeely, 1995). Its work is premised on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The work of the COE is equally founded on
the legal instruments initiated to guard and promote human rights in Europe  the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1950) and its judicial institution, the Court of Human Rights. Whereas
UNESCO
culture, science and education, the COE has a broader scope of activities, albeit
limited to the European region. However, the COE has acknowledged the central
role of education in the achievement of its key political objectives (COE, 1997).
 The strong commitment of the two organisations to democracy, the rule of law,
and human rights, which are also assumed to be shared by all their member states,
has a strong directing effect on the types of arguments, which can be advanced by
the organisations and their members (Macmullen, 2004). The initiation and
promotion of a particular type of discourse constitutes the main working mechanism
of international organisations. Thus we could say that IGOs largely operate through
discursive power. This is due to the fact that, even though national governments are
obliged to adopt policies formally agreed upon within an IGO, organisations
generally lack monitoring mechanism and the means to discipline and penalise
violators (except for suspension of membership or complete expulsion) (Lucas,
2001). In sharp contrast to confederations and federations, IGOs do not exercise
genuine sovereignty and authority over important decisions. The authority remains
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with the constituent member states, whom need to approve proposals (Lucas, 2001;
Macmullen, 2004 on the COE).
 The strong connection between nation-states and international agents is
apparent, when the historical development of IGOs is examined. They assumed
an important historical role, only with the rise and consolidation of the nation-state
in international politics. Due to the centrality of the nation-state, IGOs continue to
struggle to reconcile the prerogatives of national sovereignty with the collective
supranational dimension (Lucas, 2001). More so, the sovereignty of states over
matters of national development policy has been held as non-negotiable, leading to
accusations of statism (Jones, 1999). At the same time, it would be misleading to
treat intergovernmental organizations as mere extensions of foreign policy. Jones
(2007) and Kymlicka (2007) argue that international agendas are shaped by a
complex web of policy professionals, bureaucrats, academics and advocacy groups.
As international organizations have gradually established expertise, legitimacy and
authority of their own, they are able to develop unique policies which do not
necessarily reflect the political desires of member states.
Studying supranationalism
The ambiguity of supranational governance, which operates through multiple and
intangible ways, makes it hard to pin down the agenda of IGOs. That is why
the study of supranationalism and its regulatory ideals requires a particular
methodological sensitivity to the discursive practices employed by the IGOs. This
chapter attempts to unfold the discursive agenda of UNESCO and the COE by
means of textual analysis. UNESCO and the COE have published extensively on
different aspects of education. The following analysis is based on the official
documents, such as declarations, recommendations and resolutions, which are
explicitly concerned with the matters of citizenship and human rights education.
These materials represent the common agenda promoted by the organisations. In
addition, I studied citizenship and human rights education web-sites of UNESCO
and the COE, in order to get a general overview of the current and past activities,
their objectives and arguments. The data spans across the period from 1974 2007
for UNESCO and 1978 2007 in the case of the COE. The publication year and the
titles of the oldest documents illustrate that both organisations have a long history
of working with human rights education, whereas their adoption of the term
citizenship education is a fairly recent endeavour.
 By focusing on discourses embedded in citizenship education programmes of
as
(Soysal, 1994: 6). Discursive modes or scripts form a cultural framework for the
meaning and actions of national actors. On the supranational level, this discursive
frame both provides models and restricts actions and policies of the nation-state.
By acting upon these principles, nation-states reproduce them and the definitions of
and
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Discourse advances international organisations and is promoted, sharpened and
standardised in conferences, declarations and frames of actions, produced in the
context of international activities (Chabbott, 2003).
 UNESCO and the COE develop their citizenship education programmes
separately and through joint actions. It is remarkable that IGOs join forces on
issues which overlap or are complementary in their work, presumably fostering the
efficiency of their supranational regulatory power. In this way, they also help to
form and maintain the so-called epistemic communities with abilities to transcend
conventional inter-state authority and structures, thus consolidating and promoting
the agenda of international actors (Jones, 2005). The website of the COE provides
numerous examples of inter-organisational cooperation in the field of citizenship
and human rights education. For instance, the COE monitors on the European level
 Rights Education,
which started in 2005. A European Year of Citizenship through Education was
launched in cooperation with a number of international institutions including
UNESCO, OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights), OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the
European Commission. Hence the work of the two agents is in many respects
complementary. In the following I present the main findings of the analysis of the
official documents of UNESCO and the COE which frame their citizenship
education initiatives.
 If compared to the pillars of modern education indicated by Green (1990),
citizenship promoted by the COE and UNESCO is striking in its primary focus on
proactive political participation of the individual. The massification of politics in
the 19th century linked citizenship to its political dimension, especially the political
rights of citizens to monitor national leaders. However, the supranational definition
of political participation is somewhat different. It emphasises active participation,
encourages critical scrutiny and legitimises action against the state, as opposed to
advocating uncritical obedience and order. More so, the crucial role of human rights
means that citizens are protected against their home governments and can initiate
action against the state on the basis of universal human rights (e.g. COE, 1997).
In its guidelines for history teaching, the COE clearly states that governments have
used history in a biased manner for political purposes and ideological propaganda.
Furthermore, every citizen has a right to learn history that has not been
manipulated. In other words the document stipulates that history teaching should
encourage a critical approach to information which does not exempt criticism about
governmental institutions and political leadership (COE, 1996). The following
quite clearly demonstrates how the traditional top-down relationship between the
state and the individual is called into question:
democratic state to dictate rules for every aspect of
human behaviour, since moral and ethical attitudes must remain an area in
which the individual has freedom of choice, but always respecting the rights
of others (COE, 1999: article 8).
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The increased attention of international actors to citizenship and human rights
education springs from their declared concern about growing political apathy, racist
violence, xenophobia, nationalism and intolerance. All of these developments
endanger the fulfilment of human rights and make education indispensable as
means to combat societal ills (UNESCO, 1995; COE, 2002). Human rights are in
the centre of citizenship education (COE, 2000; UNESCO, 2007a; 2007b). Moreover,
education about human rights has become an indispensable part of the very right to
education (OHCHR, 2005). This is evident from the numerous references to human
rights education in all of the examined documents, as well as in the fact that
citizenship education projects of the late 1990s are rooted in the earlier projects
concerned with human rights education.
 The imperative of human rights illustrates that both organisations adhere to
and seek to promote the post-nationalisation of citizenship premised on universal
personhood, instead of national and particularistic peoplehood. For instance,
UNESCO urges to renounce national patriotism and proclaims universal human
rights as the core of citizenship education:
Civic education programmes have become an increasingly important means
for countries to educate citizens about their rights and responsibilities.
Increasing pluralism within states has encouraged the development of civic
citizenship
requiring uncritical loyalty to the nation state. By def
terms of human rights and civic responsibilities, civic education programmes
ethnic, religious or cultural identity. (UNESCO, 2007b: online)
Human rights education is expected to foster universal values, such as peace,
tolerance, global solidarity, democracy and justice, which are believed to win
universal recognition regardless of the socio-cultural context (UNESCO, 1995).
This statement implies that supranational agents strive to construct and enhance a
set of universal values, as opposed to the particularistic values restricted to the realm
of the nation. However, the situation appears to be more complicated than that.
ation-states has meant that the organisation
inevitably aligned itself with the main pillars of western schooling, i.e., state
formation, nation-building, identity, productivity and citizenship (Jones, 2005).
More so, despite clear references to the notion of world citizenship
core documents, its ambiguous definition does not seem to contradict or override
the primacy of the national in the individual identities of citizens. World
citizenship and global education are primarily related to inter-national
collaboration and solidarity, world integration, progress of civilisation and
appreciation and understanding of international community (UNESCO, 1974; cf.
McNeely, 1995).
 In the case of the COE, citizenship also remains a vague concept, perhaps due to
the sensitivity of the topic (Forrester, 2003). For example, the Recommendation
of the Committee of Ministers to member states (COE, 2002)  one of the core
documents of the Education for Democratic Citizenship project  discusses practical,
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rather than conceptual or ideological issues of citizenship education. It seems that
the organisation tries to strike a balance between national sovereignty and the
promotion of a common supranational agenda of citizenship. While all documents
commonly make use of
define the polity to which the rights and the responsibilities are confined. It is,
however, the definition of the polity which delineates the geopolitical scope of
citizenship  whether national (limited to the nation-state) or post-national
(extended to sub- and supra-national levels).
 Overall, the textual analysis has revealed that there is no consistency in the
supranational agenda. While some documents express a post-national agenda of
human rights, others, like the aforementioned Recommendation (COE, 2002),
underline that national governments decide on the adaptation of the supranational
agenda to the local context. Such conceptual eclecticism makes it premature to talk
of a coherent post-national agenda. On the one hand, both UNESCO and the
COE put strong emphasis on the promotion of and respect for diversity and
multiculturalism, as well as the multi-level conception of citizenship. The latter is
premised on the understanding of citizenship as simultaneously confined to local,
national and supranational (i.e. European and global) dimensions (e.g. COE, 2000: 5;
s of their own regions
2).
A text on the web-
CO, 2007a:
anticipating the geopolitical changes on the European continent at the end of
to the entire continent and is not synonymous with membership in any European
organisation (COE, 1989). Adherence to diversity and a multi-level conception of
citizenship identity are the new qualities which substantially distinguish the post-
national model from its national(istic) rival.
 On the other hand, while stating that citizenship as regards the national context
can no longer be identified or exercised solely in the context of globalization,
childhood, to become
clear-thinking and enlightened citizens who participate in decisions concerning
Society
sense of a nation with a circumscribed territory which is recognized as
(UNESCO, 2007a: online). Thus citizenship is still often confined to the national
state. The co-existence of the national discourse of citizenship and the post-
national discourse of universal human rights indicates that the supranational script
of citizenship education is far from renouncing the traditional notion of national
citizenship.
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DISCUSSION: EVALUATING THE EMERGING CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
AGENDA
Citizenship education is perhaps the most politically sensitive and controversial part
of compulsory education, because it plays a key role in forging and maintaining
national citizenship, loyalty and identity. It is particularly interesting that citizenship
education has become the subject of supranational concern, despite the strong link
between national sovereignty, citizenship and education and the fact that education
used to lie under the indisputable control of the nation-state (cf. Ramirez, Suarez &
Meyer, 2006). Thus the educational activities of UNESCO and the COE could be
interpreted in a much wider manner  as evidence pointing to the transformation
of the national state in the international arena and the extending sphere of
influence of intergovernmental actors. Should the initiatives of international
organisations to dictate the terms of citizenship education be perceived as
interference with national sovereignty, a threat to national legitimacy and even a
gradual closure of the traditional national polity? As the analysis above has
demonstrated, the supranational agenda of citizenship education displays post-
national features, which manifest changes in the perceptions of national sovereignty
and legitimacy of the nation-state. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental character of
the organisations also leads to the repetition of the traditional citizenship rhetoric.
The conceptual inconsistency arises from the dual position of UNESCO and the
COE as autonomous supranational actors constrained by the geopolitical realities
and their institutional organization.
 The methodology of contrasting the objectives of citizenship education
established in the process of nation-state formation to the recent supranational
agenda of UNESCO and the COE was premised on an understanding that the two
represent antithetical scripts. In the national model citizenship (status, rights and
duties) and nationality (identity) were tightly bound together. More so, in the national
model, the national state dictated the limits of citizenship and citizen duties in a
top-down manner, emphasising order, obedience and unquestioned loyalty
(cf. Green, 1990). The post-national model of citizenship decouples citizenship
from nationality, as it posits citizen rights within a wider global context, while
simultaneously assigning identities to national, sub- and supranational communities
(Soysal, 1994; Delanty, 2007). In the post-national discourse, the traditional
emphasis on responsibilities is replaced by the notion of rights guaranteed by the
state and, increasingly so, by the supranational human rights instruments.
 However, it is also evident that the rise of the post-national ideology neither
signals the closure of the national polity nor completely replaces the traditional
models of citizenship education. Moreover, international agents could not be
simplistically positioned against nation-states, with the former epitomising the
advent of the post-national era and the latter manifesting the fading power of
nationalism. The analysis has clearly shown that supranational discourses are not
clusion, my findings, too, demonstrate
that the global script simultaneously adheres to and promotes both the principles of
national sovereignty and universal human rights which, by definition, transcend
national borders and transform the very meaning of sovereignty. Whereas the
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principle of sovereignty reinforces the ultimate autonomy of the nation-state,
strengthens state borders and links citizenship rights to the national collectivity, the
human rights discourse attributes rights to persons regardless of their citizenship
(Soysal, 1994).
 UNESCO and the COE follow a double agenda of guarding the principle of
national sovereignty and simultaneously promoting the discourse of human rights.
In the framework of intergovernmental organisations, like UNESCO and the COE,
the state continues to play a central role, as the implementation of the post-national
agenda is greatly dependent on the will and the institutional capacity of national
governments (cf. UNESCO, 1993). However, its sovereignty and legitimacy are no
longer solely subjected to the scrutiny of the national citizenry. They are also
linked to the governments and citizens of other countries (Lucas, 2001). In this
way, legitimacy increasingly takes a supranational form. In order to uphold
international legitimacy, national governments are forced to adopt the language
produced in the supranational arena.
 Instead of proclaiming a clear shift from the national to the post-national, recent
developments in the field of citizenship education attest to the growing complexity
of the social-educational reality, characterised by the co-existence of the national
and the post-national. This complexity has to be taken into consideration by
researchers, politicians and educational practitioners seeking to either analytically
examine or practically influence citizenship education.
NOTES
1  The renewed interest in citizenship and citizenship education is reflected in the growing number of
studies on the topic. To mention a few which all point to the revaluation of citizenship education:
Janmaat and Piattoeva (2007), Grossman, Lee and Kennedy (2008), Osler and Starkey (2006),
Piattoeva (forthcoming), Soysal and Schissler (2005). International organisations, too, have studied
citizenship education policies, practices and attitudes of young people: All-European Study on
Education for Democratic Citizenship Policies (COE, 2004), the IEA Civic Study (e.g. Torney-
Purta, 2002) and Education and Active Citizenship in the European Union (European Commission,
1998).
2  My ongoing doctoral research focuses on citizenship education policies in Finland and Russia, but
locates national policies within the supranational citizenship education agenda shaped by the COE
and UNESCO.
3  The aim of this chapter is not to trace the dispersion of the new citizenship education model in the
nation-states. I analyse whether the model of citizenship education developed by intergovernmental
organizations is different from the traditional national ideal. A study by Mary Rauner (1999) has
shown that linkages to UNESCO are significant predictors of the extent to which countries
there has been a worldwide shift from national civic education to global civic education, other
studies confirm that the national and the global run in tandem, or the national model still prevails
(Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007; Piattoeva forthcoming; Soysal & Schissler, 2005; Grossman, Lee &
Kennedy, 2008). In this respect it seems that the conclusion of Soysal and Wong is most accurate:
 emphasises national history, society and citizenship. No perception of a global or
transnational citizen emerges as such, but the national is now subject to transnational reflections
this is where it obtains its legitimacy. Citizens are still constructed for a world of competitive nation-
states, however their competitiveness now comes from how much they contribute to what is held to
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4  Information on the history of the organisations is available on their web-sites: www.unesco.org and
www.coe.int.
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This paper examines the discourses framing citizenship education in Ukraine and Russia from pere-
stroika to the present and assesses the role of the Council of Europe in promoting democratic citi-
zenship in both countries. We argue that there is a tension between the discourses of active
citizenship, strongly disseminated by international agencies (the Council of Europe in our case),
and national consolidation, pursued by Ukraine and Russia since the fall of the Soviet regime. While
the beginning of the 1990s was marked by democratization and individualization, from the mid-
1990s the emphasis on state cohesion became more prominent in both states. From the end of the
1990s, however, citizenship education aims started to diverge, despite a similar approach of the
Council of Europe to the two countries. In Russia the government reinforced the state cohesion
agenda, which led to the patriotic education discourse gaining strength. In Ukraine, nation-building
was made secondary to bringing the education system in line with international standards in order
to improve the country’s competitiveness. The nature of citizenship education in the two countries
therefore seems to be more a reflection of domestic political developments than the product of inter-
national policy agenda.
Introduction
The relationship between citizenship education and authority has been hotly
debated by scholars from a range of disciplines. Central to this debate is the ques-
tion of whether citizenship education should nurture loyal law-abiding citizens
aware of their duties and responsibilities to state and society, or produce citizens
who stand up for their rights, question state authority and are open to other views
and cultures (McCowan, 2004). This paper will not touch on the normative
dimension of this debate. Rather, it seeks to explore how two new states arising
from the ashes of the Soviet Union—Ukraine and the Russian Federation—have
*Corresponding author. Department of Education, 33014 University of Tampere, Finland. Email:
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come to terms with this dilemma in their citizenship education policies following
independence.
New states are an interesting arena in which to examine citizenship education, as
these states tend to give priority to nation-building policies in the first decades of their
existence—i.e. to policies promoting cultural unity and unconditional loyalty to the
state (Coulby, 1997; Green, 1997). Moreover, it seems particularly relevant to exam-
ine post-communist new states as it has been noted that a history of communist rule has
not been conducive to civic attitudes, pluralism and tolerance. Schöpflin (2000), for
instance, contends that communism destroyed civil society and the social fabric of
communities, leaving people isolated and distrustful of the state and of their fellow
citizens. After the Soviet break-up, he argues, intolerant ethno-national identities
filled the vacuum that the communists had left behind. Assuming this view to be
valid, balanced citizenship education policies aimed at both conformity and active
citizenship are not necessarily at all possible in the transition states.
Among the post-communist states, Ukraine and Russia provide fascinating case
studies because they have different points of departure. Whereas Russia considers
itself to be the successor state of the Soviet Union and therefore has to come to terms
with a loss of territory and a declining status as superpower, Ukraine is a new state
insecure about the loyalty of its citizens. While Russia is still a powerful state possess-
ing nuclear arms and an abundance of natural resources, Ukraine relies on conven-
tional weaponry for its defence and is dependent on other countries for its gas and oil
consumption. This situation makes Ukraine much more concerned about its external
security than Russia. Whereas Russians can be confident about the continuing
strength and appeal of their language and culture, Ukrainians are struggling to gain
acceptance for their cultural heritage, which has often patronizingly been identified
as Malorussian (little Russian)—i.e. a simple peasant offshoot of Russian culture. We
assume that these different starting points and the national political developments
emanating from them affect the discourses of citizenship education.
Lastly, both countries are embedded in numerous global networks that seek to
influence their domestic policies including citizenship education. The involvement of
the Council of Europe (COE) is interesting in this regard. From the mid-1990s this
intergovernmental organization has developed a range of activities to promote the
idea of active and critical citizenship in its member states. Thus the COE fosters the
very side of citizenship education that is difficult to reconcile with the objective of
achieving unconditional loyalty to and identification with the state and the nation. In
the ensuing analysis we aim to explore whether elements of the COE’s vision on citi-
zenship, which is critical, multicultural and post-national, are included in the national
policy documents. We will interpret a complete absence of these elements in the
policy documents as a sign that nation-building issues are (still) of overriding impor-
tance to the national authorities.
The comparative dimension employed in this paper is both horizontal and vertical.
Horizontally, we compare Russia and Ukraine in the realm of citizenship education
policies, taking into consideration their similarities and differences in socio-political
and educational contexts. Vertically, we seek to ‘read the global’ (Cowen, 2000)—i.e.
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to understand the complexities of the global context in which national citizenship
education policies are developed and often contested. In view of the tendency of
international actors to offer universalized policy programmes for all contexts, we
want to examine the ‘blockages’ and ‘permeabilities’ (Cowen, 2000) of Russian and
Ukrainian citizenship education policies regarding the citizenship education ideology
of the Council of Europe. Briefly recapitulating, our study is guided by the following
questions: 
1. Which discourses have framed citizenship education in Russia and Ukraine since
the late 1980s and have there been changes in the intensity of each of them?
2. To what extent can possible differences between Russia and Ukraine in the
nature and timing of these discourses be attributed to differential points of depar-
ture and national political developments?
3. Can the COE’s critical, pluralist and active vision on citizenship education be
observed in the educational policies of the two countries?
As our focus is on the discourses framing citizenship education, we examine the
subject through curricula, policy documents and articles in the educational press. We
are primarily concerned with the ideas these texts convey rather than with the imple-
mentation of citizenship education policies. The paper starts with the introduction of
the tensions inherent in citizenship education. It is then followed by a brief discussion
on the Council of Europe’s citizenship education initiative. Subsequently, we exam-
ine the educational developments in Ukraine and Russia.
We argue that the discourses of active democratic citizenship and nation-building
do not easily coexist in the citizenship education policies of both countries following
the break-up of the Soviet Union. An increased salience of one tends to coincide
with a diminishing importance of the other. Particularly in times of turmoil and
separatist confrontations, nationalizing programmes emphasizing unity, conformity
and loyalty quickly overshadow initiatives promoting democratization, individual
autonomy and respect for diversity. In recent years, Ukraine and Russia seem to
have drifted apart, as Ukraine embraces democratic citizenship principles in an effort
to partake in European trends, while Russia prioritizes patriotic education. However,
given the unsettled nature of post-communist politics, it would be premature to
interpret these developments as signs of permanently diverging trajectories.
Citizenship education
Citizenship is membership in a political and national community, which requires
knowledge and skills to act in the community, as well as a sense of identification with
this community. By citizenship education, we understand all those educational norms
and practices that seek to socialize future generations into the realm of the state and
the nation. From this perspective, citizenship education is always a future-oriented
process guided by visions of the desirable society. As these visions are multiple and
change with time and within different segments of the society, citizenship education
is always a political endeavour, both in terms of agreement and implementation, as
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well as its consequences for the future. The contested and deeply political nature of
citizenship education explains why there are shifts in the content and relative strength
of various discourses depending on the political and societal contexts.
Philosophers and political thinkers have for a long time debated on the nature of
citizenship and citizenship education. Aristotle, for example, argued that citizenship
education should serve the requirements of the state. That is why he admired the
Spartan model of civic training, which turned young boys into obedient soldiers
(Heater, 1990, pp. 7–8). A later tradition, rooted in the writings of Locke, advocated
citizenry critical and ready to change the existing societal and political structures. In
line with these views Paolo Freire, for example, argued for citizenship education that
helps to uncover the unjust nature of society and to encourage deliberate action. The
first view can be rightfully criticized for treating people as mere objects of citizenship
indoctrination, whereas the latter might easily promote centrifugal forces and thus
endanger societal stability.
Adding to the complexity of this debate is the fact that citizenship in the modern
times has been linked to the ideology of nationalism and nationality. Affiliating the
political concept of citizenship with the nation meant that modern citizenship had to
incorporate not only rights and duties, but also a sense of tradition, community and
identity (Heater, 2002, p. 99). In Ancient Greece citizenship meant participation in
the political affairs of the city-state, the polis. But already then Aristotle claimed that
‘the citizens of the state must know one another’s characters’ (quoted in Heater,
1990, p. 3). In the modern state, the required intimacy was replaced by the myth of
belonging to one nation, the ‘imagined community’. The nation was supposed to turn
a mere bureaucratic state into our state, which expressed the will of the people and
captured their loyalty (Canovan, 1998, p. 23).
Thus, the dilemma regarding the allegiance to the state versus critical evaluation of
its institutions is further deepened by the fact that citizenship education should create
and strengthen the bond between the citizen and the nation. Among others, the
creation and maintenance of nations involves the invention of tradition, the rewriting
and even falsification of history and assimilation of ethnic groups. In order to main-
tain the nation, the future generations are not supposed to question the inherited
cultural norms and myths. Otherwise an independent critical mind could easily put
the fate of the nation at danger. Even older nation-states, such as the UK or France,
continue to inculcate the feeling of belonging to the nationhood. The Crick Report of
1998, which forms the basis for the English citizenship education curriculum,
declares the main aim ‘to find or restore a sense of common citizenship, including a
national identity that is secure enough to find a place in the plurality of nations,
cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom’ (quoted
in Osler & Starkey, 2001, p. 293). The French programmes also stress national iden-
tity and nationality in all grades (Osler & Starkey, 2001).
If these tensions continue to haunt citizenship education in the established nation-
states, how do they influence the emerging nation-states, such as Ukraine and the
Russian Federation? The recent history of these countries has shown that the task of
forming a state and identifying who belongs to the nation are not easily fulfilled. The
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situation in these countries is further complicated by the fact that they are embedded
in the global networks, which seek to influence national processes including the ideol-
ogy of citizenship education.
Council of Europe and the programme of active citizenship
The Council of Europe represents an important European agent promoting democ-
racy, human rights and the rule of law in the societies of its member states (46 by
October 2004). Having been established immediately after the Second World War,
the organization initially drew its members mainly from western Europe. More than
half of the current member states, including Ukraine and Russia, joined the institu-
tion only after the collapse of the Iron Curtain (1995 and 1996 respectively).1
At the summit meeting of the Heads of State and Government held, in Strasbourg,
in October 1997, it was decided to launch an initiative for Education for Democratic
Citizenship (EDC). The year 2002 played a crucial role in the further development
of the project, as the Committee of Ministers adopted the Recommendation to
member states on education for democratic citizenship (Rec (2002)12). As a result,
the year 2005 became a European Year of Citizenship through Education.2 Among
the multiple objectives of this initiative the one that has captured our attention seeks
‘to strengthen the capacity of member states to make the EDC a priority objective of
educational policy-making and implement sustainable reform at all levels of the educa-
tion system’ (Council of Europe, 2004). Such statements prove that the Council’s citi-
zenship work has grown into an ambitious project, which is expected to have a tangible
effect on both policy level and grassroots activity in all member states.
In the context of the paper, it is important to note that the COE’s understanding
of citizenship is largely based on the notion of active participation, tolerance and crit-
ical evaluation of institutional arrangements. Lucas (2001, p. 820) has noted that the
supranational post-modernist (i.e. post-national) dynamics essentially pressure states
to recognize the multicultural composition of their populations. This pressure, he
explains, is likely to conflict with the ‘modernist’ approach to nationhood in the newly
independent states: 
In ex-Communist, newly independent states, national governments are confronted with
the task of designing policies and development paths that forge a compromise between
modernist and postmodernist, supranational projects. This is not easy due to the fact that
these two approaches are at odds with each other. States that prioritise the modernist,
ideologically dominant traits of nation-statehood to the exclusion of multicultural open-
ness and pluralist political culture will tend to exclude themselves from the rapidly evolv-
ing ‘glocalised’ environment in which all nation-states increasingly find themselves. But
the modern nation-state cannot truly open itself to its postmodern social and cultural envi-
ronment without becoming self-critical of its traditional historical heritage and its own
history of discrimination against ‘foreign’ and minority cultures. (Lucas, 2001, p. 821)
What Lucas points at is the conflicting logic of national and post-national projects,
the latter being increasingly promoted by supranational agents, such as the Council
of Europe. In order to concur with the post-national transition, states should permit
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a multiplicity of identifications among their populations, as well as an atmosphere of
pluralism and critical questioning regarding the state, the nation and their historical
legacy.
In the educational context these contradictory objectives could be described in
terms of ‘citizenship education’ and ‘education for citizenship’ (Forrester, 2003).
Whereas the former promotes democratization, individual autonomy, respect for
diversity, challenging authority and standing up for one’s rights, the latter emphasizes
responsibility, conformity, national loyalty and service to the community. Obviously,
the Council of Europe’s critical and multicultural initiative can be equated with ‘citi-
zenship education’, while a traditional nation-building project is more in line with
‘education for citizenship’. It is precisely the latter that is likely to be prioritized in the
former communist states, as they are reconstructing their national statehood. As
members of the COE, does this mean that Ukraine and Russia will contest the COE’s
policy on EDC? These issues, along with the tensions inherent in the notion of citi-
zenship, provide the background to the following discussion of educational develop-
ments in Ukraine and Russia.
Ukraine
Since the late 1980s, several discourses have been competing for primacy in the broad
area of citizenship education. There have been clear shifts in the relative strength of
each of these discourses over time. We can roughly distinguish three periods. The first
period finds its origins in the late Glasnost era and is characterized by the uneasy coex-
istence of the discourses of democratization (‘citizenship education’) and nation-
building (‘education for citizenship’). The second period, starting with the presidential
elections of 1994, is marked by a continuation of state and nation-building rhetoric
and a marginalization of issues relating to school autonomy, democracy and pupil-
centred pedagogy. From the end of the 1990s nation-building concerns have gradually
moved to the background and the notions of democratization and active citizenship
have reappeared as part of a desire to link Ukrainian education to European trends.
The discussion of the three periods will highlight the tension between the discourses
of nation-building on the one hand, and democratization and active citizenship on the
other hand. It will also point to the significance of domestic political factors in shaping
the educational agenda.
1989–1994: democratization and nation-building
Democratization and nation-building issues have dominated much educational
thought in Ukraine from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, when oppositional move-
ments enabled by Glasnost and Perestroika first began to challenge the communist
monopoly on power. These discourses were directly related to the breakdown of
communism as the central state ideology. Democratization, for instance, was
expressed by sharp condemnations of the monolithic Soviet pedagogy and by appeals
for pupil-centred pedagogy and grassroots involvement in education. Thus, one
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observer noted that: ‘unfortunately, the bureaucratization and over-regulation of all
aspects of school education and the command-administrative style of leadership have
given rise to such formalism and humbug that high-quality secondary education truly
remains an ideological myth if these obstacles are not overcome’ (Goncharenko,
1991, p. 2).
The Communist Party was also heavily criticized for its cultural policies. Dissidents
and Ukrainian intellectuals accused the Soviet government of pursuing a policy of
gradual cultural attrition of the Ukrainian nation by Russifying all sectors of public
life. Towards the close of the 1980s, they established the oppositional movement
Rukh, which began to mobilize public sentiment on the Ukrainian national revival
issue (Hrycak, 2004). Education was identified as the key domain to reinvigorate the
Ukrainian language and culture.
The Law on Languages of 1989 marked an early victory for these nation-building
activists. Passed by a still-communist Supreme Soviet, which increasingly felt belea-
guered by Rukh, it proclaimed Ukrainian the sole state language of the Ukrainian Soviet
Republic (Arel, 1995). To the present day, this law regulates the use of Ukrainian in
education and in other public domains. As a vital instrument for later governments
to base their language policies on, the law marked the onset of a cultural nation-building
project that sought to redress Russification and to (re)affirm Ukrainian distinctiveness
vis-à-vis Russia.
The years prior to independence also saw the first attempts to reform the education
system in a democratic direction. Amid unstoppable centrifugal processes at the Union
level, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed the 1991 Education Act. Surrounded by
ever-louder calls for democratization and a humanitarian orientation of the curriculum
(e.g. Krasna et al., 1991; Yakymenko, 1991), this law marked the beginning of a
process to dismantle the rigid, centralized Soviet education system. It stated that the
key objectives of the new educational policy were to establish ideologically neutral
school curricula, to develop the personal talents and skills of youngsters and to raise
them as multifaceted individuals on their way to become invaluable contributors to
society. It further noted that ‘Education in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is based on
the principles of humanism, democracy, national self-consciousness and mutual
respect between nations’ (Education Act 1991, p. 276). As a complete novelty, it
offered schools autonomy in the planning of the teaching process, in the employment
of teaching staff, in financial and administrative matters and in commercial activities.
After the sudden advent of independence in August 1991 and the election of
communist turned nationalist Kravchuk as Ukraine’s first president, a new Rukh-
dominated government was appointed, which energetically took up the twin tasks of
nation-building and educational reform. It laid down its vision in the State National
Programme ‘Education’ (Ukraine of the twenty-first century), a strategic policy docu-
ment prepared by a group of scientists and teachers. This document took the new
spirit of the Education Act 1991 one step further by condemning Soviet educational
practices in particularly harsh terms and by proposing radical reforms. It, for
instance, lamented ‘the authoritarian pedagogy instituted by a totalitarian state
which led to a levelling of natural talents, skills and engagement of all educational
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practitioners’. This was meant to be replaced by a system offering a wide range of
educational methods, approaches and orientations to accommodate the varying
talents and preferences of individual pupils. It also called for ‘a radical restructuring
of the administration of education through democratization, decentralization and
the institution of a regional system of educational authorities’ (State National
Programme ‘Education’, 1994, pp. 7–8).
Parallel to the emphasis on democratization and pupil-centred pedagogy, the docu-
ment advocated the education of national traditions. It accused the Soviet regime of
having given rise to ‘a devaluation of general humanistic values, national nihilism and
a disconnection of education from national origins’. The programme thus saw values
formation, national consciousness and education in national traditions as closely
linked phenomena. Consequently, to undo the Soviet legacy and restore moral stan-
dards, the new education system was urged to exhibit: ‘a national orientation which
proceeds from the indivisibility of education from national foundations, the organic
unity with national history and folk traditions, the preservation and enrichment of the
culture of the Ukrainian people and […] harmonious interethnic relations’ (pp. 7, 9).
The programme thus expected public education to reflect and cultivate a national
identity that is grounded in history and culture.
The dual objectives of democratization and cultural nation-building held each
other in an uneasy balance, however. The tension between the two concepts surfaced
in an ambivalent official statement by education minister Talanchuk: ‘We must over-
come the former overemphasis on collectivism, which caused an underestimation of
individuality, but we have no right to foster unrestrained domination of individualism
which contradicts our people’s collectivist traditions originated in the customs of
Cossack communities’ (quoted in Stepanenko, 1999, p. 102). In terms of actual
policy, it was soon evident that the government gave priority to nation-building, as it
mobilized all levels of the state apparatus to Ukrainianize primary, secondary and
higher education (Janmaat, 1999). In cases where the two objectives conflicted,
nation-building overruled democratization, as happened when education minister
Talanchuk prohibited students in higher education to vote on the language of instruc-
tion at the beginning of the 1993/94 academic year (Janmaat, 2000a).
The reform of history education in schools also testified to the priority given to iden-
tity construction. The Ministry of Education endorsed a narrative that interpreted the
history of Ukraine as an age-long struggle of Ukrainians to free themselves from
foreign domination, and presented this narrative as the unquestionable historical real-
ity. The new nationalist inspired account was formalized in a separate History of
Ukraine course, which reinforced history as a marker of national identity. According
to Wanner (1995, p. 3): ‘This “restructuring” of historical interpretation, exchanging
a communist ideology for a nationalist one, did little to reduce the oppressive politi-
cization of history. Once again, historical interpretation is made a slave to the political
machine.’ Stepanenko (1999) expresses a similar concern by noting that both the
Ukrainian and the Soviet variants of history aim to affirm their own version, suppress-
ing other historical perspectives. Because of this, he argues, there is a genealogical
relatedness of the Ukrainian nationalist mentality to its communist predecessor.3
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Interestingly, the re-institutionalization of a single narrative can be seen as a step back-
wards in comparison to the Perestroika period, as the Soviet authorities in 1990
formally permitted the teaching of history from various perspectives (Wanner, 1998).
1994–9: consolidated state and nation-building
Political developments in the mid-1990s underlined that democratization had been
more token than real. A desire to give local stakeholders more say in policy matters,
including in education, quickly lost out to concerns about state unity and integrity
among the political elite in Kyiv. This elite was alarmed by the separatist movements
in the Russian-speaking Donbass and the Crimea, which had gained considerably in
strength during the Kravchuk presidency. For the new president Leonid Kuchma,
elected in July 1994, curbing these secessionist tendencies and enhancing state unity
was the key policy objective (Kuzio, 2002). The logical consequence of this agenda
was a resumption of central state control. The Constitution of Ukraine, adopted in
June 1996, clearly reflected the renewed centralization, as it established Ukraine as a
unitary state with a single state language and a strong presidency (Constitution of
Ukraine, 1996). The status of the Crimea as an Autonomous Republic was
confirmed, but the powers offered to the republic were restricted to the domains of
agriculture, infrastructure and culture, and did not include education.
Recentralization also manifested itself in the 1996 Education Act. This law
established the State Standards of Education, requirements as to the content, level
and volume of education that were mandatory for both state and private schools
(1996 Education Act). It divided the curriculum for schools into a compulsory
state and a facultative school component with the latter claiming up to 24% of the
teaching time. For Stepanenko (1999, p. 104) the school component is an indica-
tion that some progress has been made regarding the democratization of the
educational process, as it ‘presupposes choice and an initiative from below’.
Others, however, are more sceptical. Wanner (1998, pp. 119–120), for instance,
notes that ‘the monolithic educational bureaucracy and the structures and prac-
tices of Soviet schools remain virtually in place despite decrees and announced
reforms [the aforementioned State National Programme] that suggest otherwise’.
In similar vein, Stepanyshyn (1997) maintains that school education in Ukraine in
the second half of the 1990s has, by and large, retained Soviet features. He advo-
cates the right for schools and regions to modify the mandatory components of the
curriculum and argues that school councils should be given a greater role in
contracting new staff.
To the surprise of many western observers and Ukrainian nationalists, President
Kuchma, whose native language was Russian and who had promised to make Russian
the second state language in the run-up to the elections, continued the nation-building
project of his predecessor after he assumed office. The new Education Minister
Zgurovsky, though a dull functionary replacing the inspiring intellectual Talanchuk
in the eyes of one observer (Ryabchuk, 2002), proceeded with the Ukrainianization of
the education system. This was most of all reflected in policy results and administrative
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measures rather than in sweeping visions, as no new strategic documents appeared
during his term of office.
Parallel to Ukrainianization, the educational authorities consolidated the cultiva-
tion of the Ukrainian national idea as laid down in history, geography and literature
courses by preparing new programmes of study, textbooks and central exams. They
further ensured that these materials were disseminated and used in all corners of the
country, overruling regions (notably the Crimea) that had appropriated considerable
autonomy in educational matters in the early 1990s (Janmaat, 2000b). As the central
programmes and textbooks were mandatory for all schools irrespective of status or
language of instruction, national minorities and regional groups had little opportunity
to familiarize their children with alternative ideological or national perspectives
(Koshmanova, 2006).
According to Kolstoe (2000), Kuchma’s decision to continue the cultural poli-
cies of his predecessor reflects the conviction among Ukraine’s ruling elite that
language, national identity and loyalty to the state are intimately related. He
postulates that this elite, although Russian-speaking, thinks that Ukrainian state-
hood can only be secured in the long run if it is supported by a cultural identity
distinct from that of Russia. Kolstoe’s argument in fact seems to be supported by
the shift in rationales underpinning the nation-building project. Whereas cultural
concerns relating to the ethnocultural survival of the Ukrainian nation and the
legacy of Russification had been characteristic of the early 1990s, a political moti-
vation seeing the Ukrainian language as a necessary component of Ukrainian
statehood prevailed in the second half of the 1990s. As Wilson (2002, p. 195) put
it: ‘Ukrainianization was quietly forgotten, but not reversed—even promoted in
some areas if it coincided with Kuchma’s vision of raison d’état.’ The central elite
thus considered the cultural nation-building project a convenient tool to enhance
state cohesion.
The emphasis on state consolidation, however, did not preclude international
exchanges on history and citizenship education. From 1996 the Council of
Europe, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Education, organized a
series of seminars and conferences in Ukraine on reforming the teaching of history
and on the COE’s Education for Democratic Citizenship initiative (Poliansky,
1998; Duerr, 1999). Remarkably, the Ukrainian participants of these seminars
(civil servants, teachers and textbook writers) did not recoil from being highly
critical of history education in Ukraine. One civil servant, for instance, denounced
the current textbooks for presenting ‘black and white, uncompromising pictures of
the past’ and ascribing intentions to historical leaders that they could not have
possessed (Poliansky, 1998, p. 13). In the overall conclusions and recommenda-
tions emanating from the seminars, textbook authors were urged to write books
that encourage student creativity and critical thinking and present multiple
vantage points including those of minorities. These recommendations, according
to the paper reporting on the seminars, would be taken into account by the
Ministry of Education in drafting new policies and revising existing curriculum
guidelines.
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1999–present: nation-building in retreat and the reappearance of educational reform
Kuchma’s second term of office announced yet another change in discourses affecting
citizenship education. The change can best be characterized as a gradual decline in
nation-building priorities and a re-emergence of educational reform, this time going
hand in hand with a discourse of internationalization and competitiveness. As before,
internal political developments lay at the root of this change. Having alienated the
communists by his policy of (limited) economic reform, state consolidation and
Ukrainian nation-building, Kuchma depended on the support of a motley crew of
oligarchs, centrists, nationalists and reformers to win the 1999 elections (Kuzio,
2005). After assuming his second term of office, he rewarded his supporters by
appointing the reformer Viktor Yushchenko, the former head of the national bank, as
prime minister. Under the latter’s leadership Vasyl Kremen’, an academic who
chaired the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, succeeded Zgurovski as education
minister. Identifying globalization and individualization as global trends that necessi-
tate educational reform, the new minister established three policy priorities for the
Ukrainian education system: lifelong education, education fine-tuned to the needs
and talents of individuals and skills-oriented teaching in vocational education and the
humanities to enhance the social capital of individuals (Kremen’, 2006, pp. 1, 2). His
key policy objective was to bring the education system in line with European and
international standards in order to improve Ukraine’s competitiveness. Once in
office, he immediately launched an ambitious school reform which aimed at trans-
forming the Soviet inherited system of 10 years’ all-through comprehensive schooling
into a 12-year system of elementary, lower secondary and upper secondary education
(Kremen’, 2004). In higher education all efforts were geared at participating in the
Bologna process.4
The shift in priorities was noticeable both on paper and in practice. While, for
instance, the periodicals Osvita and Osvita Ukrainy5 had regularly reported on nation-
building issues until the close of the decade, they increasingly published articles on
the Bologna process and on other themes relating Ukrainian education to international
trends from 2000 onward. The decline in relative importance of nation-building was
also reflected in the steady reduction of the number of hours devoted to the mandatory
disciplines of History of Ukraine and Ukrainian Culture in higher education,6 a devel-
opment that was much deplored by the advocates of Ukrainian revivalism. These intel-
lectuals were equally disturbed by the Ukrainian-Russian agreement on the
streamlining of the content of school history textbooks in the two countries. According
to the National Association of Ukrainian Writers (NSPU), these policies reflected the
‘anticultural, immoral posture and snobbish attitude towards the titular nation [the
ethnic Ukrainians], which is openly supported by the highest echelons of power,
including the president and the patriarch of the Moscow-based Orthodox Church’
(NSPU, 2002, p. 1). Further, in relation to language issues, the government pursued
a more pragmatic course by ratifying the Charter for Regional and Minority
Languages, which commit states to the protection and endorsement of minority
languages in a limited number of public domains, including education.
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Finally, the change could also be detected in the National Doctrine for the
Development of Education (NDDE), a strategic document replacing the aforemen-
tioned State National Programme and outlining the government’s long-term vision
for education. It stated that: ‘Education is a strategic resource for improving people’s
well-being, assuring the national interests, and strengthening the authority and
competitiveness of the Ukrainian state on the international scene’ (NDDE, 2002,
p. 4). A close reading of this quotation reveals that it includes some elements referring
to state consolidation (‘assuring the national interests’; ‘strengthening the authority
[…] of the state’). The idea of state unity is further underlined by the stipulation on
language education saying that the state will guarantee the mandatory command of
the state language (i.e. Ukrainian) by all citizens. Elsewhere, the document repeatedly
states that the aim of education is to enhance patriotism. None the less, the stress on
state consolidation did not preclude elements of citizenship education promoted by
the Council of Europe from entering the text. On the contrary, references to democ-
racy, civic attitudes and self-rule outnumber remarks pointing to unity and cohesion.
Thus, the document calls on education to develop people with ‘a democratic state of
mind, adhering to civic rights and freedoms’ and capable of making ‘an independent
judgement and a reasoned choice’ and pursuing ‘civic activities’ (2002, p. 4). It
further promised local authorities and parents a greater say in educational matters.
The reformist government was short-lived, however. In April 2001, Yushchenko
was removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no confidence (Kuzio, 2005).
Thereafter Kuchma’s regime steadily became more defensive and authoritarian. It
acquired an increasingly bad reputation in the west for corruption, abuse of state
power and muzzling the press. Feeling ever more isolated internationally, Kuchma
allied with Putin’s Russia to find support for his unpopular regime.
Surprisingly, this change seems not to have affected educational policies much.
Kremen’ continued his school reform and internationalization agenda. The citizenship
education elements from the National Doctrine were translated into state standards
prepared for the new school system. The new standard for the theme ‘Knowledge of
Society’, for instance, mentions the cultivation of tolerance and respect for other
nations, critical thinking, responsibility, independent judgement and the ability to
make a conscious choice as key assignments for school education (Government of
Ukraine, 2004, p. 3). To meet the requirements of this standard, the Ministry of
Education devised a series of new courses (philosophy, ‘Man and World’, law and
economics) for upper secondary education under the heading Civic Education
(Hromadians’ka osvita) (Ministry of Education, 2004, p. 11). This meant that, for the
first time since independence, citizenship education was given a formal place in the
school curriculum.
After the turbulent events of the Orange Revolution and the election of Yushchenko
as president in December 2004, many members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia
expected the new national democratic government to reinvigorate the Ukrainian
renaissance project. So far, however, these expectations have not been met. The new
Education Minister Stanislav Nikolaenko largely continued the pragmatic, competi-
tiveness-driven course of Kremen’. Among the five policy priorities that he established
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for his term of office (European quality and accessibility of education; teacher salaries;
democratization; overcoming the moral and spiritual crisis; and close cooperation
between education, science and industry), nation-building concerns are conspicu-
ously absent (Zhovta, 2005, p. 2). Moreover, on the 17 May he made the dream of
his predecessor come true by organizing Ukraine’s formal accession to the Bologna
process. According to one observer, the Orange Revolution has even transformed
Ukrainian national identity itself, bringing in notions of tolerance, inclusion, openness
and democracy that will inspire future educational reform (Koshmanova, 2006).
Russia
Here we will briefly introduce the changes in the education of citizens in the USSR
and the Russian Federation. As in the Ukrainian part, the time to be discussed in the
following could be roughly divided into three periods during which three discourses
have competed for primacy in the education of citizens. During the Perestroika
reforms and the first years after the establishment of the sovereign Russia, education
was expected to revive the sub-national identification of various ethnic groups (1985–
1992). The second period is concerned with Boris Yeltsin’s time in the president’s
office (until 1999). In educational terms, this period emphasized citizenship educa-
tion for the establishment of a democratic state based on the rule of law. At the same
time, since the mid-1990s we have witnessed the return of the Russian national ideol-
ogy. The third period covers the presidency of Vladimir Putin until summer 2005 and
is characterized by coexistence of the democratic and patriotic citizenship education
discourses in which the latter dominates.
1985–1992: regionalization and education in the ethnic spirit
The dissolution of the Soviet Union was preceded by some fundamental changes in
the political visions of the elites. Within the frame of the communist ideology, Mikhail
Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost aimed at making Russian society more open,
more plural and more critical to the authority of the state and the Communist Party.
The developments in the wider society were echoed in the educational sphere, though
not without considerable resistance on behalf of the conservative party leaders and
some members of the teaching profession. But in 1989, Gorbachev himself referred
to education as ‘his overall promotion of Perestroika’ (quoted in Webber, 1999,
p. 25). Among the main aims of the educational restructuring was the democratiza-
tion of the educational relations and management, which meant more say in educa-
tional matters for regional authorities and parents. In addition, the nationalization of
education was expected to transform schools into cultural institutions reviving and
passing on the traditions and languages of various local cultures.7 At the same time,
the humanization of education emphasized the primacy of the individual in the
educational process, whereas the de-ideologization was expected to empty the school
of the over-politicized (communist) contents (Dneprov, 1998; Long & Long, 1999;
Webber, 1999).
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According to the reform goals, the educational system was expected to raise an
individual, who is strongly attached to his/her ethnic group, but who paradoxically
lacks a connection to the whole state and the nation. Isak Froumin (2004a, p. 280)
has written that the emphasis on ethnic education was one of the most important
features of Russian education in the early 1990s. In addition, he identified a growing
emphasis on the ‘universal human values’ illustrated, for instance, by the Ministry’s
recommendation to introduce an interdisciplinary course titled ‘Mankind and
Society’ in the upper secondary school (p. 282).
To use the metaphor cited by Eduard Dneprov, the Russian Minister of Education
in 1990–1992, the country was supposed to grow into a garden where all flowers
bloom.8 Whereas Dneprov’s predecessor, Gennadi Yagodin, mainly believed that
education in the local languages must be expanded, Dneprov insisted on each nation-
ality and region to develop an educational platform in accordance with the local
conditions. He stated that ‘the mission of the Ministry must be, above all, not to
unify, but rather to stimulate in all possible ways the expeditious development of such
programmes’ (Long & Long, 1999, pp. 89–91). Eduard Dneprov contrasted this
initiative with the Soviet times, when the school played a crucial role in the denation-
alization of the people and constituted one of the main instruments in Russifying the
non-Russians and de-Russifying the ethnic Russians (Dneprov, 1998, pp. 47–8).
In line with the reform agenda, the document entitled The conception of the national
school of the RSFSR and the scientific and organizational mechanisms of its implementa-
tion, adopted in 1990, argued that the system of compulsory education, which affects
the entire population of the country, should be redirected at the revival and satisfac-
tion of people’s national and cultural demands. The document emphasized that: ‘the
school will turn into the real agency of cultural revival of the Russian nations only if
it will be restructured as national in the true meaning of the word, if the national
dimension in schooling and up-bringing will form its fundamental core’ (Dneprov,
1998, p. 26).
The growing interest in the system of national schools is closely linked to the polit-
ical context of those years. In 1988, after years of misapprehension or denial,
Gorbachev finally identified the nationality policy as ‘the most fundamental vital issue
of our society’ (quoted in Lapidus, 1992, p. 46). Amid increasing critique with regard
to the Soviet nationality policies, ethnic conflicts and threats of disintegration,
Gorbachev was forced to assert that ‘we cannot permit even the smallest people to
disappear, the language of even the smallest people to be lost; we cannot permit nihil-
ism with regard to the culture, traditions and history of peoples, be they big or small’
(Gorbachev, 1989, quoted in Lapidus, 1992, p. 60).
Remarkably, in 1989 Uchitel’skaya Gazeta, the teachers’ newspaper and one of the
leading professional publications for educators, introduced a column titled ‘Ethnos’
to mark the importance of education in the ethnic spirit. In the time of political strug-
gles and uncertainty, it was believed that inter-ethnic tensions and disintegration
could be prevented with the help of national schools (Dneprov, 1998, p. 48). For the
sovereign Russian Federation the nationalization and regionalization of education
were also the instruments of building a federal state. The political leaders assumed
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that stronger national identifications of the regions will help them to achieve firm
positions in the political and economic fields. On the societal level, the nationalization
was expected to pave the way for the establishment of a democratic civil society (inter-
view in Moscow with Eduard Dneprov, 27.5.2005; Srarovoitova, 1989, quoted in
Ossipov, 1999, p. 191).
At the same time, while stating that the school is the cradle of democracy and
humanism, the implementation of democratization was more focused on educational
management (shifting the decision-making process from the federal to the regional and
municipal levels and from there to the schools) and on the teacher–student–parents
relations (more influence on the educational process for all stakeholders). However,
on the federal level less attention was paid to equipping children with the necessary
knowledge and skills to build a democratic society and to encourage them to take an
active role in it. Instead, as a reaction to the over-politicized nature of the Soviet vospi-
taniye (political and moral education) and the unpredictable situation in the society
at large, the educational authorities wanted schools to preserve peace and stability and
prevent any political movement or ideology from entering the school (On the democ-
ratization of upbringing work in comprehensive schools of the RSFSR, 1991).
1992–1999: the development of legal education
The Yeltsin period (1992–1999) was marked by ambiguities. On the one hand, the
reform agenda of Perestroika was carried over and formalized in various legislative acts
arranging the introduction of human rights and legal education in the school curric-
ulum. On the other hand, and increasingly so from the mid-1990s, we see a return to
a discourse stressing unity and loyalty to the state, running in an uneasy manner
parallel to the democratic reform agenda in the remainder of the 1990s.
The 1992 Law on Education, which was hailed as the first legislative act of the
sovereign Russian Federation, clearly reflected the spirit of reform. The Act declared
the humanitarian character and the priority of universal human values as the first
principles of the state policy in education (Article 2). It also confirmed the right
to receive comprehensive education in other than the Russian language (Article 6,
point 2). At the same time, the law stated that Russian should be studied in all state-
licensed schools, except pre-schools, according to the federal educational standards
(Article 6, point 5). The federal curricula, published in 1993, declared that Russian,
being the official language of the Russian Federation, should be taught in all schools,
but in varying amounts depending on the linguistic situation in the region and the
school. However, such statements do not necessarily imply that all federal authorities
were aiming at the purposeful consolidation of the Russian nation. In fact, already in
1992 a group of civil servants from the Ministries of Education and Defence drafted
a programme of patriotic education, which was rejected by the Ministry of Finances
due to the lack of funds, only to be modified and adopted in 2001.9
During the second period in the development of Russian citizenship education,
the contents of history and the social sciences were revised. More so, the importance
of a well-organized citizenship education programme was explicitly stated. The
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ministerial circular, On citizenship education and the study of the Constitution of the
Russian Federation (1995) claimed that: ‘the establishment of the legal state and the
civil society in Russia will in many ways depend on the progress in citizenship educa-
tion.’ The emphasis on law studies is evident in the ministerial materials published
between 1994 and 1999 (see also Morozova, 2000; Vaillant, 2001). The issued
documents discussed the implementation of constitutional studies, studies in the
electoral process and human rights. For example, the circular, On citizenship and
legal education of students in comprehensive schools of the Russian Federation (1996),
highlights the need for legal knowledge. It referred to Boris Yeltsin’s speech on
6 March 1996, in which he argued that one of the prerequisites in the transition to a
legal state is the legal education of citizens.
The first references to the Council of Europe’s activities are found in a document
that urged comprehensive schools to teach about human rights (On the study of human
rights in the comprehensive schools of the Russian Federation in the academic year 1998/99).
The document claimed that since Russia’s entry into the COE, the country has been
adopting the organization’s instructions in the field of citizenship education—i.e. the
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on teaching about human rights.
The section on human rights was incorporated into the compulsory syllabuses for
social studies in the secondary school. During these years, also witnessed was the
emergence of innovative courses like ‘The Basics of Law Studies’, ‘Citizenship
Education’, ‘To Schoolchildren about the Law’, and others—many of which were
developed in cooperation with foreign partners. However, these courses were not part
of the federal (compulsory) curricula and their implementation depended, and still
depends, on the regional authorities and the school (the regional and the school
curricula).10 The first federal standards of higher education also contained courses
related to citizenship education. The federal standard for primary teacher education
(1995) introduced courses in political and law studies and, remarkably, exchanged
the course of homeland history for the ‘The History of World Civilizations’.
Nevertheless, this period is also marked by a slow return to the unifying national
ideology. In line with the ideas of the early 1990s, The development strategy of historical
and social science education in comprehensive schools, published in 1994, acknowledged
the importance of teaching about ethnic, Russian and universal values, but assigned
primacy to the national Russian ones. The following quote illustrates it well: ‘When
working on the content of school history education, it is necessary to guarantee the
balance of political, cultural, ethno-national and other values but the national ones
should prevail’ (p. 2 of aforementioned document).
The reading of the document leads one to think that the aim of education was
converted into strengthening the national Russian identity and lessening the role of
the local ethnic ones. And indeed, the above-quoted document expressed worries
about the uneven illustration of national versus ethnic aspects in the regionally
published textbooks. It claimed that such an imbalance may lead to the ‘deformation’
of inter-ethnic relations. These changes closely followed the general political atmo-
sphere in the centre. As has been well documented, in 1996, Boris Yeltsin appealed
to the entire society to search for a new ‘Russian idea’. Most suggestions, published
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in Rossiyskaya Gazeta—the official periodical of the Russian government—supported
state patriotism (Tolz, 2001, p. 256; emphasis added).
The renewed drive to inculcate collectivist loyalties must be seen in the political
context of the mid-1990s, characterized by intense political rivalries in the centre and
by movements for more autonomy in the peripheral regions. The elite in Moscow
watched the nation-building attempts of the ethnic minorities in these regions with
great concern, fearing that they ‘moved from cultural revival to well-organized polit-
ical movements’ (Tishkov, 1997, p. 241). This concern was not unjustified. Whereas
the secessionist actions of the political elite of the republic of Tatarstan were still kept
under control and were finally resolved in a peaceful agreement, the separatist
tendencies in Chechnya have had much gloomier consequences (Tishkov, 1997,
pp. 242–243). At the same time, the amount of votes received by Vladimir
Zhirinovsky’s party and the communists, whose primary election slogans referred to
the restoration of the Soviet Union, patriotism and the inferior position of the ethnic
Russians, forced liberal politicians to pay more attention to the questions of national
identity (Tishkov, 1997; Tolz, 1998; Simonsen, 2001).
1999–2005: the rise of patriotic education
In the context of political struggles and fears of national disintegration, the new
administration chose to focus on patriotic education of the Russian citizens. One indi-
cation of such a trend lies in the growing emphasis on vospitaniye (political and moral
education), as one of the central responsibilities of the state educational system. In
1999 the Ministry of Education, for the first time since the break-up of the USSR,
adopted The upbringing development programme, 1999–2001, followed by another
programme for 2002–2004. The key message of the programmes is the reconsolida-
tion of the people: social, ethnic, cultural, generational and political. According to the
programmes, citizenship and patriotic upbringing are among the main goals of state
educational policies. In the institutions of higher education we witness the return of
homeland history in the second generation of the educational standards adopted in
2000. The federal curricula for the comprehensive school published in 2004 contain
more hours of Russian language and introduce Russian in the upper secondary
school.11 But at the same time, foreign language is now to be taught from the second
grade of the primary school, which indicates a greater importance assigned to learning
international communication competences.
On the basis of the documents produced in 2001, especially The state programme of
patriotic upbringing, it could be suggested that Vladimir Putin and the current admin-
istration adhere to the idea of state patriotism, which first appeared under Yeltsin’s
presidency. Without doubt, there is a growing tendency to stress a uniform national
identity in educational policies. This is demonstrated by the fact that, in 2001, the
Ministry of Education issued a circular entitled, On the official rituals related to the use
of the state symbols in comprehensive schools, and in 2002 the Ministry distributed
another circular that aimed at improving teaching about the national symbols (About
the organization of upbringing activities aimed at familiarization with the history and
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implication of official state symbols of the Russian Federation and their popularization).
The Ministry of Education classifies this activity as an important element of patriotic
and citizenship education, which is expected to guarantee generational continuity
and to ensure societal unity. The students are expected to develop a strong bond and
understanding of the state symbols, while the educational institutions should ensure
that the state heraldry is rightfully exhibited.
More so, in 2003 the Ministry established a Coordinative Council on the patriotic
upbringing of young people. The work of the Council is directly related to The state
programme of patriotic upbringing (2001). Patriotic upbringing is defined as a systematic
activity of state authorities and other organizations aiming at the development of
patriotic consciousness, sense of loyalty to the Fatherland, willingness to fulfil one’s
civic duty, and constitutional responsibilities to defend the interests of the homeland
(Piattoeva, 2005, 45; emphasis added). The programme and The concept of patriotic
upbringing (2003) both focus on the development of love and devotion to the
Motherland of Russia. It is stated that patriotism originates from love of the ‘minor
Motherland’ and matures up to the point of state patriotic consciousness and love of
the Fatherland (The concept of patriotic education, 2003, p. 3). Thus, Russian patrio-
tism, as an expression of national identity, is superior to any other identification,
including that with one’s home region or ethnic group. Other researchers have also
noticed that, in contrast with the 1980s, contemporary history textbooks have become
more like books about ‘the Russian people, Russian statehood and Russian culture’,
thus eliminating sections on different ethnic groups living in Russia (Bogolubov et al.,
1999, p. 540). Such discourses are common among politicians who criticize Russia’s
ethnic federalism and want to establish a more centralized state (Ossipov, 1999,
p. 191). In order to diminish the influence of ethnically defined regions, the federal
government has already instituted seven federal districts, which do not respect the
established ethnic borders12 (Tolz, 2001, p. 261).
The promotion of state patriotism could imply that Russia is on its way to build a
civic national ideology as opposed to the ethno-cultural conception of the nation
promoted during the final years of Perestroika. Some minor steps in this direction were
taken earlier by Yeltsin’s administration, when they adopted the civic term Rossiyanin
(Russian citizen) as opposed to Russki (ethnic Russian) and declared the importance
of building a legal state. However, the recent conception of state patriotism contains
a few dangerous elements. It narrowly equates the state to the administrative appara-
tus in charge; it puts an explicit emphasis on servitude and it has a distinctive
militaristic character.
Nevertheless, we should not mistakenly think that the attempts to introduce a demo-
cratic citizenship education have completely faded away. The ministerial circular, On
citizenship education of comprehensive school students of the Russian Federation (2003),
takes citizenship education away from the bare realm of legal studies. Citizenship
education as a means of educating politically literate active participants of societal life
should be achieved through a multifaceted combination of interdisciplinary approach,
democratic school ethos and active teaching methods throughout all school grades.
In this document we also observe the importance of patriotism, but in a more delicate
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phrasing. It argues that students’ upbringing should be based on socio-cultural and
historical achievements of the multinational Russian nation, accomplishments of other
countries, and cultural and historical traditions of the home area. In line with other
educational documents (i.e. The national doctrine of education of the Russian Federation,
2000), it expresses concern about the harmonization of national and ethno-cultural
relations and the preservation of and support for languages and cultures of all nations
of the Russian Federation. These documents combine two important components of
democratic citizenship education—i.e. the development of a civic multinational
Russian identity and education of politically active citizens.
Despite the apparent development in the understanding of democratic citizenship
education—its progress from legal studies to a multifaceted interdisciplinary
concept—patriotism has been given clear priority at the governmental level. Such a
conclusion can be drawn when comparing the relative significance of the published
documents. The state-supported federal programme gives a clear sign of where the
government’s priorities lie. Furthermore, in summer 2005 the government approved
a new programme of patriotic upbringing for the years 2002–2010 with extensive
financial backing. At the same time, scholars and politicians advocating democratic
citizenship education in line with the ideology of the Council of Europe have prepared
a preliminary proposal for a federal programme of democratic citizenship education
for 2005–2010 which is still awaiting approval.
Conclusion
Our discussion of discourses framing citizenship education in Russia and Ukraine
has revealed interesting parallels and differences between the two countries. During
Glasnost and Perestroika, both republics witnessed ever-louder calls for the democra-
tization and humanization of the education system. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the establishment of Ukraine and the Russian Federation as independent
states, this discourse soon gave way to anxieties about state integrity. In both coun-
tries these anxieties were fuelled by ethno-culturally based separatist movements that
had gained considerably in strength in the early 1990s when central power was at its
weakest. From the mid-1990s concerns about state cohesion increasingly found their
expression in recentralizing policies and patriotic education programmes.
By the same logic, circumstances in which the two countries differed have given rise
to diverging policies. In Ukraine anxiety and indignation about the vulnerable position
of Ukrainian vis-à-vis Russian led to the adoption of an early cultural nation-building
programme that sought to redefine Ukrainian language and culture in opposition to
the Soviet past. Given the dominant position of the Russian language and culture, a
similar cultural anxiety was not expressed in Russia in the late 1980s. Instead of initi-
ating a Russian identity project, reformist education ministers promoted a policy
aimed at the resuscitation of minority cultures within the Russian Federation. Only
well into the 1990s was this policy overshadowed by the state cohesion discourse.
The rather different trajectories in citizenship discourses that Ukraine and
Russia have followed from the end of the 1990s also have their roots in diverging
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domestic political developments. In Russia, President Putin reinforced the central-
ization and state cohesion agenda that his predecessor Yeltsin had pursued with a
varying measure of success. Respect and understanding of state symbols and
unconditional love and devotion to the Motherland are the key objectives this
policy was designed to achieve. Some initiatives in democratic citizenship were
incorporated into the curricula and the ministerial documents, but they were not
given the same urgency as the patriotic education programme promoted at the
federal level.
In Ukraine, on the other hand, the Education Minister Kremen’ was primarily
motivated by a desire to bring the education system in line with international stan-
dards in order to improve the country’s competitiveness. Nation-building was made
secondary to a comprehensive school reform and participation in the Bologna
process. As part of the effort to keep up with international trends, the government
integrated EDC ideas advocated by the Council of Europe in the National Doctrine
of Education and in central curriculum guidelines. None the less, some of the nation-
building rhetoric was retained in these documents.
It is tempting to interpret these recent differences between Ukraine and Russia as
evidence of the two countries showing diverging trends. We would argue, however,
that it is still too early to state this conclusion with certainty. The political situation
in the post-Soviet world is still volatile, as witnessed by the recent revolutions in
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and policies may change abruptly when a new
regime comes to power. Until now these turbulent developments have all been
moving in the direction of democracy and the rule of law, but there is no guarantee
that these trends are irreversible. Seen in this light, the recent relaxation of the nation-
building project in Ukraine may well be only a temporary phenomenon.
Interestingly, a report commissioned by the Council of Europe expresses doubts
about the willingness of the post-Soviet states to support education for democratic
citizenship (EDC), noting that most of them do not have explicit EDC policies. It
further observes that EDC is challenged by ‘patriotic forces, which criticise demo-
cratic citizenship education for promoting simplistic universal values’ (Froumin,
2004b, p. 104). These forces, it argues, are more compatible with the traditional
culture of an authoritarian society than the ideas promoted by EDC, and as a result,
EDC is relegated to the margins of citizenship education. The Council of Europe thus
realizes that its EDC recommendations are not welcomed in all regional contexts,
particularly when they conflict with nation-building projects.
In sum, an education agenda promoting active citizenship and independent think-
ing faces considerable obstacles in new states emerging from totalitarianism such as
Ukraine and Russia. In these states the adoption or rejection of the democratic citi-
zenship principles is very much dictated by the whims of domestic political events
and will depend in large measure on the confidence of the authorities in the national
loyalties of their citizenries. In times of instability and challenges to central state
authority, a discourse stressing pluralism, democracy and autonomy is easily
exchanged for a programme sanctioning conformity, loyalty and patriotism in the
broad area of citizenship education.
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Notes
1. For a brief history of the Council of Europe see: http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe
2. For more information on the EC project see: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co–operation/
education/E.D.C/
3. It must be noted here that Ukraine is by no means an exception in the post-Soviet world for
exchanging a communist for a nationalist-inspired account of history. Kissane (2005) has
observed that the very same transformation has occurred in Kazakhstan. She argues that the
Kazakh government is struggling to find a balance between a Kazakhified history curriculum,
serving identity construction purposes, and a more internationally orientated history
programme.
4. The Bologna process seeks to establish a European Higher Education Area in which the partic-
ipating institutions issue comparable degrees, recognize each other’s diplomas and operate a
system of accumulation and transfer of credits with the aim of increasing student and staff
mobility.
5. These are independent professional journals called Education and Education of Ukraine
respectively.
6. All institutes of higher education have to teach these courses, regardless of their profile or status
(public or private). The courses replaced a number of core disciplines from the Soviet era
designed to impart communist ideology.
7. National and ethnic are often expressed with the same word ‘natsional’nii’. The synonymous
usage of the two terms often causes confusion when translated into the English language.
8. Nelli Piattoeva’s interview with Eduard Dneprov in Moscow, 27.5.2005.
9. Nelli Piattoeva’s interview with Igor Melnichenko, 27.5.2005, specialist in patriotic education,
Deputy Director, Department of Youth Affairs, Federal Agency of Education.
10. The Law on Education introduced a decentralized form of curriculum consisting of the
compulsory federal component taking 75% of the overall curriculum and a combination of the
regional and school components filling the rest of the curriculum. The regional and the school
components gave local stakeholders a chance to enrich the curriculum with subjects and
contents meaningful for their local environment—e.g. local languages, history, geography, etc.
11. Previously, the last two grades of the upper secondary school offered lessons in literature and
none in linguistic proficiency.
12. Russia is a federal state; continuing the legacy of the Soviet Union, many of the constituent
parts of the Federation are formed on the ethnic principle—i.e. they are seen as a homeland for
one titular nationality.
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mation of the political scenery in Finland and the Russian Federation. One central question
framing the analysis of Finnish citizenship education is whether nationally-based citizenship
is becoming obsolete because of Finland’s latest involvement in the European integration
process. In the Russian case, the aim is to investigate whether nationality has become more
strongly linked to the Russian state since the breakdown of the Soviet empire. The study also
examines whether nationality has acquired new meanings because of the political transfor-
mations of the last two decades in Finland and Russia. The study’s findings illustrate that
Finland is both forsaking the strong link between the state and the nation, and returning to
the pre-independence cultural concept of the nation. These changes allow Finland to move
in the direction of a multi-level conception of citizenship. Nevertheless, for Finland national
citizenship remains the nucleus of other citizenship and identity layers. In contrast to the
recent developments in Finland, the discourses of state integrity and national unity have
become more prominent in Russia. Russia seeks to attach citizenship to the state-wide national
space by encouraging state patriotism and strengthening the position of the Russian language.
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In Europe, the end of the 20th century is characterized by two conflicting
geopolitical processes. On the one hand, the breakdown of the multinational
states of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union (USSR) has
resulted in the emergence or re-emergence of new states that use nationaliz-
ing policies to strengthen their internal cohesion and the loyalty of their citi-
zens towards the newly-formed state institutions. On the other hand, the
process of European integration has in many respects abolished the internal
borders of ‘Old Europe’. The European Union (EU) has grown rapidly, and
citizens of its member states have acquired EU citizenship. Moreover, the
organization is seeking to forge a European identity based on a set of
common values (EU 2005: 4). Thus, while in some parts of Europe the idea
of a sovereign nation-state with absolute control over national identity and
citizenship is gradually fading away, in other European countries the nation-
state seeks to (re)-assume its traditional tasks.1
Nelli Piattoeva is an academic assistant and doctoral student in the Department of Education,
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on the construction of national identity and citizenship through compulsory education. She
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Drawing on recent developments in the European political arena,
I examine how past structures and new political challenges interplay in
countries with almost opposed socio-political contexts, Finland and the
Russian Federation. I analyse, with particular reference to the notions of citi-
zenship and nationality, how the aims of citizenship education, as declared
in legislation and policy documents, have changed since the end of the
1980s. Policy documents constitute the main source of information, and it
should be borne in mind that the implementation of policies may offer a
different picture. However, the question of implementation is left outside
the scope of this paper.
Finland has been deeply involved in the process of European integration
since the beginning of the 1990s. Russia, a successor state of the former
Soviet empire, has been fundamentally reconfigured as a result of the
USSR’s demise. As part of these socio-political processes, both countries
have sought to redefine the inter-relationship between nationality and citi-
zenship as well as the meaning attached to both terms. Because of their
contrasting political histories and different geopolitical positions they make
a useful case for examining converging and diverging political trends
through the prism of the system of education.
The paper is premised on the assumption that the aims of citizenship
education largely reflect the self-perception of the state. In many respects,
formal education was both a product of and a major determinant in the
political principle of nationalism which holds that the nation and the state
should be congruent (Gellner 1983). Education has remained one of the
central institutions legitimizing the power of the state and connecting
succeeding generations to the imagined community of the nation. Thus,
when approached from a larger societal perspective, the objectives of educa-
tion unravel a fascinating story of social and political transformations and
the interplay between education, citizenship, and the state.
One central question framing the analysis of Finnish citizenship educa-
tion is whether a nationally-based citizenship is becoming obsolete as an
outcome of Finland’s involvement in European integration. In the Russian
case, the aim is to investigate whether nationality has become more strongly
linked to the Russian state since the breakdown of the Soviet empire. I also
examine whether nationality has acquired new meanings as a result of the
political transformations in the last two decades in Finland and Russia.
I begin with an introduction to the conceptual framework of the study
and the relationship between education, citizenship, and the nation-state.
The political legacies and the comparative choice are then surveyed. In the
empirical section I examine, through the prism of educational policy docu-
ments, changes in the perceptions of nationality since the end of the 1980s
in Finland and Russia, as well as the inter-relationship between citizenship
and nationality in both countries.
Education, citizenship, and two state models
Two concepts, nation-state and empire-state, are central to analysing the
political legacies of Finland and Russia and interpreting the findings of the
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CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY IN CHANGING EUROPE 3
textual analysis of citizenship education. The former term designates the
state model of modern Finland; the latter describes the state model of the
USSR, the political and symbolical predecessor of contemporary Russia.
The conceptual division into empire-state and nation-state is applied here
as an analytical tool that helps to highlight major differences between
Finland and Russia and to interpret empirical findings. However, it is
important to bear in mind that both nation-state and empire-state are ideal
constructs. Connor (1994) has asserted that only ∼ 10% of the world’s
states could be termed nation-states. Even though Finland is still often
considered highly homogeneous, with immigrants constituting only ∼ 2% of
the population, traditional ethnic and linguistic groups of Roma, Sami,
Jews, and Swedish-speakers have lived on its territory for centuries. Thus,
‘nation’ is more an ideological construct and a political slogan rather than
an objective feature of a territorially bounded community.
In relation to ‘empire’ it is equally important to note that its definition
remains highly contested. According to Suny (1995: 187), only states that
failed successful transformation into nation-states have been termed
empires, post factum. Thus, ‘empire’ has acquired a negative, almost pejora-
tive, connotation in contrast to the nation-state (Beissinger 1995: 157n14).
Empire-states and nation-states are historically and conceptually inter-
related, as numerous contemporary nation-states are either former imperial
centres or their peripheries. However, only the nation-state is perceived as
natural and morally justifiable.
After the French and American revolutions, the nation-state emerged as
the predominant model of political organization and a vehicle of collective
identity (Smith 1998). I follow the argument of modernists that the nation-
state is a modern phenomenon produced by nationalism. The nation, for its
part, was created and maintained as an artefact of nationalism. It was
invented to confront emerging mass (at times oppositional) politics and to
advance the development of the modern bureaucratic territorially-bound
secular state in the 18th and 19th centuries.2 The age of nationalism merged
the nation and the state, and turned the nation into the main source of polit-
ical legitimation of the state. As nations came to be defined in cultural terms,
citizen’s rights and duties were increasingly available only for those sharing
the cultural bond of the ethnic majority, speaking the national language and
possessing a sense of loyalty to the nation-state. As Castles (2005: 689) has
put it, ‘the democratic state appears in the guise of the nation-state, whose
citizen is also a national’.
Nationalism is not only a political principle equating state with a nation,
but it also constitutes a discourse: 
the production of a cultural understanding and rhetoric which leads people
throughout the world to think and frame their aspirations in terms of the idea
of nation and national identity, and the production of particular versions of
nationalist thought and language in particular settings and traditions.
(Calhoun 1997: 6)
In other words, nationalism is a cognitive phenomenon shaping how people
see and structure their entire world (Özkirimli 2005: 30). Nationalistic
discourse largely operates through institutions, and national identity has to
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4 N. PIATTOEVA
be learned through socialization (p. 33). As Hobsbawm’s (1987: 149–150)
analysis of the formation of the nation-state has shown, nothing compares
with the possibilities of the classroom to pursue the propaganda of a homo-
geneous nation, with teachers as patriotic agents of the state. Historically, the
spread of compulsory standardized elementary education ensured that all
new cohorts underwent the process of political socialization. The purpose of
education, whose ownership was gradually transferred from the Church to
the State, was to advance the usage of national language, to spread a stan-
dardized form of culture, and to create citizenry loyal to the emerging nation-
state. Through various pedagogical instruments the school brought the
abstract notions of citizenship and nation-state directly to each individual,
thus playing a crucial role in the political integration of the national society.
If state is defined as a polity with fixed boundaries and sovereignty over
its demarcated territory, the central difference between nation-state and
empire-state lies in the state’s legitimation principle. Empire-states and
nation-states are characterized by almost opposite perceptions of integration
of their constituent societies into a political community (Parrott 1997: 7).
Empire-states do not legitimize themselves in terms of shared nationhood
and do not seek national homogeneity and cohesion. In empire-states, the
state and the nation, nationality and citizenship, are perceived as distinct,
and are often related to different levels of the state system. These crucial
differences will be demonstrated in the following analysis of Finnish and
Russian state models.
The political legacies and current challenges in the Finnish 
and Russian state systems
The Finnish nation-state
Finland has been politically constructed and represented as an homoge-
neous nation-state. When the terms nation, nationhood, and citizenship
were translated into Finnish in the mid-19th century, they all acquired a
common root—kansa.3 The choice of translation manifested a strong bond
between nation, nationality, and citizenship in the emerging Finnish political
culture (Pulkkinen 1999: 119).
The Finnish nation-state was originally built on two ideologies. The first
one springs from the heritage of the Fennoman movement which proclaimed
the Finnish culture, embodied in the uniqueness of the Finnish language, as
the only legitimate basis for the Finnish state. The philosopher and Finnish
statesman Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1800–1881) wrote that Finnish state
character lies in its linguistic and cultural particularity (Pulkkinen 1999).4
For Snellman and his followers language especially expresses the common
national mentality of people. Cultural unity is thus a pre-condition and a
legitimate claim for political and national sovereignty. Snellman’s ideas were
crystallized in Finnish political thinking in the following manner: 
● nation as a political unit within which there is no division into rulers
and ruled. Instead, all are united by the new concept of citizen;
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CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY IN CHANGING EUROPE 5
● nation is an ethnic concept and naturalizes the political unit; and
● the political unit is also a mental unit and is striving to achieve self-
governance. (Pulkkinen 1999: 127)
The ethno-cultural form of nationalism from below was comple-
mented by elements of a civic-territorial type of nationalism from above.
The latter arguments were already employed in the 19th century when
Finland was increasingly perceived as a proto-state, prior to its indepen-
dence in 1917. Finland’s status within the Russian empire was exceptional
in that it allowed for a considerable amount of political autonomy, in
comparison to many other constituents of the Romanov Empire. This,
together with the Swedish constitutional tradition, led to a growing
perception of Finland as an autonomous polity. At the end of the 19th
century and the beginning of the 20th century the elite envisioned Finland
as separate from the tsarist rule and argued for a common national ideol-
ogy to draw a clear line between Finland and Russia. In this respect, an
ethno-cultural ideology was an essential condition for state-building
(Lepola 2000: 317–327).
Since 1945 both the cultural and the political discourse have existed
simultaneously (Lepola 2000). It is fair to say that throughout its existence
the Finnish state has been imagined as an homogeneous coherent nation
united by virtue of ethnic descent and loyalty to the national state institu-
tions. According to Liikanen (2005: 223), the birth and development of
the independent Finnish nation-state has constituted the core narrative of
Finnish history-writing. This means that for decades academic research
was preoccupied with constructing a linear history of the development of
the Finnish nation-state rather than turning the relationship between the
state and the nation into a research question per se.
Beginning in the 1980s, the perception of Finland as an homogeneous
nation-state started to be questioned (Alasuutari and Ruuska 1999: 236).
Keränen (1998: 9) suggests that the very ‘opening’ of Finland because of its
entry into the EU marks a deconstructive moment for the Finnish nation-
state. The integration process led to discussions, deconstruction, and recon-
struction of what ‘Finland’ is (Keränen 1998). Therefore, an important
question is how Finnishness is redefined following the country’s entry to the
Council of Europe (1989) and the EU (1995), and a steady inflow of
foreigners. In this respect, Finland is confronted with a task similar to the
one Russia is facing since the collapse of the USSR: how to re-define its
national self-image in a reconfigured international and national context. The
fundamental question faced by both countries is similar, even though for
Russia the dilemma is further complicated by the rapidity of the political
change and several other fundamental economic and social problems that
emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet state.
Russia as a successor of the former empire-state
In contrast to Finland, the predecessor of the Russian Federation—the
USSR—was never organized as a Russian or Soviet nation-state (Brubaker
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6 N. PIATTOEVA
1996: 28). The doctrine of the ‘Soviet people’, promoted since the 1960s,
was based on political and ideological rather than national sentiments. At the
same time, although Russians were the dominant nationality and Russian
the lingua franca of the entire USSR, the state was never perceived as a
Russian polity by the political elite (Brubaker 1996: 28–29). Instead, the
Soviet system institutionalized multinationality. In this respect its structure
resembled that of an empire-state more than a nation-state. In the Russian
(Soviet) case, the very conception of the nation was relegated to the sub-
state level of numerous republics, national okrugs (districts), and other
ethnically defined constituents of the state (Brubaker 1994: 52).
The relegation of nationhood to the sub-state level represents an impor-
tant feature of Russian political thinking that was institutionalized during the
Soviet regime (Brubaker 1994). Institutionalization means that it became
embedded in the structures, political thinking, and the daily life of people. It
led to the emergence of nationality as distinct from citizenship and state-
hood. Brubaker (1994) explains that the principle of nationality as distinct
from citizenship was consolidated on two levels. On the one hand, the USSR
was structured as an ethno-federation granting many nationalities their own
territories, with varying autonomies. At the same time, nationality was
consolidated on the personal level by ascribing it to each individual from
birth. The latter was reinforced by the Soviet passport formalities, which
required citizens to specify their nationality in personal identification papers.
The nationality indicated in the official documents was inherited by ‘blood’
from either parent. At the same time Soviet nationality was never an option
(Brubaker 1994, 1996, Simonsen 1999).
Ethno-federalism and the practice of ascribed nationality helped to
solidify further the role played by the sub-state nationality. Brubaker
(1994: 54) has concluded that because of the institutionalization of nation-
ality it ironically ‘became and remained a basic institutional building block
of the avowedly internationalist, supra-nationalist, and anti-nationalist
Soviet state.’ In addition, the Soviet state ‘established nationhood and
nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from the over-
arching categories of statehood and citizenship’ (Brubaker 1996: 23). One
could go a step further and suggest that nationality and ethnic conscious-
ness became more meaningful to the Soviet people, as authorities paid lip
service to the political rights and responsibilities emanating from citizen-
ship. Especially with the collapse of the USSR and its ideological founda-
tion, ethnic consciousness and ethnic politics easily filled the ideological
vacuum.
To add complexity to the controversial relationship between national-
ity and citizenship in the USSR, it should be noted that the Russian
Republic (RSFSR)5 was not defined as a Russian proto-nation-state in
comparison to other republics bearing the name of their titular nationality.
In addition, it hosted the central Soviet political and cultural institutions,
but lacked the key national institutions found in other Soviet republics.
Ethnic Russians were scattered across the USSR, and tended to perceive
the entire USSR as their homeland. Because of these factors, neither
Russian political leaders nor the public were prepared to view the territory
and the institutions of the new shrunken Russia as a legitimate base for
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CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY IN CHANGING EUROPE 7
the Russian national statehood. Consequently, territorial and institutional
issues have been more vigorously contested in Russia than in the other
former republics of the USSR, which are now independent states
(Brubaker 1994, 1996).
The reconfigured Russia continues the Soviet legacy of decoupling
citizenship and nationality. As demonstrated by Tishkov and Olcott (1999:
64–67), Russia is still a form of ‘institutionalized multiethnicity’. At present,
the Russian Federation consists of 83 autonomous formations (subjects of
the federation), with 21 republics being simultaneously federal units and
proto-nation-states (Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993). Another
problem for Russia lies in the existence of different visions of what Russian
nationhood and citizenship should constitute. Since the collapse of the
USSR, the executive branch has almost simultaneously adhered to three
visions of the Russian nation. According to the civic conception of rossiiane,
Russians constitute a community of citizens, regardless of their ethnic affili-
ation, expressing loyalty to the new political institutions of the Russian
Federation. The linguistic notion brings Russian speakers living in the newly
independent states or the so-called ‘near abroad’ into the realm of the
Russian nation. In the imperialistic ethno-cultural perception, the Russian
nation expands to the borders of the former USSR, but often contains a
Slavic bias, limiting itself to ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians
(Tolz 2001). The official understanding of nationhood is often coloured by
tensions between ethnic and civic meanings of the term, with the ethnic
conception bearing deep historical roots (e.g. nationality inherited by blood
from either parent).
Thus contemporary Russia is haunted by its imperial legacy and the
discrepancy between nation and state, nationality and citizenship. Also,
because of the peculiar position of the RSFSR—its function as the centre of
the USSR—the territorial and institutional parameters of the reconfigured
Russian statehood cause heated disputes. Russia cannot be defined as an
entirely new nation-state akin to the other states established in the aftermath
of the collapse of the Union. It has a long history of statehood, whereas its
national statehood is still emerging.
The comparative choice
A parallel and comparative examination of Finland and Russia is interesting
in several respects. Both countries have encountered serious geopolitical
changes that have put into question the very foundation of their statehood.
Russia experienced the demise of its empire and seeks to find new ways to
maintain national cohesion. Finland has also been affected by the collapse
of the USSR, being its close neighbour and a long-term political and
economic partner. It had to reconsider its position vis-à-vis Russia and the
European political arena. As a result, Finland embarked upon the integra-
tion process with Europe. For Finland, the challenge thus lies in adjusting
its national identity and citizenship to Europe. As Finland and Russia repre-
sent two different state models, they may be expected to react differently to
the emerging challenges.
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In many respects, Russia and Finland could be juxtaposed. For instance,
whereas Finland has an over 100-year history of equating state with the nation,
contemporary Russia, because of its imperial past, has inherited a tradition
of separating state and nation. And, whereas Finland has gradually entered
a process of decoupling nationality and citizenship, Russia is searching for
ways to reconcile the two. Juxtaposition and comparison help to demonstrate
major changes that have taken place in both countries. I apply attributes of
macro-social units in explanatory statements (Ragin 1987). This means that
instead of merely pointing to similarities and differences in citizenship educa-
tion in the examined countries, the study attempts to explain them in terms
of variations between macro elements, such as the perceptions of state, nation,
nationality, and citizenship in the Russian and Finnish political contexts.
Furthermore, it is in the framework of the aforementioned political transfor-
mations that I interpret changes in the objectives of state-led political social-
ization as it is performed by the system of compulsory education.
The data sources of the study
The objectives of education related to the political society and citizenship are
generally referred to as citizenship education and political socialization, and
the terms are treated as synonyms. Given the strong affiliation between citi-
zenship, state, and education, it is to be expected that changes in the notions
of state, citizenship, and nationhood affect the aims of school citizenship
education. Therefore, citizenship education represents an effective medium
to examine changes in the self-perception of states.
The paper is based on decrees, committee reports, programmes, curric-
ulum guidelines, and circulars outlining objectives for the system of educa-
tion in general, and citizenship education, social studies, and history
teaching in compulsory education in particular.6 The period since the end of
the 1980s coincides with major political changes in both Finland and Russia,
consequently affecting the nature of citizenship education in both countries.
I employ textual analysis of Russian and Finnish state-produced educational
policy documents in order to reconstruct the official discourses on citizen-
ship and national identity.
Citizenship and national identity in Finland and Russia
Finland: ‘Kulturnation’ replaces the ‘Staatsnation’
The Basic School Act issued in 1983 stated that, in addition to providing
students with diverse opportunities for personal development and enhanc-
ing skills necessary for society and working life, the choice of profession
and further education, protection of the environment and nature, and
international co-operation and peace, the school should be arranged in the
way that it promotes skills required for the consolidation of national culture
and national values (Finland, Ministry of Education [FME] 1983). The
curriculum guidelines, for their part, stated explicitly that: 
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CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY IN CHANGING EUROPE 9
One of the most important tasks of education is to secure the continuity of the
basic functions of society related to the transmission of culture to the members
of society. (Finland, National Board of Education [FNBE] 1985: 11)
Moreover: 
From the perspective of developing skills important for the national culture
and national values, the aim is to protect and strengthen national identity.
School education aims to guide a student to realize that as an individual he or
she is part of the nationhood united by the common cultural heritage and the
environment of the independent fatherland. (p. 12)
Both the School Act and the curriculum guidelines express firm beliefs in the
existence of universally shared national values that should be protected and
communicated to the young generation. Even though the documents of this
period devoted greater attention to international education expressed in
terms of international solidarity, human rights, peace, and disarmament,
they also stated that these aims are not in conflict with the objective of
nurturing national culture. On the contrary, the appreciation of one’s
national culture is the prerequisite of internationalization (p. 13).7
In 1998 a new Basic Education Act (FME 1998) came into force; the
content, significantly, omitted any reference to promoting national culture
and national identity as a basic function of education. Section 2 of the act,
entitled ‘Objectives of education’, referred to the purpose of education as
growth into humanity and ethically responsible membership in society, and
knowledge and skills necessary in life. In light of these changes, I explore
whether the Finnish state has diminished efforts to preserve the unity of the
nation by means of compulsory education.
Two extensive committee reports published in 1993 may be viewed as
reactions to the changing external and internal conditions in Finland. Both
documents provided a general appraisal of the societal context before
proceeding to the examination of the education system and further recom-
mendations. The National Education Strategy (FME 1993a) portrayed
social changes in terms of the decline of social cohesion and the possibility
of conflicts. It stated that unity is threatened by the national economic crisis
and the widening gap between the rich and the poor, on the one hand, and
the growing cultural diversity of Finnish society, on the other (p. 8). It is due
to these changes that the objectives and contents of education have to be re-
evaluated. The document argued that in the transformed societal context
Finland should understand and appreciate its national traditions and create
new ones, but should also turn into a cultural community with respect for
diversity and vivid international co-operation (p. 2). Moreover, Finland
should free itself from an image of a monocultural country and demolish the
cultural hegemony embedded in institutions (p. 14). Nevertheless, Finnish
culture shall remain the foundation of Finland’s national being, whereas
multiculturalism is accepted as a force necessary for the further development
of society (p. 32).
The arguments and recommendations expressed in the National
Education Strategy affirm that internal and external changes make it impos-
sible to proceed with the national project as before. However, they do not
proclaim the project obsolete. Instead, the authors of the report search for
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10 N. PIATTOEVA
ways to re-emphasize the national element, because of the perceived erosion
of national unity, but also to reconcile it with the rise of cultural diversity and
the growing need for international collaboration. Thus, emphasis on the
national aspect has not disappeared. Even though the usage of the term
‘national’ has decreased, national identity is camouflaged in the language of
culture and cultural identity. At the same time the national is now perceived
with greater flexibility. It is acknowledged that individuals develop their
identities in multiple cultural environments, with the national element as
one among others. This change reflects the multicultural turn in educational
policies, which are now increasingly based on the assumption that societies
are inhabited by numerous different cultures not necessarily adhering to a
common set of national values. Thus, instead of enhancing one national
cultural identity for all, education documents recognize cultural diversity
and individual identity. Identity construction is perceived as a personal
development project comprised of various building blocks instead of one
pre-determined national component.
As a manifestation of this important change, the latest National Core
Curriculum (FNBE 2004) introduced a new interdisciplinary theme entitled
‘Cultural identity and internationalization’, with the aim of helping the
student understand the essence of Finnish and European cultural identity,
find his or her own cultural identity, and develop skills of intercultural
communication and internationalization (pp. 38–39). In the previous core
curriculum (FNBE 1994) it was indicated that cultural distinctiveness and
the ability to act as an interpreter of one’s culture are appreciated in an inter-
nationalizing world. For the majority of students in basic education, Finnish
culture and its close ties with other Nordic countries form the basis of
cultural identity. However, those coming from other cultural backgrounds
are equally entitled to secure membership in their cultural communities and
become active members of the Finnish society (pp. 13–14).
The National Committee Report on Humanities and Social Science
Education (FME 1993b) maintained that European integration has
increased the need to protect cultural diversity in general and the cultural
identities of local communities in particular. It also stated that familiarization
with one’s cultural heritage becomes valuable in a new way. Significantly,
‘culture partially replaces the state as a cohesive force holding the society
together, mother tongue surpasses the fatherland’ (p. 31). This phrase
captures perfectly a significant change. The traditional understanding of the
nation in terms of political sovereignty has been exchanged for a cultural one.
The importance of culture is rising because globalization, European integra-
tion, and migration perforate and weaken national state borders. In addition,
the state is losing its decision-making powers to the transnational actors.
Thus, the very definitions of independence and sovereignty are bound to
change.
In relation to state sovereignty and independence, a textual analysis has
revealed that earlier topics prescribed for grades 1 and 2 in primary school
included fatherland and Independence Day, familiarization with the Finnish
flag and the national hymn, clarification of the notions of independent
nationhood and state, and discussions on the significance of independence
and fatherland (FNBE 1985: 103–105). In the latest curriculum guidelines
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CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY IN CHANGING EUROPE 11
(FNBE 2004) neither state independence nor state symbols nor the
language of the fatherland could be found among the aims and contents of
school subjects. Even though this observation does not automatically mean
that state symbols and the promotion of patriotism have disappeared from
classrooms, it demonstrates that state educational authorities do not find it
necessary to emphasize their place in teaching.
An important survival strategy for a state is continuous promotion of the
practices and discourses of nation and national identity (Paasi 1997: 41).
The Finnish authorities seem to be less concerned with the political sover-
eignty of the nation, but they have increased attention to its cultural vitality.
Since the end of the Cold War, Finland needed to re-define itself interna-
tionally. The process of Europeanization challenged the traditional notions
of sovereignty and called into question the relationship between the state
and the nation. Some researchers who examined changes in the Finnish
national identity since the end of the 1980s have pointed to the ever-stronger
emphasis on culture inflicted by these changes. For instance, Joenniemi
(2002) contends that Finland’s entry into the EU signified a new position
vis-à-vis European integration, and depended on the successful re-definition
of the Finnish nation-state. Joenniemi infers that Finland managed to avoid
major anxieties concerning its integration with the EU because of its effec-
tive re-articulation as Kulturnation. The Herderian non-statist discourse
embraced by the Finnish elites (the Fennomans) prior to Finland’s indepen-
dence and once again since the end of World War II substituted the Hegelian
notion of Staatsnation. By so doing, the integration process was not
perceived as a threat to the independent Finnish nationhood. The ‘cultural
(re)-turn’ permitted Finland to open up and enter international alliances,
thus making it more inclusive in terms of its approach towards Europe and
the world.
Embracing multiple citizenship in Finland
Recent debates about the effect of globalization on the nation-state have
raised questions about the relationship between the state and the nation.
Nationalism and the ideology of the nation-state have traditionally given
preference to national identity and national citizenship. Consequently, the
influence of local identities was demolished and the acquisition of double/
multiple citizenship prevented, lest loyalty conflicts emerge (Urry 1999). It
is argued that globalization interrupts the peaceful alliance between the
nation and the state (Delanty 2000, Sassen 2002). Both citizenship and
nationality diverge, shifting rights, responsibilities, and identities to sub-
national and supra-national levels. As I will demonstrate below, the Finnish
state has recently launched a process of constructing what may be termed a
multiple conception of citizenship.
In 1985, the central objective of school history and social studies in the
curriculum was to clarify national identity (FNBE 1985: 133). Similarly,
biology and geography aimed at developing attachment to the home area,
one’s homeland, and belonging to the Finnish nation (p. 165). However,
already in this period the curriculum referred to global solidarity in the aims
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12 N. PIATTOEVA
of international education. Nevertheless, this objective did not embrace
global identity; instead, the document asserted that a clear cultural identity
is the foundation of independent international collaboration (FNBE 1988:
18). In the document published in 1993 there are references to the European
identity, although it suggested that such a European identity cannot develop
without a sound national identification (FME 1993b: 19). Significantly,
educators from primary to upper-secondary levels were expected to approach
educational content by asking themselves: ‘To what extent does the teaching
content acknowledge national, European and world-wide dimensions, as
they enable the expansion of one’s personal identity?’ (pp. 32–33, 57, 71).
At the same time, the curriculum guidelines published in 1994 recom-
mended strengthening the national identity, while advocating familiarity with
the history of neighbouring areas and Europe—thus signifying ambiguity
about identity matters (FNBE 1994: 95).
In April 2004 the Finnish Council of State adopted the Citizen
Participation Policy Programme for the duration of the cabinet’s term in
office (until spring 2007) with the aim to ‘improve the prerequisites for
citizens’ activities and democracy’ (Finland, Ministry of Justice 2006: 5).
Citizenship education has acquired one of the central places in the
programme. Its first principle asserts that: 
Schools and other educational institutions will promote growth to active and
democratic citizenship in accordance with the principle of lifelong learning.
Alongside Finnish citizenship, EU and world citizenship should also be taken
into consideration in education. (pp. 4–5)
The director of the programme, Seppo Niemelä (2004), discussed the objec-
tives of the project at greater length. He noted that according to the
Maastricht Treaty (1992) nationals of the EU member states became citi-
zens of the EU. In addition, many feel that they are citizens of the world and
simultaneously possess strong local identities. That is why, Niemelä
suggested, there is a need for a new multi-level citizenship, whose nucleus
remains with the national citizenship but is complemented by local, EU, and
world citizenship. Niemelä (2004: 3) asserted that it is necessary to construct
a new national narrative that places Finland in the broader context of global
economy and ecology, and brings it to the realm of the European commu-
nity. These ideas reveal that national citizenship, and in this respect national
identity, are no longer perceived as incompatible with local or transnational
identifications.
The latest curriculum guidelines were issued in 2004, the same year as
the Policy Programme, but they were developed much earlier. Perhaps the
time-lag explains why European and world dimensions are not emphasized
to the extent suggested by the Policy Programme. The curriculum states that
the Finnish culture, which has developed in interplay with indigenous,
Nordic, and European cultures, is the foundation of education (FNBE 2004:
14). In addition, Finnish culture is perceived as increasingly diverse because
of the inflow of immigrants. However, there are no direct references to rais-
ing European or global identities. The multicultural identity referred to in
the document is entirely associated with immigrants and cultural minorities.
Only minority groups are expected to develop multicultural identity and
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CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY IN CHANGING EUROPE 13
bilingualism, which means that they can preserve bonds with their respective
ethnic groups and become incorporated into the national society. Even
though Finnish documents do not embrace European identity to any great
extent, neither do they express any form of Euro-scepticism. Europeanness
as such is not perceived as a threat to the Finnish norms, political structures,
or ways of living.
The Finnish educational documents reveal a minor change in the direc-
tion of multiple citizenship which combines national level with sub-national
and supra-national ones. However, the national still constitutes the core,
with the sub- and supra-national as additional ingredients of the emerging
citizenship recipe.
Russia: strengthening identification with the Russian state
Many educational reforms implemented by the educational authorities of
the new Russia in the beginning of the 1990s were initiated prior to the
collapse of the USSR in the liberating climate of perestroika. The nationaliza-
tion of education, which was expected to transform schools into cultural
institutions reviving and passing on the traditions and languages of local
cultures, was among the main aims of the restructuring. Given that nation-
ality was widely understood as a sub-state category, nationalization of educa-
tion was above all expected to cater to the demands of ethnic groups.
In line with the reform agenda, a ministerial document—adopted in
1990 and entitled ‘On the conception of the national school of the RSFSR
and the scientific and organizational mechanisms of its implementation’—
suggested that the system of compulsory education, which affects the
entire population of the country, should be re-directed at the revival and
satisfaction of people’s national and cultural demands (RSFSR Ministry of
Education 1990). It was declared that schools will turn into real agents of
cultural revival of Russian nations only if restructured as national in the
true meaning of the word, if a national dimension in schooling and
upbringing becomes fundamental (p. 26). The document declared that the
number of hours allocated for teaching native languages should be
increased in vocational schools and in extracurricular activities. It defined
the truly national school as one connecting children and young people to
their ethno-cultural traditions. The aim of the national school was to
educate younger generations to carry on ethnic traditions and possess full
command of their native languages.
The document also paid attention to the position of the Russian culture
and language.8 It stated that an independent sub-programme for the Russian
national school is required (ethnic Russians constituted 81.5% of the popu-
lation of the republic). The development of such a school was seen as impor-
tant as a stimulus for the national and cultural development of all nations of
Russia; Russian culture was perceived as the means of connecting these
nations to modern, worldwide developments. In addition, Russian culture
and languages are seen as important because all higher education institu-
tions function in Russian, and Russian is the only means of mutual commu-
nication for the non-Russian intelligentsia (p. 28).
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14 N. PIATTOEVA
This document clearly reflected the central Soviet assumption that
nations are ethnic and primordial, and reproduced the idea that Russian
language and culture hold the multinational country together. Russian was
seen as the prerequisite for intercultural communication and educational
opportunities, constituting a bridge connecting the under-developed
nations to the developed world. Significantly non-Russian nationalities
were not expected to identify with Russia and the Russian nation per se.
Their primary identity, further solidified by means of national school, lay
with the sub-state ethnicity. Ethnic groups were increasingly viewed as
victims of the Soviet regime. In order to dissociate from the Soviet system,
which allowed for some non-Russian schooling under the strict control of
the Communist Party, all ethnic groups were encouraged to establish
national schools on the basis of local needs and traditions. The neglect of
the state-wide identity was thus, on the one hand, a manifestation of the
persistence of the Soviet conception of nationality—viewing distinct, ethnic
and primordial nations as the constituents of the state—and, on the other
hand, a policy to break with the past—aiming to abolish the Soviet nation-
alities hierarchy and to ensure country-wide support for the political leaders
in charge of reforms. In addition, the Soviet formula ‘national in form,
socialist in content’ was replaced by the ‘national in form and content’
ideology, as educational authorities allowed the teaching of national history
and literature, especially with the advent of decentralization and differentia-
tion as the central goals of the reform agenda in education since the begin-
ning of the 1990s.9
The absence of a unifying national ideology was complemented by
emphasis on universal human values. Universal human values, though never
defined, were to replace the highly ideology-driven educational content of
the Soviet school. It was commonly believed that they offered a ‘neutral’ and
‘objective’ substitute to the centralized communist-driven curriculum. The
document entitled ‘On democratization of upbringing work of comprehen-
sive educational institutions of the RSFSR’ (RSFSR Ministry of Education
1991: 90) stated that the upbringing of children and young people is based
on universal human values and friendship among nations. Later, the Law on
Education (1992)—the first legislative act of the new sovereign Russian
Federation—echoed these objectives. The act declared the humanistic char-
acter and the priority of universal human values as the first principles of the
state policy in education (Article 2). It also confirmed the right to receive
comprehensive education in other than the Russian language (Article 6,
para. 2).
Nevertheless it would be inaccurate to suggest that the principles of unity
and state integrity were altogether absent from the political discourse of the
period. On the contrary, as the then Minister of Education Eduard Dneprov
(1990–1992; Dneprov 1998: 48) argued, inter-ethnic tensions and disinte-
gration could be prevented with the help of national schools during periods
of political struggle and uncertainty. In other words, the idea of national
schools and the nationalization of education was in a sense a political
manoeuvre addressing the threat of state disintegration.
I contend that the ideas encouraging sub-state ethnic identities on the
one hand, and universal human values on the other, have had to make space
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CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY IN CHANGING EUROPE 15
for a state-wide ideology of patriotism. This transformation is manifested in
three major findings of the analysis of Russian educational documents.
First, Russian state authorities have revived interest in upbringing (vospita-
niie), which used to constitute an integral part of the Soviet school and
could be translated as character, moral, and political education. Secondly,
since the official adoption of the Russian state symbols by the Russian
parliament (2001), the Ministry of Education has issued several recommen-
dations on teaching about the Russian flag, the national anthem, and the
coat of arms. Finally, and most importantly, since the end of the 1990s the
state has adopted two federal programmes of patriotic education and two
programmes emphasizing the importance of the Russian language. These
documents aim at building state cohesion and identification with Russia. In
the Russian language programmes the motivation is not only premised on
the necessity of cultural revival and the role of the Russian language as
lingua franca, akin to the ideas of the end of the 1980s and the beginning of
the 1990s, the Russian language is perceived as an indispensable compo-
nent of Russian statehood.
The first signs of change in the direction of citizenship education that
stresses loyalty and national cohesion are evident in the growing emphasis
on upbringing as the central responsibility of the state. In 1999 the Ministry
of Education adopted ‘The upbringing development programme for 1999–
2001,’ followed by another programme for 2002–2004 (Russia, Ministry of
Education [RME] 1999, 2002a). Both programmes focus on the social,
ethnic, cultural, generational, and political re-consolidation of the Russian
people. According to the documents, citizenship and patriotic upbringing lie
at the centre of state educational policies. In fact, the documents aim to
persuade the reader that the state should resume it’s primary role in defining
and implementing the upbringing of the younger generation. The earlier
programme, revealing a growing suspicion toward ethnic elements in educa-
tion, stated that: 
the ethnic factor has acquired considerable position in the societal development.
On the one hand, it reveals the socializing potential of ethnic environment. But
on the other hand, it also gives rise to ethnic tensions. (RME 1999: 3)
In 2001, after the Russian parliament agreed on the new state symbols,
the Ministry of Education issued circulars on the teaching of state symbols
in schools.10 The objectives and measures proposed in the documents are
expected to guarantee generational continuity and to ensure societal unity.
In a symbolic manner the circular distributed in 2001 recommended that
when the Russian flag is used together with regional or other flags, the state
flag should be positioned on the left side of other flags or, in the case of an
odd number, in the middle. In addition, the sizes of other flags cannot
exceed the size of the Russian flag (RME 2001). National iconography—the
visual image of the nation—is an important element of any national ideology.
Its role is to concretize the abstract notion of the nation and to promote
emotional attachment to it. Thus, by dictating how the space of the school
should be organized, and by locating the Russian flag at the centre of the
school’s physical environment, the Russian state aspires to establish the
supremacy of, and loyalty to, the common Russian nationhood.
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16 N. PIATTOEVA
In 2003 the Ministry of Education established a Co-ordinating Council
on the patriotic upbringing of young people. The work of the Council is
directly related to the ‘State programme of patriotic upbringing’ (Russia
2001). This programme and ‘The concept of patriotic education’ (RME
2003) focus on the development of love and devotion to the ‘Motherland’
Russia. It is stated that patriotism originates from love toward the ‘minor
Motherland’ and matures up to the point of state patriotic consciousness
and love toward the ‘Fatherland’ (p. 3). In this context ‘Motherland’ consti-
tutes a sub-state territory, whereas the state is described in the paternalistic
language of the ‘Fatherland’. Russian patriotism, as an expression of
national identity, should occupy a superior position in comparison to the
sub-state identifications.
Patriotism is defined as love and loyalty to one’s homeland, a determi-
nation to serve its interests, as well as a readiness to protect the Fatherland
up to the point of self-sacrifice. Patriotic upbringing is described as a system-
atic activity of state authorities and other organizations aiming at the devel-
opment of patriotic consciousness, a sense of loyalty to the Fatherland, a
willingness to fulfil one’s civic duty, and constitutional responsibilities to
defend the interests of the homeland (Russia 2001). Patriotism should also
become the main quality of each individual, as well as the entire Russian
society (RME 2003). In fact, the latest ‘Programme of patriotic upbringing’,
adopted in the summer of 2005, states that the aim is to develop patriotism
into the core spiritual component of Russia (Russia 2005a: 4).
The ‘Concept of patriotic upbringing’ elaborates on the personal mean-
ing of patriotism: ‘On the personal level patriotism represents the main
secure feature of the human being, which is expressed in his or her world-
view, moral ideals and norms of behaviour’ (RME 2003: 2). In addition, it
is argued that the priority of the social and the statist does not embody a limi-
tation. On the contrary, their primacy is the prerequisite and the stimulus of
individual freedom (pp. 3–4). The nature of these claims resembles general
nationalistic rhetoric. It is often argued by nationalists that only through the
nation people can find true freedom and lead meaningful lives (Kymlicka
and Straehle 1999).
Another important aspect of the programme is its strong connection to
the army and conscription. The militaristic nature of state patriotism is
apparent in the key role played by the Ministry of Defence in drafting and
lobbying the project, as well as in the concrete measures of patriotic educa-
tion recommended to schools. These include ‘lessons of courage’, which
involve participation of war veterans in school discussions, immortalization
of soldiers who died defending the Fatherland, and essays and other
student work that should help to (re)-discover Russia’s heroic past. Even
though the programme was arguably intended to raise prestige of the
Russian army, there is another important reason why ‘soldier’ constitutes
the central subject of the document. Putin (2006), in his address to the
Federal Assembly, announced the following: the ‘army is part of us, our
society. Service in the army is very necessary for our country and for the
Russian people’. Putin also quoted a famous Russian thinker Ivan Il’in
(1883–1954) that the soldier represents the national unity, state will,
power, and honour of Russia. Thus, the army and the soldier symbolize
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Russia’s unity. The discourse of national security, apparent in the docu-
ments on patriotic upbringing, justifies the necessity of national unity and
sacrifice to the state. Metaphorically speaking, ‘soldier’ symbolizes the ideal
Russian citizen, with loyalty, duty, and self-sacrifice to the state as the
primary citizen virtues.
The arguments of national consolidation also legitimize the federal
programme ‘Russian language 2006–2010’ (Russia 2005b), whose aim is to
improve command of the Russian language among the Russian population,
immigrants in Russia, Russians and non-Russians living in the former Soviet
republics, and the Russian diaspora abroad.11 The dissemination of the
Russian language is perceived as an important means of consolidating
Russian society and ensuring state integrity and national security of Russia
(pp. 8–9). Even though state consolidation seems to be the primary objective
of the programme, the document also reveals tensions in defining who
belongs to the Russian nation.12 Because the programme incorporates
Russians and non-Russians residing abroad, it adheres to both ethnic and
cultural definitions of Russianness which surpass the present borders of the
Russian state.
While listing the unwanted consequences of poor command of the
Russian language, the document warns against the weakening of the national
identity of the Russian citizens and low patriotism of younger generations,
as well as against ethnic separation among the Russian population and those
in the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia
2005b: 12–13). Thus, the role of the Russian language is perceived in two
ways. Continuing the lingua franca intentions of the Soviet system, it consti-
tutes a unifying factor among Russians and non-Russian in Russia and
abroad. At the same time, Russian language has become more strongly
linked to Russian statehood, and is expected to foster identification with and
loyalty to Russia.
By elevating nationality to the state-wide level, the Russian state
attempts to strengthen the connection between nationality and citizenship
and simultaneously limit the scope of citizenship. In other words, Russian
authorities are searching for ways to break from the Soviet legacy of decou-
pling nationality and citizenship and bring the state and the nation into a
closer alliance. It must be emphasized that, apart from references to the
universal human values, there are no mentions of European or global iden-
tities akin to those found in the Finnish documents. Thus, for Russia, the
primary concern lies with adjusting the balance between sub-state and state-
wide identifications.
Conclusion
This analysis of documents from Finland and Russia has demonstrated that
geopolitical transformations lead to the revision of the socialization task of
school—as state authorities adjust their national identities, and the relation-
ship between nationality and citizenship, to the new socio-political contexts.
However, political contexts and historical legacies greatly influence how
nation-states adapt to the new ‘reality’.
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18 N. PIATTOEVA
Finland is both forsaking the strong link between the state and the
nation, and returning to the pre-independence cultural conception of the
nation. These changes allow Finland to move in the direction of a multi-level
conception of citizenship. Nevertheless, for Finland, national citizenship
remains the nucleus of other citizenship and identity layers. The new narra-
tives of Finland-in-Europe do not make the notion of Finnishness
completely redundant. The transformation into a Kulturnation is only a
necessary step to secure Finland’s national being under the supranational
umbrella of the EU, which arguably weakens the sovereignty of the nation-
state. Finland seems to be strengthening its cultural identity in peaceful
alliance with Europeanness.
In Russia, the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent redefinition of
the country’s borders, national composition, and state institutions led to
the transformation of the relationship between nationality and citizenship.
Russia seeks to attach citizenship to the state-wide national space by
encouraging state patriotism and strengthening the position of the Russian
language. In this way contemporary Russia dissociates itself from the impe-
rial legacy of the USSR and moves towards state nationalism, integrating
the nation and the state. In contrast to the recent developments in Finland,
the discourses of state integrity and national unity have become more
prominent.
Is the binary conception of Finland and Russia justified? Are educators
witnessing a true divide in Europe, with some countries abandoning the
traditional notions of citizenship and nationality and others urgently seeking
to re-establish the glory of the nation-state? On the basis of the analysis of
Finland and Russia such a conclusion is clearly premature. Both countries
attach strong value to national identity and citizenship. Even Finland, often
called the best student of the EU and a pioneer of post-modern information
and communication technology, emphasizes its national identity and adjusts
it to the changing political scenery.
Notes
1. I thank anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to the fact that tension between
the forces of nation-building and globalization undoubtedly exists within every state.
Thus, it is empirically impossible to divide states into two categories. However, states that
have recently undergone considerable transformations of borders, national composition,
and political regime are arguably keener to revive and hold on to the traditional role of
the nation-state than the so-called stable or old states. New states can hardly escape the
effects of globalization, but they often prioritize nation-building. On the tension between
nation-building and globalization in Ukrainian and Russian citizenship education, see
Janmaat and Piattoeva (2007).
2. See e.g. Anderson (2003) and Breully (1993).
3. The Finnish word kansa could be translated as nation, people, or rabble. Citizenship is
translated as kansalaisuus, nationality as kansallisuus, and nationhood as kansakunta.
4. Snellman drew from the writings of Hegel on Geist. However, he deviated from the orig-
inal in linking the Spirit to the national being (Oittinen 2006: 14–15). Snellman empha-
sized the cultural aspect of nationhood as he argued that the history and essence of
nations are culturally determined (Pulkkinen 1999: 128, Oittinen 2006: 17fn5). In this
respect, Snellman’s ideas come close to the philosophy of Herder. Interpreting the
notion of Geist, Snellman argued that every nation, including Finns, has its own spirit or
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mentality, which is manifested in common values, beliefs, and traditions. The spirit of
the nation could only be rightfully expressed in the national language.
5. That is, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, the territorial predecessor of the
modern Russian Federation.
6. The documents were collected through library and on-line searches in 2003–2006. The
time span for the Russian documents is 1990–2005 and the Finnish documents 1983–
2006. In the Finnish case, the Basic School Act (1983) and the National Curriculum
Guidelines (1985) were taken into consideration because they determined educational
objectives into the 1990s. All documents analysed were adopted and disseminated by
state authorities and thus reflect the intentions of the state regarding education and citi-
zenship. Documents in Finnish and Russian have been translated by the author.
7. The same idea is expressed in the guide for international education published in 1988
(FNBE 1988).
8. The Russian adjectives russkii and rossiskii can only be rendered with the English word
‘Russian’. This translation overlooks an important difference in connotation: russkii
refers exclusively to Russian ethnicity, whereas rossiskii is a civic term related to the state-
wide level. I bore this important nuance in mind while examining and interpreting
Russian educational documents.
9. A comprehensive analysis of the post-Soviet educational reforms is offered by Webber
(2000).
10. These circulars are entitled ‘On official rituals related to the use of the state symbols in
comprehensive schools’ (RME 2001) and ‘About the organization of upbringing activi-
ties aimed at familiarization with and popularization of the history and meaning of official
state symbols of the Russian Federation’ (RME 2002b).
11. An earlier programme was valid during 2002–2005.
12. This confusion also proves that Russia is uncertain about its place in the world. See also
Maier (2005).
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